Narrative:

The ATC clearance was received, with all 3 pilots listening because of the frequent difficulty in communicating reliably with ATC in south america, about 10 mins before engine start and taxi out. I recall reading back the clearance in full, repeating it at least twice for confirmation, and having to repeat the departure control frequency (129.35) 5 times before the ATC clearance deliverer distinctly spoke the correct frequency. He initially gave 118.3, according to my ears, and seemed unable to understand english, except for the word 'frequency.' he finally gave the correct ground control tower and departure frequency after his fifth try. The so still believed he heard 119.20, or some other erroneous frequency, but confirmation with the frequencys on the approach chart confirmed 129.35 was a good frequency if the other wasn't. Thank god for the correct frequency, at least, for the departure procedure given was the wrong one. On taxi out, the controller gave us a wrong, but plausible, tower frequency once (118.0 versus 118.2), but by monitoring the frequency we sorted that out. (Before takeoff, in retrospect, the captain told me he had an uneasy feeling about the departure, but due to dropping his charts, time, etc, did not reconfirm it as he had planned.) the departure controller was excellent, and conversed in good, usable english. Having commenced the 'porto 2' departure procedure (a right turn after takeoff), this controller, before we had finished 90 degrees of right turn, pointedly directed us to turn left and execute the 'merica 4' departure procedure. The captain wisely requested immediate vectoring, and received it, for these departure procedures were complex and quite different, and time was of the essence with terrain hazards in all quadrants. Needless to say, I kept takeoff power and maximum climb performance confign until the minimum safe sector altitude (MSA) was reached, and all ended well. But for an alert and competent departure controller, things could have been much worse. In south america, poor communication in english is so common, that united states pilots almost become jaded and compromised with the situation. The sloppy, imprecise, and inaccurate clrncs received are so common that I can understand somewhat how air carrier X went down the primrose path.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LANGUAGE BARRIER PROBS IN SOUTH AMERICAN OPS, SPECIFICALLY IN RIO DE JANEIRO. ACR FLT GIVEN WRONG SID DEP. CLRNC DEL CTLR VERY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. PROFICIENCY IN DOUBT ATC. ATCT CLRNC DELIVERY CTLR QUALIFICATION IN DOUBT.

Narrative: THE ATC CLRNC WAS RECEIVED, WITH ALL 3 PLTS LISTENING BECAUSE OF THE FREQUENT DIFFICULTY IN COMMUNICATING RELIABLY WITH ATC IN SOUTH AMERICA, ABOUT 10 MINS BEFORE ENG START AND TAXI OUT. I RECALL READING BACK THE CLRNC IN FULL, REPEATING IT AT LEAST TWICE FOR CONFIRMATION, AND HAVING TO REPEAT THE DEP CTL FREQ (129.35) 5 TIMES BEFORE THE ATC CLRNC DELIVERER DISTINCTLY SPOKE THE CORRECT FREQ. HE INITIALLY GAVE 118.3, ACCORDING TO MY EARS, AND SEEMED UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND ENGLISH, EXCEPT FOR THE WORD 'FREQ.' HE FINALLY GAVE THE CORRECT GND CTL TWR AND DEP FREQ AFTER HIS FIFTH TRY. THE SO STILL BELIEVED HE HEARD 119.20, OR SOME OTHER ERRONEOUS FREQ, BUT CONFIRMATION WITH THE FREQS ON THE APCH CHART CONFIRMED 129.35 WAS A GOOD FREQ IF THE OTHER WASN'T. THANK GOD FOR THE CORRECT FREQ, AT LEAST, FOR THE DEP PROC GIVEN WAS THE WRONG ONE. ON TAXI OUT, THE CTLR GAVE US A WRONG, BUT PLAUSIBLE, TWR FREQ ONCE (118.0 VERSUS 118.2), BUT BY MONITORING THE FREQ WE SORTED THAT OUT. (BEFORE TKOF, IN RETROSPECT, THE CAPT TOLD ME HE HAD AN UNEASY FEELING ABOUT THE DEP, BUT DUE TO DROPPING HIS CHARTS, TIME, ETC, DID NOT RECONFIRM IT AS HE HAD PLANNED.) THE DEP CTLR WAS EXCELLENT, AND CONVERSED IN GOOD, USABLE ENGLISH. HAVING COMMENCED THE 'PORTO 2' DEP PROC (A R TURN AFTER TKOF), THIS CTLR, BEFORE WE HAD FINISHED 90 DEGS OF R TURN, POINTEDLY DIRECTED US TO TURN L AND EXECUTE THE 'MERICA 4' DEP PROC. THE CAPT WISELY REQUESTED IMMEDIATE VECTORING, AND RECEIVED IT, FOR THESE DEP PROCS WERE COMPLEX AND QUITE DIFFERENT, AND TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE WITH TERRAIN HAZARDS IN ALL QUADRANTS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I KEPT TKOF PWR AND MAX CLB PERFORMANCE CONFIGN UNTIL THE MINIMUM SAFE SECTOR ALT (MSA) WAS REACHED, AND ALL ENDED WELL. BUT FOR AN ALERT AND COMPETENT DEP CTLR, THINGS COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE. IN SOUTH AMERICA, POOR COM IN ENGLISH IS SO COMMON, THAT UNITED STATES PLTS ALMOST BECOME JADED AND COMPROMISED WITH THE SIT. THE SLOPPY, IMPRECISE, AND INACCURATE CLRNCS RECEIVED ARE SO COMMON THAT I CAN UNDERSTAND SOMEWHAT HOW ACR X WENT DOWN THE PRIMROSE PATH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.