Narrative:

We were cleared to fly mci VOR approach to runway 27. ATIS reported only layers of scattered clouds, mild winds, good visibility. There was no additional information provided by approach control or tower. We were painting WX with on-board radar, but close-in, the WX returns were saturated because of the rain, (not unusual on B727 radar), we knew there were showers nearby. But again no alerts or comments from ATC and the ride was generally good. We were configured for landing except for final flaps set-up (we were at flaps 25 degrees), in descent to MDA. At approximately 1600 ft MSL we were in clouds, began to pick up turbulence and rain. Without any normal warnings (airspeed loss or gain, sink rate change, etc) we were suddenly given an on-board 'windshear' alert (aural and red light). I immediately executed an escape maneuver (maximum firewall power, 20 degrees nose up) as aircraft began descending. Fortunately, we had a lot of energy and the 20 degrees nose up and thrust allowed us to climb. When we climbed approximately 1000 ft, and were out of the shear we called tower who only then told us that there had been a 'microburst' at the airport and issued missed approach instruction. We maneuvered away from the airport, while some rapidly moving WX (shower) passed through the airport area. We were then re-sequenced into the arrival traffic and shot the same non-precision approach (still in WX, but stable WX) and landed without further incident. The on-board system, plus my recent (just completed in july) annual recurrent training allowed us to escape from this disturbingly significant windshear! ATC provided no help, and when the so monitored ATIS while we were maneuvering for re- sequencing, no mention of 'microburst' or 'windshear' was added. (We were now on approach control frequency and I don't know what tower may have been saying to other aircraft.) I believe we were lucky to have escaped from this incident with nothing more than an adrenalin rush! I am only glad that I just completed annual recurrent training in which windshear training was an emphasis item. I did not hesitate to initiate the escape maneuver, but I'm not certain that I would have done so immediately if I hadn't just had the need for 'immediate and decisive' response emphasized in that training!! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter was interviewed as part of a special study entitled 'multi- engine turbojet upset incidents.' his windshear/microburst incident did not exactly fit the questionnaire but was very helpful. The reporter attributes his immediate and successful recovery to his air carrier simulator wind shear training taken less than 2 months prior to this incident. The so also had the same training, and the entire crew worked well as a team. The reporter is disappointed that mci ATCT did not pass on to him the report of microburst activity until he was in his escape maneuver. He is also disappointed that his air carrier has made almost nothing of this incident other than a remark to the simulator instructors regarding the importance of the training. The reporter wishes that his B-727 had a better radar.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT WAS CAUGHT IN A MICROBURST.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO FLY MCI VOR APCH TO RWY 27. ATIS RPTED ONLY LAYERS OF SCATTERED CLOUDS, MILD WINDS, GOOD VISIBILITY. THERE WAS NO ADDITIONAL INFO PROVIDED BY APCH CTL OR TWR. WE WERE PAINTING WX WITH ON-BOARD RADAR, BUT CLOSE-IN, THE WX RETURNS WERE SATURATED BECAUSE OF THE RAIN, (NOT UNUSUAL ON B727 RADAR), WE KNEW THERE WERE SHOWERS NEARBY. BUT AGAIN NO ALERTS OR COMMENTS FROM ATC AND THE RIDE WAS GENERALLY GOOD. WE WERE CONFIGURED FOR LNDG EXCEPT FOR FINAL FLAPS SET-UP (WE WERE AT FLAPS 25 DEGS), IN DSCNT TO MDA. AT APPROX 1600 FT MSL WE WERE IN CLOUDS, BEGAN TO PICK UP TURB AND RAIN. WITHOUT ANY NORMAL WARNINGS (AIRSPD LOSS OR GAIN, SINK RATE CHANGE, ETC) WE WERE SUDDENLY GIVEN AN ON-BOARD 'WINDSHEAR' ALERT (AURAL AND RED LIGHT). I IMMEDIATELY EXECUTED AN ESCAPE MANEUVER (MAX FIREWALL PWR, 20 DEGS NOSE UP) AS ACFT BEGAN DSNDING. FORTUNATELY, WE HAD A LOT OF ENERGY AND THE 20 DEGS NOSE UP AND THRUST ALLOWED US TO CLB. WHEN WE CLBED APPROX 1000 FT, AND WERE OUT OF THE SHEAR WE CALLED TWR WHO ONLY THEN TOLD US THAT THERE HAD BEEN A 'MICROBURST' AT THE ARPT AND ISSUED MISSED APCH INSTRUCTION. WE MANEUVERED AWAY FROM THE ARPT, WHILE SOME RAPIDLY MOVING WX (SHOWER) PASSED THROUGH THE ARPT AREA. WE WERE THEN RE-SEQUENCED INTO THE ARR TFC AND SHOT THE SAME NON-PRECISION APCH (STILL IN WX, BUT STABLE WX) AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE ON-BOARD SYS, PLUS MY RECENT (JUST COMPLETED IN JULY) ANNUAL RECURRENT TRAINING ALLOWED US TO ESCAPE FROM THIS DISTURBINGLY SIGNIFICANT WINDSHEAR! ATC PROVIDED NO HELP, AND WHEN THE SO MONITORED ATIS WHILE WE WERE MANEUVERING FOR RE- SEQUENCING, NO MENTION OF 'MICROBURST' OR 'WINDSHEAR' WAS ADDED. (WE WERE NOW ON APCH CTL FREQ AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT TWR MAY HAVE BEEN SAYING TO OTHER ACFT.) I BELIEVE WE WERE LUCKY TO HAVE ESCAPED FROM THIS INCIDENT WITH NOTHING MORE THAN AN ADRENALIN RUSH! I AM ONLY GLAD THAT I JUST COMPLETED ANNUAL RECURRENT TRAINING IN WHICH WINDSHEAR TRAINING WAS AN EMPHASIS ITEM. I DID NOT HESITATE TO INITIATE THE ESCAPE MANEUVER, BUT I'M NOT CERTAIN THAT I WOULD HAVE DONE SO IMMEDIATELY IF I HADN'T JUST HAD THE NEED FOR 'IMMEDIATE AND DECISIVE' RESPONSE EMPHASIZED IN THAT TRAINING!! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS INTERVIEWED AS PART OF A SPECIAL STUDY ENTITLED 'MULTI- ENG TURBOJET UPSET INCIDENTS.' HIS WINDSHEAR/MICROBURST INCIDENT DID NOT EXACTLY FIT THE QUESTIONNAIRE BUT WAS VERY HELPFUL. THE RPTR ATTRIBUTES HIS IMMEDIATE AND SUCCESSFUL RECOVERY TO HIS ACR SIMULATOR WIND SHEAR TRAINING TAKEN LESS THAN 2 MONTHS PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT. THE SO ALSO HAD THE SAME TRAINING, AND THE ENTIRE CREW WORKED WELL AS A TEAM. THE RPTR IS DISAPPOINTED THAT MCI ATCT DID NOT PASS ON TO HIM THE RPT OF MICROBURST ACTIVITY UNTIL HE WAS IN HIS ESCAPE MANEUVER. HE IS ALSO DISAPPOINTED THAT HIS ACR HAS MADE ALMOST NOTHING OF THIS INCIDENT OTHER THAN A REMARK TO THE SIMULATOR INSTRUCTORS REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRAINING. THE RPTR WISHES THAT HIS B-727 HAD A BETTER RADAR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.