The reporter as first officer is astounded by the captain's philosophy regarding ignoring the checklist. During the reported incident the captain took off with the stall warning switches and igniters off.

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Attributes
ACN	325961
Time
Date	199601
Day	Wed
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	airport : bct
State Reference	FL
Altitude	agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Dusk
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : ewr
Operator	general aviation : corporate
Make Model Name	Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 91
Flight Phase	climbout : takeoff
Flight Plan	VFR
Person 1
Affiliation	Other
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : atp pilot : cfi
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 90 flight time total : 11000 flight time type : 300
ASRS Report	325961
Person 2
Affiliation	Other
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : far other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : unable
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation other

Narrative:

We flew the boss to bct, dropped him off and started for departure to lal. Captain started and taxied to runway, I was programming GNS and GPS and getting clearance. He came to runway end. I was on radio. He just said 'let's go' and we took off. On takeoff roll I noted stall switches were off as well as igniters. After V1 I turned stalls on and told him about igniters. Factors affecting human performance is plain and simple no use of checklist! This captain always says checklists are 'in his head.' the fallacy was proven by this incident. I try to go over checklists myself but many times he just goes anyway. His idea is 'everything is done on my side' so you have no 'call and response' to items. This opens you up for disaster and is very unprofessional. It is even worse when the boss is on board. It seems it becomes a race to get airborne. I see this happen all the time on accident reports and I can't believe this captain operates this way.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE RPTR AS FO IS ASTOUNDED BY THE CAPT'S PHILOSOPHY REGARDING IGNORING THE CHKLIST. DURING THE RPTED INCIDENT THE CAPT TOOK OFF WITH THE STALL WARNING SWITCHES AND IGNITERS OFF.

Narrative: WE FLEW THE BOSS TO BCT, DROPPED HIM OFF AND STARTED FOR DEP TO LAL. CAPT STARTED AND TAXIED TO RWY, I WAS PROGRAMMING GNS AND GPS AND GETTING CLRNC. HE CAME TO RWY END. I WAS ON RADIO. HE JUST SAID 'LET'S GO' AND WE TOOK OFF. ON TKOF ROLL I NOTED STALL SWITCHES WERE OFF AS WELL AS IGNITERS. AFTER V1 I TURNED STALLS ON AND TOLD HIM ABOUT IGNITERS. FACTORS AFFECTING HUMAN PERFORMANCE IS PLAIN AND SIMPLE NO USE OF CHKLIST! THIS CAPT ALWAYS SAYS CHKLISTS ARE 'IN HIS HEAD.' THE FALLACY WAS PROVEN BY THIS INCIDENT. I TRY TO GO OVER CHKLISTS MYSELF BUT MANY TIMES HE JUST GOES ANYWAY. HIS IDEA IS 'EVERYTHING IS DONE ON MY SIDE' SO YOU HAVE NO 'CALL AND RESPONSE' TO ITEMS. THIS OPENS YOU UP FOR DISASTER AND IS VERY UNPROFESSIONAL. IT IS EVEN WORSE WHEN THE BOSS IS ON BOARD. IT SEEMS IT BECOMES A RACE TO GET AIRBORNE. I SEE THIS HAPPEN ALL THE TIME ON ACCIDENT RPTS AND I CAN'T BELIEVE THIS CAPT OPERATES THIS WAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.