Narrative:

Upon application of power for takeoff the EPR's were checked at 1.4 for confirmation of the surge bleed valves closing on all 3 engines. The valves closed normally. Power was then advanced for takeoff. Normal acceleration occurred up to V1, and vr. At vr the call for 'rotate' was given and at that time the aircraft was rotated, although the aircraft would not fly. This continued until the captain said to leave nose on ground until speed increase slightly and then rotate 3 degrees so as to allow the aircraft to fly when able. This takeoff was not a standard takeoff due to (what we the flight crew members believe) excessive baggage (weight) loaded in cargo compartment without our knowledge and ultimately rendering our takeoff calculation unusable. We utilized all of the remaining runway beyond vr in order to get this aircraft airborne. Any such action regarding an abort beyond V1 would have been disastrous. The captain's invaluable experience on the B727 and guidance regarding the first officer's flying the aircraft proved to be the only ingredient which prevented any mishap. Again, the use of runway 22R's full length for takeoff was the ground crew's inaccurate handling and accounting of weight they loaded onto this aircraft. We the crew received inaccurate weight counts which could have resulted in a disaster.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN LGT EXTENDED THE TKOF DISTANCE WHEN IT WAS DETERMINED ON THE TKOF ROLL THE ACFT WOULD NOT FLY AT THE SPDS CALCULATED BY THE WT AND BAL NUMBERS PROVIDED.

Narrative: UPON APPLICATION OF PWR FOR TKOF THE EPR'S WERE CHKED AT 1.4 FOR CONFIRMATION OF THE SURGE BLEED VALVES CLOSING ON ALL 3 ENGS. THE VALVES CLOSED NORMALLY. PWR WAS THEN ADVANCED FOR TKOF. NORMAL ACCELERATION OCCURRED UP TO V1, AND VR. AT VR THE CALL FOR 'ROTATE' WAS GIVEN AND AT THAT TIME THE ACFT WAS ROTATED, ALTHOUGH THE ACFT WOULD NOT FLY. THIS CONTINUED UNTIL THE CAPT SAID TO LEAVE NOSE ON GND UNTIL SPD INCREASE SLIGHTLY AND THEN ROTATE 3 DEGS SO AS TO ALLOW THE ACFT TO FLY WHEN ABLE. THIS TKOF WAS NOT A STANDARD TKOF DUE TO (WHAT WE THE FLC MEMBERS BELIEVE) EXCESSIVE BAGGAGE (WT) LOADED IN CARGO COMPARTMENT WITHOUT OUR KNOWLEDGE AND ULTIMATELY RENDERING OUR TKOF CALCULATION UNUSABLE. WE UTILIZED ALL OF THE REMAINING RWY BEYOND VR IN ORDER TO GET THIS ACFT AIRBORNE. ANY SUCH ACTION REGARDING AN ABORT BEYOND V1 WOULD HAVE BEEN DISASTROUS. THE CAPT'S INVALUABLE EXPERIENCE ON THE B727 AND GUIDANCE REGARDING THE FO'S FLYING THE ACFT PROVED TO BE THE ONLY INGREDIENT WHICH PREVENTED ANY MISHAP. AGAIN, THE USE OF RWY 22R'S FULL LENGTH FOR TKOF WAS THE GND CREW'S INACCURATE HANDLING AND ACCOUNTING OF WT THEY LOADED ONTO THIS ACFT. WE THE CREW RECEIVED INACCURATE WT COUNTS WHICH COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A DISASTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.