|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : jax|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Controlling Facilities||tower : bos|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||DC-10 30|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Navigation In Use||Other|
|Flight Phase||ground : preflight|
|Route In Use||enroute : atlantic|
enroute : other oceanic
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 80|
flight time total : 7000
flight time type : 1000
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Anomaly||non adherence : far|
other anomaly other
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Air Traffic Incident||other|
My crew was scheduled to operate a DC10-30. The flight was a military charter from jacksonville, fl, to shannon, ireland. The aircraft had been at greensboro, nc, for scheduled maintenance and installation of an inertial navigation system. The aircraft was ferried to jax by a company crew. On oct/tue/95, the members of the operating crew received in the mail a change to the company flight crew operating manual with the description and abbreviated operating procedures for the inertial navigation system. Although the aircraft had completed installation of the system, no formal training was conducted by the company prior to the crew boarding the aircraft in jax for the trip to shannon. A private installation company's representative who had accompanied the aircraft to jax to check out the INS operation after the conversion, remained aboard during the preflight to assist the crew in programming and set up of the system for the flight. He provided a brief overview of the system operation and procedures to be used in operating the system. He did not document any training accomplishment and deplaned prior to departure. There was an operating manual for the INS aboard the aircraft. The crew operated the system in accordance with that manual during the flight to shannon. En route to shannon I got a phone patch to our dispatch and advised them to make sure the crew accepting the aircraft at shannon had obtained the change to their fcom and had access to the information prior to their arrival at the aircraft. Upon arrival at shannon I gave a short familiarization of the system to the captain assuming command and instructed him in the procedures to load and operate the system. He had received facsimile information on the INS prior to the aircraft arrival. I also familiarized him with the operating procedures in the system book aboard the aircraft. The aircraft then departed for cairo, egypt, for the rest of the scheduled military charter. On the return segment of the military charter, my crew again operated the aircraft from shannon to philadelphia, PA, to st louis, mo. We encountered no problems with the system in-flight. Our company provided no formal training and had no procedures to ensure training on the system was accomplished and documented prior to crew operation of the system. The crew was able to successfully operate the navigation system because of previous experience with other inertial navigation system, which had included this system. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter, a captain, was uncertain regarding the legalities of how the training was handled on the INS, so an ASRS report was submitted and the pilot's union informed. Outcome was a response from the company training department -- the differences training now utilizes a video, not just a handout. The reporter also states that he has since received a programmed learning tool, and this disk has been circulated among the DC10 pilots. Most of the pilots in the company did not have operating experience with this particular INS, so the reporter felt that the training received through a handout was an issue, especially with the operational requirements involved.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: THE CAPT OF A DC10 EXTENDED OVERWATER FLT WAS CONCERNED THAT DIFFERENCES TRAINING FOR NEWLY INSTALLED NAVIGATIONAL EQUIP WAS INADEQUATE.
Narrative: MY CREW WAS SCHEDULED TO OPERATE A DC10-30. THE FLT WAS A MIL CHARTER FROM JACKSONVILLE, FL, TO SHANNON, IRELAND. THE ACFT HAD BEEN AT GREENSBORO, NC, FOR SCHEDULED MAINT AND INSTALLATION OF AN INERTIAL NAV SYS. THE ACFT WAS FERRIED TO JAX BY A COMPANY CREW. ON OCT/TUE/95, THE MEMBERS OF THE OPERATING CREW RECEIVED IN THE MAIL A CHANGE TO THE COMPANY FLC OPERATING MANUAL WITH THE DESCRIPTION AND ABBREVIATED OPERATING PROCS FOR THE INERTIAL NAV SYS. ALTHOUGH THE ACFT HAD COMPLETED INSTALLATION OF THE SYS, NO FORMAL TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED BY THE COMPANY PRIOR TO THE CREW BOARDING THE ACFT IN JAX FOR THE TRIP TO SHANNON. A PVT INSTALLATION COMPANY'S REPRESENTATIVE WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED THE ACFT TO JAX TO CHK OUT THE INS OP AFTER THE CONVERSION, REMAINED ABOARD DURING THE PREFLT TO ASSIST THE CREW IN PROGRAMMING AND SET UP OF THE SYS FOR THE FLT. HE PROVIDED A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SYS OP AND PROCS TO BE USED IN OPERATING THE SYS. HE DID NOT DOCUMENT ANY TRAINING ACCOMPLISHMENT AND DEPLANED PRIOR TO DEP. THERE WAS AN OPERATING MANUAL FOR THE INS ABOARD THE ACFT. THE CREW OPERATED THE SYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT MANUAL DURING THE FLT TO SHANNON. ENRTE TO SHANNON I GOT A PHONE PATCH TO OUR DISPATCH AND ADVISED THEM TO MAKE SURE THE CREW ACCEPTING THE ACFT AT SHANNON HAD OBTAINED THE CHANGE TO THEIR FCOM AND HAD ACCESS TO THE INFO PRIOR TO THEIR ARR AT THE ACFT. UPON ARR AT SHANNON I GAVE A SHORT FAMILIARIZATION OF THE SYS TO THE CAPT ASSUMING COMMAND AND INSTRUCTED HIM IN THE PROCS TO LOAD AND OPERATE THE SYS. HE HAD RECEIVED FACSIMILE INFO ON THE INS PRIOR TO THE ACFT ARR. I ALSO FAMILIARIZED HIM WITH THE OPERATING PROCS IN THE SYS BOOK ABOARD THE ACFT. THE ACFT THEN DEPARTED FOR CAIRO, EGYPT, FOR THE REST OF THE SCHEDULED MIL CHARTER. ON THE RETURN SEGMENT OF THE MIL CHARTER, MY CREW AGAIN OPERATED THE ACFT FROM SHANNON TO PHILADELPHIA, PA, TO ST LOUIS, MO. WE ENCOUNTERED NO PROBS WITH THE SYS INFLT. OUR COMPANY PROVIDED NO FORMAL TRAINING AND HAD NO PROCS TO ENSURE TRAINING ON THE SYS WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND DOCUMENTED PRIOR TO CREW OP OF THE SYS. THE CREW WAS ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY OPERATE THE NAV SYS BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH OTHER INERTIAL NAV SYS, WHICH HAD INCLUDED THIS SYS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR, A CAPT, WAS UNCERTAIN REGARDING THE LEGALITIES OF HOW THE TRAINING WAS HANDLED ON THE INS, SO AN ASRS RPT WAS SUBMITTED AND THE PLT'S UNION INFORMED. OUTCOME WAS A RESPONSE FROM THE COMPANY TRAINING DEPT -- THE DIFFERENCES TRAINING NOW UTILIZES A VIDEO, NOT JUST A HANDOUT. THE RPTR ALSO STATES THAT HE HAS SINCE RECEIVED A PROGRAMMED LEARNING TOOL, AND THIS DISK HAS BEEN CIRCULATED AMONG THE DC10 PLTS. MOST OF THE PLTS IN THE COMPANY DID NOT HAVE OPERATING EXPERIENCE WITH THIS PARTICULAR INS, SO THE RPTR FELT THAT THE TRAINING RECEIVED THROUGH A HANDOUT WAS AN ISSUE, ESPECIALLY WITH THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS INVOLVED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.