Narrative:

Flight ab, of which I was PIC, was being vectored by msp approach for an expected visual to runway 29L at msp. The controller vectored us onto a descending left downwind for runway 29L which continued some 12-13 mi beyond the airport. We were then turned by approach (left turn) to a heading of 040 degrees at 4000 ft MSL, as our left base. While flying base, the controller told us to contact msp tower, without clearing us for either the visual or ILS for runway 29L. We therefore maintained our assigned heading and altitude. 3 attempts by the first officer to contact the tower were unsuccessful. I then took the radio and asked tower if ab was cleared to join the runway 29L localizer. After a brief pause, the tower answered yes. Almost immediately tower ordered us to turn left heading 270 degrees to avoid traffic at our 1 O'clock (an air carrier jetstream, I believe) which was established on final for runway 29R. After completing our turn to 270 degrees, the tower cleared us for the visual to runway 29L, and the landing proceeded uneventfully thereafter. Upon calling the approach control supervisor, I learned that a trainee controller had been assigned to duty on that scope. The trainee suggested that he did not tell us to contact tower on base. Our crew believes he did. A review of the audio tapes will settle that matter. Nonetheless, we as a crew, might have done some things differently to prevent such a close midair encounter. This was my very first day as captain. I had briefed the crew to this fact, and requested their best efforts to assist me. They did as much, but none of us saw the conflicting traffic until we were advised by tower. My attention was focused on my heading, altitude, airspeed, the lack of tower response on radio, and on the runway itself, which was about to slide behind us if we weren't cleared for an approach. All of us should have paid more attention to possible conflicts approaching from our right, especially because we were aware of simultaneous approachs occurring on runway 29R. In focusing on our attempts to maintain precise and proper procedures, we neglected to see and avoid! Postscript: on the morning of dec/xx/95, I consulted with ATC quality assurance in msp. I was informed that a review of ATC audio tapes shows that when an air carrier X flight was switched to msp tower, we answered, and apparently switched to tower frequency prematurely. This then led to the delay in tower's response to our calls. This information serves to point out the need for strict radio vigilance, especially during periods of high cockpit workloads (eg, takeoff, approach, and landing). All three of us would have sworn that we were passed to tower. I believe this is the result of our expecting to be passed to tower during the base leg to runway 29L. In fact the routine nature of the flight up to that point, and good WX prevailing at msp, may have contributed to a false sense of normalcy, and helped lull the crew into a false sense of security. Once again, a focus on the basic principles of 'see and avoid,' and the maintenance of strict radio vigilance would have served to prevent both this, and future occurrences of this nature.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MISCOM BTWN ATC APCH CTLR AND FLC ON APCH CLRNC. FLC DIDN'T SEE OTHER ACFT ON FINAL APCH UNTIL TWR ALERTED THEM TO IT AND GAVE VECTORS TO BRING ACFT BACK TO THE APPROPRIATE RWY.

Narrative: FLT AB, OF WHICH I WAS PIC, WAS BEING VECTORED BY MSP APCH FOR AN EXPECTED VISUAL TO RWY 29L AT MSP. THE CTLR VECTORED US ONTO A DSNDING L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 29L WHICH CONTINUED SOME 12-13 MI BEYOND THE ARPT. WE WERE THEN TURNED BY APCH (L TURN) TO A HDG OF 040 DEGS AT 4000 FT MSL, AS OUR L BASE. WHILE FLYING BASE, THE CTLR TOLD US TO CONTACT MSP TWR, WITHOUT CLRING US FOR EITHER THE VISUAL OR ILS FOR RWY 29L. WE THEREFORE MAINTAINED OUR ASSIGNED HDG AND ALT. 3 ATTEMPTS BY THE FO TO CONTACT THE TWR WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. I THEN TOOK THE RADIO AND ASKED TWR IF AB WAS CLRED TO JOIN THE RWY 29L LOC. AFTER A BRIEF PAUSE, THE TWR ANSWERED YES. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TWR ORDERED US TO TURN L HDG 270 DEGS TO AVOID TFC AT OUR 1 O'CLOCK (AN ACR JETSTREAM, I BELIEVE) WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED ON FINAL FOR RWY 29R. AFTER COMPLETING OUR TURN TO 270 DEGS, THE TWR CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 29L, AND THE LNDG PROCEEDED UNEVENTFULLY THEREAFTER. UPON CALLING THE APCH CTL SUPVR, I LEARNED THAT A TRAINEE CTLR HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO DUTY ON THAT SCOPE. THE TRAINEE SUGGESTED THAT HE DID NOT TELL US TO CONTACT TWR ON BASE. OUR CREW BELIEVES HE DID. A REVIEW OF THE AUDIO TAPES WILL SETTLE THAT MATTER. NONETHELESS, WE AS A CREW, MIGHT HAVE DONE SOME THINGS DIFFERENTLY TO PREVENT SUCH A CLOSE MIDAIR ENCOUNTER. THIS WAS MY VERY FIRST DAY AS CAPT. I HAD BRIEFED THE CREW TO THIS FACT, AND REQUESTED THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO ASSIST ME. THEY DID AS MUCH, BUT NONE OF US SAW THE CONFLICTING TFC UNTIL WE WERE ADVISED BY TWR. MY ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON MY HDG, ALT, AIRSPD, THE LACK OF TWR RESPONSE ON RADIO, AND ON THE RWY ITSELF, WHICH WAS ABOUT TO SLIDE BEHIND US IF WE WEREN'T CLRED FOR AN APCH. ALL OF US SHOULD HAVE PAID MORE ATTN TO POSSIBLE CONFLICTS APCHING FROM OUR R, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE WE WERE AWARE OF SIMULTANEOUS APCHS OCCURRING ON RWY 29R. IN FOCUSING ON OUR ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN PRECISE AND PROPER PROCS, WE NEGLECTED TO SEE AND AVOID! POSTSCRIPT: ON THE MORNING OF DEC/XX/95, I CONSULTED WITH ATC QUALITY ASSURANCE IN MSP. I WAS INFORMED THAT A REVIEW OF ATC AUDIO TAPES SHOWS THAT WHEN AN ACR X FLT WAS SWITCHED TO MSP TWR, WE ANSWERED, AND APPARENTLY SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ PREMATURELY. THIS THEN LED TO THE DELAY IN TWR'S RESPONSE TO OUR CALLS. THIS INFO SERVES TO POINT OUT THE NEED FOR STRICT RADIO VIGILANCE, ESPECIALLY DURING PERIODS OF HIGH COCKPIT WORKLOADS (EG, TKOF, APCH, AND LNDG). ALL THREE OF US WOULD HAVE SWORN THAT WE WERE PASSED TO TWR. I BELIEVE THIS IS THE RESULT OF OUR EXPECTING TO BE PASSED TO TWR DURING THE BASE LEG TO RWY 29L. IN FACT THE ROUTINE NATURE OF THE FLT UP TO THAT POINT, AND GOOD WX PREVAILING AT MSP, MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A FALSE SENSE OF NORMALCY, AND HELPED LULL THE CREW INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. ONCE AGAIN, A FOCUS ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF 'SEE AND AVOID,' AND THE MAINT OF STRICT RADIO VIGILANCE WOULD HAVE SERVED TO PREVENT BOTH THIS, AND FUTURE OCCURRENCES OF THIS NATURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.