Narrative:

Normal departure from sdf, normal cruise and descent. Radar vectors to downwind and base leg at den for runway 17R. Local controller asked several times if we had the field. Traffic was very light and I felt like he was trying to get rid of us, so to speak. This was my first trip to denver in 3 or more yrs and the first time into the new denver airport. I had the field, or rather I could see runway 17L, but runway 17R was hard to make out because of the low light conditions. I called the field and was cleared for the visual for runway 17R. I was tuned and idented for runway 17R, so I turned to set up an approximately 30 degree intercept to the localizer and continued to try to visually locate runway 17R. When cleared to intercept the localizer I was approximately 2500-3000 ft AGL, but began a slight descent as we flew toward the airport. It did not take me long to locate runway 17R and at the same time recognize that I was farther from the threshold than I originally had thought. I had a clear visual picture of the terrain and the airport at this time and was 1200-1500 ft AGL, even though I was several mi farther out on final than I had first estimated. I saw no reason to climb back to the GS, so I just continued in level flight until I intercepted the PAPI for runway 17R. Shortly after arresting my sink rate, approach called an altitude alert for our flight, which we acknowledged. We continued to an uneventful landing, rolled to the end, turned off the runway and taxied to parking. Human performance factors: I think my perceptions were not as good as they could have been due to low light conditions close to sunset with an overcast sky cutting the available light even more. The runway lights were not on at the time, and looking back I should have asked that they be turned on as I was looking for the field/runways. Even though the other crew members had not been into the new airport, and it was our first flight together, CRM was good. In this case my judgement was not as good as it should have been with respect to situational awareness and altitude awareness, AGL. Another factor to consider is that I had only 45 hours as captain in the aircraft at the time of this incident. I have a policy of, and had briefed the crew in the approach briefing, not to accept a visual approach unless we were darn sure that we had the correct runway in sight. I feel this is the safest thing to do when approaching any airport that I am not familiar with. I reluctantly accepted this visual, and broke my own rule. Dumb!!!! The bottom line is that I need to have better situational awareness at all times and follow the rules I have made for myself during 20 plus yrs of flying.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT DSNDED TOO LOW ON VISUAL APCH AND SET OFF LOW ALT ALERT. APCH CTLR CALLED ACFT WITH LOW ALT ALERT.

Narrative: NORMAL DEP FROM SDF, NORMAL CRUISE AND DSCNT. RADAR VECTORS TO DOWNWIND AND BASE LEG AT DEN FOR RWY 17R. LCL CTLR ASKED SEVERAL TIMES IF WE HAD THE FIELD. TFC WAS VERY LIGHT AND I FELT LIKE HE WAS TRYING TO GET RID OF US, SO TO SPEAK. THIS WAS MY FIRST TRIP TO DENVER IN 3 OR MORE YRS AND THE FIRST TIME INTO THE NEW DENVER ARPT. I HAD THE FIELD, OR RATHER I COULD SEE RWY 17L, BUT RWY 17R WAS HARD TO MAKE OUT BECAUSE OF THE LOW LIGHT CONDITIONS. I CALLED THE FIELD AND WAS CLRED FOR THE VISUAL FOR RWY 17R. I WAS TUNED AND IDENTED FOR RWY 17R, SO I TURNED TO SET UP AN APPROX 30 DEG INTERCEPT TO THE LOC AND CONTINUED TO TRY TO VISUALLY LOCATE RWY 17R. WHEN CLRED TO INTERCEPT THE LOC I WAS APPROX 2500-3000 FT AGL, BUT BEGAN A SLIGHT DSCNT AS WE FLEW TOWARD THE ARPT. IT DID NOT TAKE ME LONG TO LOCATE RWY 17R AND AT THE SAME TIME RECOGNIZE THAT I WAS FARTHER FROM THE THRESHOLD THAN I ORIGINALLY HAD THOUGHT. I HAD A CLR VISUAL PICTURE OF THE TERRAIN AND THE ARPT AT THIS TIME AND WAS 1200-1500 FT AGL, EVEN THOUGH I WAS SEVERAL MI FARTHER OUT ON FINAL THAN I HAD FIRST ESTIMATED. I SAW NO REASON TO CLB BACK TO THE GS, SO I JUST CONTINUED IN LEVEL FLT UNTIL I INTERCEPTED THE PAPI FOR RWY 17R. SHORTLY AFTER ARRESTING MY SINK RATE, APCH CALLED AN ALT ALERT FOR OUR FLT, WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED. WE CONTINUED TO AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG, ROLLED TO THE END, TURNED OFF THE RWY AND TAXIED TO PARKING. HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACTORS: I THINK MY PERCEPTIONS WERE NOT AS GOOD AS THEY COULD HAVE BEEN DUE TO LOW LIGHT CONDITIONS CLOSE TO SUNSET WITH AN OVCST SKY CUTTING THE AVAILABLE LIGHT EVEN MORE. THE RWY LIGHTS WERE NOT ON AT THE TIME, AND LOOKING BACK I SHOULD HAVE ASKED THAT THEY BE TURNED ON AS I WAS LOOKING FOR THE FIELD/RWYS. EVEN THOUGH THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS HAD NOT BEEN INTO THE NEW ARPT, AND IT WAS OUR FIRST FLT TOGETHER, CRM WAS GOOD. IN THIS CASE MY JUDGEMENT WAS NOT AS GOOD AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN WITH RESPECT TO SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND ALT AWARENESS, AGL. ANOTHER FACTOR TO CONSIDER IS THAT I HAD ONLY 45 HRS AS CAPT IN THE ACFT AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT. I HAVE A POLICY OF, AND HAD BRIEFED THE CREW IN THE APCH BRIEFING, NOT TO ACCEPT A VISUAL APCH UNLESS WE WERE DARN SURE THAT WE HAD THE CORRECT RWY IN SIGHT. I FEEL THIS IS THE SAFEST THING TO DO WHEN APCHING ANY ARPT THAT I AM NOT FAMILIAR WITH. I RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED THIS VISUAL, AND BROKE MY OWN RULE. DUMB!!!! THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT I NEED TO HAVE BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AT ALL TIMES AND FOLLOW THE RULES I HAVE MADE FOR MYSELF DURING 20 PLUS YRS OF FLYING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.