Narrative:

While flying from bil to slc we were cleared to descend to cross cartr at 16000 ft from FL350. (Cartr is a fix on the ogden 5 arrival, slc.) prior to arriving at the fix, center reclred us to 14000 ft and handed us off to approach control. Upon checking we were reclred to 12000 ft and told to expect the visual approach to runway 17 and to inform approach control when we could see the airport. Additionally, there was traffic 2000 ft below us at 2 O'clock in a modified right base for runway 16. We acknowledged the altitude and expected visual approach but informed approach control we could not make out the field yet. We set the cockpit up for the runway 17 ILS as a backup for the visual. A few moments later we called to report the field as in sight. We were then given some additional traffic, (again going to runway 16) cleared for the visual and given a frequency change. We acknowledged the instructions and changed frequencys, finished our cockpit duties associated with the runway 17 ILS backup, checked the traffic and began our descent. At this point we were at 12000 ft and approximately a DOT and a half above the GS. We checked in 'on the visual to runway 27.' a moment passed and then a controller acknowledged call, pointed out the previously mentioned traffic for runway 16 and then asked us 'were you cleared for the visual approach,' to which replied, yes we were. Needless to say we all thought we had been cleared, nothing more was said and we were cleared to land. We did so and arrived at the gate. None of the crew thought much about this until we were departing slc an hour later. Climbing to our initial altitude of 8000 ft we were passing 6000 ft and were cautioned that there was traffic overhead level at 9000 ft. We slowed our climb and picked up the traffic on TCASII. As we approached 8000 ft we were cleared to climb above 8000 ft to 13000 ft or 14000 ft (I can't recall exactly) and shortly after that while passing 11000 ft we were cleared to FL200, we read back climbing to FL200 and continued. A frequency change followed and we checked in 'climbing to FL200.' the new controller acknowledged our check in and asked if the previous controller cleared us to FL200. We said yes he did. Again nothing was said and we continued to pdx. We all remarked that twice in one day is a bit much to be having these communications snafu's. Either slc was having a bad day or we were, or both. A frequency change in a busy approach control/airport/departure control area is always difficult for all parties involved. Utmost care must be exercised by pilots and controllers. We went carefully over the events in both sits and feel while there is always room for improvement all parties involved were trying to do the job at hand correctly. We know there are extremely busy times in the cockpit and that there are equally busy times for the controllers, yet miscoms do occur. We will certainly be redoubling our efforts toward more effective communications in and out of the cockpit. Use of cockpit checklists must be synchronized with the flow of information to and from the controling agency on the ground. Both aircrew and controllers must work together to achieve safety in the skies.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POSSIBLE COM COORD PROB. ATC FLC OR INTRAFAC.

Narrative: WHILE FLYING FROM BIL TO SLC WE WERE CLRED TO DSND TO CROSS CARTR AT 16000 FT FROM FL350. (CARTR IS A FIX ON THE OGDEN 5 ARR, SLC.) PRIOR TO ARRIVING AT THE FIX, CTR RECLRED US TO 14000 FT AND HANDED US OFF TO APCH CTL. UPON CHKING WE WERE RECLRED TO 12000 FT AND TOLD TO EXPECT THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17 AND TO INFORM APCH CTL WHEN WE COULD SEE THE ARPT. ADDITIONALLY, THERE WAS TFC 2000 FT BELOW US AT 2 O'CLOCK IN A MODIFIED R BASE FOR RWY 16. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE ALT AND EXPECTED VISUAL APCH BUT INFORMED APCH CTL WE COULD NOT MAKE OUT THE FIELD YET. WE SET THE COCKPIT UP FOR THE RWY 17 ILS AS A BACKUP FOR THE VISUAL. A FEW MOMENTS LATER WE CALLED TO RPT THE FIELD AS IN SIGHT. WE WERE THEN GIVEN SOME ADDITIONAL TFC, (AGAIN GOING TO RWY 16) CLRED FOR THE VISUAL AND GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE INSTRUCTIONS AND CHANGED FREQS, FINISHED OUR COCKPIT DUTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE RWY 17 ILS BACKUP, CHKED THE TFC AND BEGAN OUR DSCNT. AT THIS POINT WE WERE AT 12000 FT AND APPROX A DOT AND A HALF ABOVE THE GS. WE CHKED IN 'ON THE VISUAL TO RWY 27.' A MOMENT PASSED AND THEN A CTLR ACKNOWLEDGED CALL, POINTED OUT THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED TFC FOR RWY 16 AND THEN ASKED US 'WERE YOU CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH,' TO WHICH REPLIED, YES WE WERE. NEEDLESS TO SAY WE ALL THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN CLRED, NOTHING MORE WAS SAID AND WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. WE DID SO AND ARRIVED AT THE GATE. NONE OF THE CREW THOUGHT MUCH ABOUT THIS UNTIL WE WERE DEPARTING SLC AN HR LATER. CLBING TO OUR INITIAL ALT OF 8000 FT WE WERE PASSING 6000 FT AND WERE CAUTIONED THAT THERE WAS TFC OVERHEAD LEVEL AT 9000 FT. WE SLOWED OUR CLB AND PICKED UP THE TFC ON TCASII. AS WE APCHED 8000 FT WE WERE CLRED TO CLB ABOVE 8000 FT TO 13000 FT OR 14000 FT (I CAN'T RECALL EXACTLY) AND SHORTLY AFTER THAT WHILE PASSING 11000 FT WE WERE CLRED TO FL200, WE READ BACK CLBING TO FL200 AND CONTINUED. A FREQ CHANGE FOLLOWED AND WE CHKED IN 'CLBING TO FL200.' THE NEW CTLR ACKNOWLEDGED OUR CHK IN AND ASKED IF THE PREVIOUS CTLR CLRED US TO FL200. WE SAID YES HE DID. AGAIN NOTHING WAS SAID AND WE CONTINUED TO PDX. WE ALL REMARKED THAT TWICE IN ONE DAY IS A BIT MUCH TO BE HAVING THESE COMS SNAFU'S. EITHER SLC WAS HAVING A BAD DAY OR WE WERE, OR BOTH. A FREQ CHANGE IN A BUSY APCH CTL/ARPT/DEP CTL AREA IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT FOR ALL PARTIES INVOLVED. UTMOST CARE MUST BE EXERCISED BY PLTS AND CTLRS. WE WENT CAREFULLY OVER THE EVENTS IN BOTH SITS AND FEEL WHILE THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT ALL PARTIES INVOLVED WERE TRYING TO DO THE JOB AT HAND CORRECTLY. WE KNOW THERE ARE EXTREMELY BUSY TIMES IN THE COCKPIT AND THAT THERE ARE EQUALLY BUSY TIMES FOR THE CTLRS, YET MISCOMS DO OCCUR. WE WILL CERTAINLY BE REDOUBLING OUR EFFORTS TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE COMS IN AND OUT OF THE COCKPIT. USE OF COCKPIT CHKLISTS MUST BE SYNCHRONIZED WITH THE FLOW OF INFO TO AND FROM THE CTLING AGENCY ON THE GND. BOTH AIRCREW AND CTLRS MUST WORK TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE SAFETY IN THE SKIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.