Narrative:

On oct/xx/95, at approximately pm in the afternoon, I narrowly avoided a midair collision with a twin engine aircraft in the vicinity of puna-kalapana volcano devastation area. The following is a report of the sequence of events that occurred. Hilo's departure radar controller released me from his control near the pahoa NDB. On 122.9 VHF, I announced my presence at the NDB and was proceeding to the old geothermal site in a southerly direction. I did not hear any aircraft acknowledge my call. Several mins later, I announced that I was passing the geothermal and proceeding toward kalapana sbound. 2 aircraft announced their location, one was approaching the royal gardens area (the royal garden aircraft was idented as the twin engine fix wing involved in this near midair), the other was a helicopter at puu O'o vent and would be departing the vent soon. The aircraft at the vent suggested that I plan on viewing the vent first because the conditions and the views were good. I acknowledged his advice and announced that WX from the geothermal to pahoa NDB was clear and broken clouds and that I had transitioned the area above 3500 ft MSL. I made my decision to change course from kalapana to the vent and announced on 122.9 that I was heading toward the vent. While providing the passenger with comments, a few seconds had passed and I saw the vent clearly. I initiated a slow climb and a right turn toward the vent. While in the climbing right turn I saw a twin engine aircraft on my left. The aircraft was on a collision course with my aircraft. I made an abrupt climb and turn to the left. All of the passenger on board saw the aircraft pass just below us. After composing myself, I contacted the pilot of the twin engine aircraft. He was apologetic and stated he did not see me prior to my aircraft passing above his aircraft. My concern at that time was the safety of the passenger and our aircraft. At our office in hilo, the main topic of conversation for our passenger was the near collision. I view the psychological impact the near collision had on these passenger as long term shock. Considering that they had just seen an impressive display of natures relentless, awesome power of a volcano, the one high point of their tour was surviving the near collision. The near midair collision was filmed by the aircraft's video recording system. At approximately 16 mins after departure, a twin engine aircraft comes within camera range just prior to the pilot taking evasive actions. Area situation: the volcano area contributes to the problem by concentrating air traffic into a small area. The problem is further aggravated when aircraft with vastly different flight envelopes and pilots with varying skill levels and piloting attitudes are occupying a limited area. Helicopter pilots slow their aircraft when they are visually searching to clarify the position of another converging aircraft. Or they will orbit their area until the other aircraft is seen and idented. Fix-wing aircraft cannot reduce their speed as much as helicopters are able. Their usual alternative is to adjust course and increase their separation. Conclusion: this has not been the first near miss incident in the volcano area since oct/94. This is the first incident that has been recorded on video tape. The increase in high speed fix wing traffic over the volcano area has increased by at least 100 percent since 1994. The ht restr of sfar 71 has created a marketing advantage for twin engine fix-wing aircraft. The fix wing aircraft tour are flying at the same altitudes as the helicopter tour. This was not the case prior to sfar 71. And the ability for high speed twin-engine fix wings to travel long distances in less time, provides them with advantages that a helicopter cannot match. Both types of aircraft have to share the same uncontrolled airspace. Normally fix-wing aircraft and helicopters avoid the same traffic pattern at airports because of their differences. That was not the case with this incident at the volcano area. When traveling in the same direction the twin engine airplane will overtake the helicopter easily. When converging head on, the see and avoid time is small and difficult because of the fore mentioned conditions. My failure to see the on-coming aircraft was aggravated by the climbing right turn attitude of my aircraft. The climb was necessary to maintain sfar altitude restrs for the vent area. This climbing attitude increased the natural blind spot to the l-front of the astar. May I remind everyone that both the helicopter and twin engine-fix-wing were flying according to sfar 71 restrs. This incident is very uncomfortable for me personally because the twin engine fix-wing came from below. An area of concern that was not a problematic blind spot in the past. The increase in stress to all pilots is aggravated by the mix of aircraft with a large operational speed differential. Tensions are further heightened by the prospect of being prosecuted under the sfar regulations by a community that feels they are within their rights, even when we operate our aircraft according to the regulations. This is not taking into account that several 3500 ft wire tethered balloons were sighted over a community in the proximity of the volcano a week before this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC -- SIGHTSEEING KILAUHE CRATER ON HAWAII.

Narrative: ON OCT/XX/95, AT APPROX PM IN THE AFTERNOON, I NARROWLY AVOIDED A MIDAIR COLLISION WITH A TWIN ENG ACFT IN THE VICINITY OF PUNA-KALAPANA VOLCANO DEVASTATION AREA. THE FOLLOWING IS A RPT OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT OCCURRED. HILO'S DEP RADAR CTLR RELEASED ME FROM HIS CTL NEAR THE PAHOA NDB. ON 122.9 VHF, I ANNOUNCED MY PRESENCE AT THE NDB AND WAS PROCEEDING TO THE OLD GEOTHERMAL SITE IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION. I DID NOT HEAR ANY ACFT ACKNOWLEDGE MY CALL. SEVERAL MINS LATER, I ANNOUNCED THAT I WAS PASSING THE GEOTHERMAL AND PROCEEDING TOWARD KALAPANA SBOUND. 2 ACFT ANNOUNCED THEIR LOCATION, ONE WAS APCHING THE ROYAL GARDENS AREA (THE ROYAL GARDEN ACFT WAS IDENTED AS THE TWIN ENG FIX WING INVOLVED IN THIS NEAR MIDAIR), THE OTHER WAS A HELI AT PUU O'O VENT AND WOULD BE DEPARTING THE VENT SOON. THE ACFT AT THE VENT SUGGESTED THAT I PLAN ON VIEWING THE VENT FIRST BECAUSE THE CONDITIONS AND THE VIEWS WERE GOOD. I ACKNOWLEDGED HIS ADVICE AND ANNOUNCED THAT WX FROM THE GEOTHERMAL TO PAHOA NDB WAS CLR AND BROKEN CLOUDS AND THAT I HAD TRANSITIONED THE AREA ABOVE 3500 FT MSL. I MADE MY DECISION TO CHANGE COURSE FROM KALAPANA TO THE VENT AND ANNOUNCED ON 122.9 THAT I WAS HDG TOWARD THE VENT. WHILE PROVIDING THE PAX WITH COMMENTS, A FEW SECONDS HAD PASSED AND I SAW THE VENT CLRLY. I INITIATED A SLOW CLB AND A R TURN TOWARD THE VENT. WHILE IN THE CLBING R TURN I SAW A TWIN ENG ACFT ON MY L. THE ACFT WAS ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH MY ACFT. I MADE AN ABRUPT CLB AND TURN TO THE L. ALL OF THE PAX ON BOARD SAW THE ACFT PASS JUST BELOW US. AFTER COMPOSING MYSELF, I CONTACTED THE PLT OF THE TWIN ENG ACFT. HE WAS APOLOGETIC AND STATED HE DID NOT SEE ME PRIOR TO MY ACFT PASSING ABOVE HIS ACFT. MY CONCERN AT THAT TIME WAS THE SAFETY OF THE PAX AND OUR ACFT. AT OUR OFFICE IN HILO, THE MAIN TOPIC OF CONVERSATION FOR OUR PAX WAS THE NEAR COLLISION. I VIEW THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT THE NEAR COLLISION HAD ON THESE PAX AS LONG TERM SHOCK. CONSIDERING THAT THEY HAD JUST SEEN AN IMPRESSIVE DISPLAY OF NATURES RELENTLESS, AWESOME PWR OF A VOLCANO, THE ONE HIGH POINT OF THEIR TOUR WAS SURVIVING THE NEAR COLLISION. THE NMAC WAS FILMED BY THE ACFT'S VIDEO RECORDING SYS. AT APPROX 16 MINS AFTER DEP, A TWIN ENG ACFT COMES WITHIN CAMERA RANGE JUST PRIOR TO THE PLT TAKING EVASIVE ACTIONS. AREA SIT: THE VOLCANO AREA CONTRIBUTES TO THE PROB BY CONCENTRATING AIR TFC INTO A SMALL AREA. THE PROB IS FURTHER AGGRAVATED WHEN ACFT WITH VASTLY DIFFERENT FLT ENVELOPES AND PLTS WITH VARYING SKILL LEVELS AND PILOTING ATTITUDES ARE OCCUPYING A LIMITED AREA. HELI PLTS SLOW THEIR ACFT WHEN THEY ARE VISUALLY SEARCHING TO CLARIFY THE POS OF ANOTHER CONVERGING ACFT. OR THEY WILL ORBIT THEIR AREA UNTIL THE OTHER ACFT IS SEEN AND IDENTED. FIX-WING ACFT CANNOT REDUCE THEIR SPD AS MUCH AS HELIS ARE ABLE. THEIR USUAL ALTERNATIVE IS TO ADJUST COURSE AND INCREASE THEIR SEPARATION. CONCLUSION: THIS HAS NOT BEEN THE FIRST NEAR MISS INCIDENT IN THE VOLCANO AREA SINCE OCT/94. THIS IS THE FIRST INCIDENT THAT HAS BEEN RECORDED ON VIDEO TAPE. THE INCREASE IN HIGH SPD FIX WING TFC OVER THE VOLCANO AREA HAS INCREASED BY AT LEAST 100 PERCENT SINCE 1994. THE HT RESTR OF SFAR 71 HAS CREATED A MARKETING ADVANTAGE FOR TWIN ENG FIX-WING ACFT. THE FIX WING ACFT TOUR ARE FLYING AT THE SAME ALTS AS THE HELI TOUR. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE PRIOR TO SFAR 71. AND THE ABILITY FOR HIGH SPD TWIN-ENG FIX WINGS TO TRAVEL LONG DISTANCES IN LESS TIME, PROVIDES THEM WITH ADVANTAGES THAT A HELI CANNOT MATCH. BOTH TYPES OF ACFT HAVE TO SHARE THE SAME UNCTLED AIRSPACE. NORMALLY FIX-WING ACFT AND HELIS AVOID THE SAME TFC PATTERN AT ARPTS BECAUSE OF THEIR DIFFERENCES. THAT WAS NOT THE CASE WITH THIS INCIDENT AT THE VOLCANO AREA. WHEN TRAVELING IN THE SAME DIRECTION THE TWIN ENG AIRPLANE WILL OVERTAKE THE HELI EASILY. WHEN CONVERGING HEAD ON, THE SEE AND AVOID TIME IS SMALL AND DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF THE FORE MENTIONED CONDITIONS. MY FAILURE TO SEE THE ON-COMING ACFT WAS AGGRAVATED BY THE CLBING R TURN ATTITUDE OF MY ACFT. THE CLB WAS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN SFAR ALT RESTRS FOR THE VENT AREA. THIS CLBING ATTITUDE INCREASED THE NATURAL BLIND SPOT TO THE L-FRONT OF THE ASTAR. MAY I REMIND EVERYONE THAT BOTH THE HELI AND TWIN ENG-FIX-WING WERE FLYING ACCORDING TO SFAR 71 RESTRS. THIS INCIDENT IS VERY UNCOMFORTABLE FOR ME PERSONALLY BECAUSE THE TWIN ENG FIX-WING CAME FROM BELOW. AN AREA OF CONCERN THAT WAS NOT A PROBLEMATIC BLIND SPOT IN THE PAST. THE INCREASE IN STRESS TO ALL PLTS IS AGGRAVATED BY THE MIX OF ACFT WITH A LARGE OPERATIONAL SPD DIFFERENTIAL. TENSIONS ARE FURTHER HEIGHTENED BY THE PROSPECT OF BEING PROSECUTED UNDER THE SFAR REGS BY A COMMUNITY THAT FEELS THEY ARE WITHIN THEIR RIGHTS, EVEN WHEN WE OPERATE OUR ACFT ACCORDING TO THE REGS. THIS IS NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT SEVERAL 3500 FT WIRE TETHERED BALLOONS WERE SIGHTED OVER A COMMUNITY IN THE PROX OF THE VOLCANO A WEEK BEFORE THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.