Narrative:

The first flight of the trip was canceled due to an aircraft mechanical problem. Maintenance cleared the aircraft and we were dispatched to reposition, part 91 -- no revenue -- via flight control. Engine start and taxi were routine, all checklists completed and the captain briefing that he would fly. We were cleared for takeoff on runway 28L, with instructions to maintain runway heading after takeoff. As we taxied into position, the captain noticed that the rear internal baggage compartment door had been left open, and asked if I had any problem departing with the door open. I responded that no, it did not bother me. There was no indication, verbal or otherwise, that the departure would be other than standard. The takeoff was normal through acceleration and rotation. At approximately 50-100 ft AGL the captain leveled the aircraft and called for gear-up. At the departure end of the runway he rocked the wings and then smoothly pulled the nose up approximately 12-14 degrees resulting in a vertical speed of approximately 4000 FPM. As we climbed through 500 ft AGL the captain called for 'flaps zero, flows on' as per standard operating procedure. As I was adjusting the flows, the captain noticed that the pod door light was illuminated, indicating an unsafe door. At this point we were at or above traffic pattern altitude and still with the local traffic controller. The captain reduced pitch and power, then instructed me to notify the tower that we would like to return to the airport. The tower responded 'do you have a problem?' the captain responded 'no, we have a light that is on.' the tower then cleared us to land on runway 28L, and asked 'are you declaring an emergency?' I answered 'negative on the emergency' and acknowledged that we were cleared to land on runway 28L. The captain then called for the go around and the after takeoff checklists. He then called for the emergency checklist for the pod light. After completing the emergency checklist, and with no aerodynamic indication that the pod door was indeed open, I notified company that we were returning to land. A normal VFR profile to landing was accomplished. As we were clearing the runway the tower controller stated 'would you please call the tower and ask for the manager?' I acknowledged affirmative, contacted ground control and we proceeded to the gate. Throughout the takeoff the airspeed did not exceed any limitations, based on aircraft confign, nor were any excessive loads imposed on the airframe of the aircraft. Arriving at the gate the captain shut down the left engine. The mechanic, whom was still on the ramp, cycled the pod door and the light went out. The captain restarted the left engine and I called ground for taxi. All checklists were completed. After departure the captain advised the tower that he would call them when we arrived at our destination. The hasty departure added 2 additional problems to the situation. The first was not writing up the pod light as a maintenance discrepancy. The mechanic on the ramp recycled the door and the light went out. Both the mechanic and the captain agreed, communicated via thumbs up, that the problem was solved. After discussion, the captain and I agreed that there was no mechanical problem with the door, that it had been improperly secured by the new and inexperienced rampers. The second problem involved fuel. Each flight is dispatched with a specific amount of fuel indicated on the printed dispatch. When we departed the second time, the captain and I were in agreement that we had sufficient fuel on the aircraft. However, when the captain originally completed the load manifest, he rounded the fuel load down to an even number which put us in a marginal fuel situation at our second departure. We arrived at our destination well above company established minimum fuel on board. The entire sequence of events transpired in less than 20 mins. The one and most obvious factor that perpetuated the situation to the point of becoming a serious problem was a lack of communication between the crew. Supplemental information from acn 314724: maintenance problem with a tire. Grounded it in mry. Maintenance flew over from faj to fix the tire. Then our reposition flight to lax empty. On takeoff my airspeed never exceeded 150 IAS to 160 IAS. Near departure end I pitched up, rocked my wings and proceeded to pitch up to approximately 12-14 degrees. Mry tower stated that the mry airport manager had called and wanted to know who had departed with the nonstandard takeoff. After I returned to mry later in the day I went and spoke to the tower supervisor and he said it looked unusual but he said it looked like I had total control at all times and at no time did it look unsafe! On paper it shows that I did depart with less than minimum fuel. However in reality, the approximately 6-7 mins taxi, and takeoff and return, had indeed left me with enough. I had approximately 1570 pounds or 1580 pounds prior to re-starting the engine for the second taxi and takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RETURN LAND MANDATED BY A CARGO DOOR LIGHT ON AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: THE FIRST FLT OF THE TRIP WAS CANCELED DUE TO AN ACFT MECHANICAL PROB. MAINT CLRED THE ACFT AND WE WERE DISPATCHED TO REPOSITION, PART 91 -- NO REVENUE -- VIA FLT CTL. ENG START AND TAXI WERE ROUTINE, ALL CHKLISTS COMPLETED AND THE CAPT BRIEFING THAT HE WOULD FLY. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 28L, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO MAINTAIN RWY HDG AFTER TKOF. AS WE TAXIED INTO POS, THE CAPT NOTICED THAT THE REAR INTERNAL BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT DOOR HAD BEEN LEFT OPEN, AND ASKED IF I HAD ANY PROB DEPARTING WITH THE DOOR OPEN. I RESPONDED THAT NO, IT DID NOT BOTHER ME. THERE WAS NO INDICATION, VERBAL OR OTHERWISE, THAT THE DEP WOULD BE OTHER THAN STANDARD. THE TKOF WAS NORMAL THROUGH ACCELERATION AND ROTATION. AT APPROX 50-100 FT AGL THE CAPT LEVELED THE ACFT AND CALLED FOR GEAR-UP. AT THE DEP END OF THE RWY HE ROCKED THE WINGS AND THEN SMOOTHLY PULLED THE NOSE UP APPROX 12-14 DEGS RESULTING IN A VERT SPD OF APPROX 4000 FPM. AS WE CLBED THROUGH 500 FT AGL THE CAPT CALLED FOR 'FLAPS ZERO, FLOWS ON' AS PER STANDARD OPERATING PROC. AS I WAS ADJUSTING THE FLOWS, THE CAPT NOTICED THAT THE POD DOOR LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED, INDICATING AN UNSAFE DOOR. AT THIS POINT WE WERE AT OR ABOVE TFC PATTERN ALT AND STILL WITH THE LCL TFC CTLR. THE CAPT REDUCED PITCH AND PWR, THEN INSTRUCTED ME TO NOTIFY THE TWR THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THE ARPT. THE TWR RESPONDED 'DO YOU HAVE A PROB?' THE CAPT RESPONDED 'NO, WE HAVE A LIGHT THAT IS ON.' THE TWR THEN CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 28L, AND ASKED 'ARE YOU DECLARING AN EMER?' I ANSWERED 'NEGATIVE ON THE EMER' AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 28L. THE CAPT THEN CALLED FOR THE GAR AND THE AFTER TKOF CHKLISTS. HE THEN CALLED FOR THE EMER CHKLIST FOR THE POD LIGHT. AFTER COMPLETING THE EMER CHKLIST, AND WITH NO AERODYNAMIC INDICATION THAT THE POD DOOR WAS INDEED OPEN, I NOTIFIED COMPANY THAT WE WERE RETURNING TO LAND. A NORMAL VFR PROFILE TO LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED. AS WE WERE CLRING THE RWY THE TWR CTLR STATED 'WOULD YOU PLEASE CALL THE TWR AND ASK FOR THE MGR?' I ACKNOWLEDGED AFFIRMATIVE, CONTACTED GND CTL AND WE PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. THROUGHOUT THE TKOF THE AIRSPD DID NOT EXCEED ANY LIMITATIONS, BASED ON ACFT CONFIGN, NOR WERE ANY EXCESSIVE LOADS IMPOSED ON THE AIRFRAME OF THE ACFT. ARRIVING AT THE GATE THE CAPT SHUT DOWN THE L ENG. THE MECH, WHOM WAS STILL ON THE RAMP, CYCLED THE POD DOOR AND THE LIGHT WENT OUT. THE CAPT RESTARTED THE L ENG AND I CALLED GND FOR TAXI. ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED. AFTER DEP THE CAPT ADVISED THE TWR THAT HE WOULD CALL THEM WHEN WE ARRIVED AT OUR DEST. THE HASTY DEP ADDED 2 ADDITIONAL PROBS TO THE SIT. THE FIRST WAS NOT WRITING UP THE POD LIGHT AS A MAINT DISCREPANCY. THE MECH ON THE RAMP RECYCLED THE DOOR AND THE LIGHT WENT OUT. BOTH THE MECH AND THE CAPT AGREED, COMMUNICATED VIA THUMBS UP, THAT THE PROB WAS SOLVED. AFTER DISCUSSION, THE CAPT AND I AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO MECHANICAL PROB WITH THE DOOR, THAT IT HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY SECURED BY THE NEW AND INEXPERIENCED RAMPERS. THE SECOND PROB INVOLVED FUEL. EACH FLT IS DISPATCHED WITH A SPECIFIC AMOUNT OF FUEL INDICATED ON THE PRINTED DISPATCH. WHEN WE DEPARTED THE SECOND TIME, THE CAPT AND I WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT WE HAD SUFFICIENT FUEL ON THE ACFT. HOWEVER, WHEN THE CAPT ORIGINALLY COMPLETED THE LOAD MANIFEST, HE ROUNDED THE FUEL LOAD DOWN TO AN EVEN NUMBER WHICH PUT US IN A MARGINAL FUEL SIT AT OUR SECOND DEP. WE ARRIVED AT OUR DEST WELL ABOVE COMPANY ESTABLISHED MINIMUM FUEL ON BOARD. THE ENTIRE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TRANSPIRED IN LESS THAN 20 MINS. THE ONE AND MOST OBVIOUS FACTOR THAT PERPETUATED THE SIT TO THE POINT OF BECOMING A SERIOUS PROB WAS A LACK OF COM BTWN THE CREW. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 314724: MAINT PROB WITH A TIRE. GNDED IT IN MRY. MAINT FLEW OVER FROM FAJ TO FIX THE TIRE. THEN OUR REPOSITION FLT TO LAX EMPTY. ON TKOF MY AIRSPD NEVER EXCEEDED 150 IAS TO 160 IAS. NEAR DEP END I PITCHED UP, ROCKED MY WINGS AND PROCEEDED TO PITCH UP TO APPROX 12-14 DEGS. MRY TWR STATED THAT THE MRY ARPT MGR HAD CALLED AND WANTED TO KNOW WHO HAD DEPARTED WITH THE NONSTANDARD TKOF. AFTER I RETURNED TO MRY LATER IN THE DAY I WENT AND SPOKE TO THE TWR SUPVR AND HE SAID IT LOOKED UNUSUAL BUT HE SAID IT LOOKED LIKE I HAD TOTAL CTL AT ALL TIMES AND AT NO TIME DID IT LOOK UNSAFE! ON PAPER IT SHOWS THAT I DID DEPART WITH LESS THAN MINIMUM FUEL. HOWEVER IN REALITY, THE APPROX 6-7 MINS TAXI, AND TKOF AND RETURN, HAD INDEED LEFT ME WITH ENOUGH. I HAD APPROX 1570 LBS OR 1580 LBS PRIOR TO RE-STARTING THE ENG FOR THE SECOND TAXI AND TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.