Narrative:

On aug/xx/95, I departed the kapalua-west maui airport on flight as the first officer. I was the PNF on an instrument departure en route to honolulu. The takeoff briefing by the captain consisted of a review of the clearance I had just received: hnl, as filed, chain intersection, julle 4 arrival, 8000 ft. We discussed the initial climb out from kapalua, and both agreed on the recommended initial departure procedure of runway heading, and 1500 ft or above across the shoreline. The captain then set both navaids and informed me during this takeoff brief of his plan to depart the airport as discussed, and then execute the prescribed IFR departure procedure for kapalua. After climbing through 1500 ft and crossing the shoreline, we proceeded on the prescribed heading of 220 degrees, up to 8000 ft. Once established on the initial heading the captain reviewed his intentions aloud saying 'ok, 220 degree heading to intercept the 25 DME out of molokai.' after climbing past 2000 ft I contacted ZHN, but was only given an acknowledgement and not told 'radar contact.' shortly after, the captain said 'there's the 25 out of mkk,' and proceeded to turn to intercept. I did not have the julle 4 arrival out and in view at that time. I only had the VOR DME-a approach plate for kapalua in sight (the plate depicts both the molokai VOR and chain intersection). My VOR was tuned to lanai, his to molokai. As we continued on what I believed to be the 25 DME arc the captain began reviewing the departure procedures aloud to reconfirm his actions. As he read we were called by center asking if we had passed chain. I believe the captain answered yes, and began a turn to the left, further south. We were still not in radar contact when center called us asking us to confirm our altitude of 8000 ft. I replied yes, and got a quick cut off of the lny VOR to see exactly where we were. I pointed to my approach plate and said to the captain 'we're over here, southeast of lny.' I then called center asking for vectors to intercept the julle 4 arrival. Center did not give us vectors at that time, and once again asked us to confirm our altitude. After confirming 8000 ft both the captain and I agreed we were well south of course, and we turned north immediately to rectify. ATC then asked if we showed ourselves south of lanai. I replied yes. We flew the remainder of the flight without incident. Factors which I believe contributed to the occurrence include the following: the captain's unfamiliarity with the kapalua IFR departure procedures, and his misinterp of the navaids used. The company had only begun flts to kapalua months before, and the captain had been upgraded only weeks before. My inexperience flying in the local area. I should have been more situationally aware, and should have more thoroughly reviewed our plan of flight as well. (It wasn't until after we departed kapalua and had begun our turn to 220 degrees that I saw we were following the prescribed climbing left turn after 1200 ft instead of the 1500 ft over the shoreline.) steps that I believe could aid in possibly preventing other such occurrences are: non-scheduling of relatively new first officer with new captain. (A policy which is currently being implemented by our chief pilot.) an area familiarization class incorporated into indoctrination for those pilots new to the area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC DEVIATES FROM ASSIGNED DEP ROUTING.

Narrative: ON AUG/XX/95, I DEPARTED THE KAPALUA-W MAUI ARPT ON FLT AS THE FO. I WAS THE PNF ON AN INST DEP ENRTE TO HONOLULU. THE TKOF BRIEFING BY THE CAPT CONSISTED OF A REVIEW OF THE CLRNC I HAD JUST RECEIVED: HNL, AS FILED, CHAIN INTXN, JULLE 4 ARR, 8000 FT. WE DISCUSSED THE INITIAL CLBOUT FROM KAPALUA, AND BOTH AGREED ON THE RECOMMENDED INITIAL DEP PROC OF RWY HDG, AND 1500 FT OR ABOVE ACROSS THE SHORELINE. THE CAPT THEN SET BOTH NAVAIDS AND INFORMED ME DURING THIS TKOF BRIEF OF HIS PLAN TO DEPART THE ARPT AS DISCUSSED, AND THEN EXECUTE THE PRESCRIBED IFR DEP PROC FOR KAPALUA. AFTER CLBING THROUGH 1500 FT AND XING THE SHORELINE, WE PROCEEDED ON THE PRESCRIBED HDG OF 220 DEGS, UP TO 8000 FT. ONCE ESTABLISHED ON THE INITIAL HDG THE CAPT REVIEWED HIS INTENTIONS ALOUD SAYING 'OK, 220 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT THE 25 DME OUT OF MOLOKAI.' AFTER CLBING PAST 2000 FT I CONTACTED ZHN, BUT WAS ONLY GIVEN AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND NOT TOLD 'RADAR CONTACT.' SHORTLY AFTER, THE CAPT SAID 'THERE'S THE 25 OUT OF MKK,' AND PROCEEDED TO TURN TO INTERCEPT. I DID NOT HAVE THE JULLE 4 ARR OUT AND IN VIEW AT THAT TIME. I ONLY HAD THE VOR DME-A APCH PLATE FOR KAPALUA IN SIGHT (THE PLATE DEPICTS BOTH THE MOLOKAI VOR AND CHAIN INTXN). MY VOR WAS TUNED TO LANAI, HIS TO MOLOKAI. AS WE CONTINUED ON WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE THE 25 DME ARC THE CAPT BEGAN REVIEWING THE DEP PROCS ALOUD TO RECONFIRM HIS ACTIONS. AS HE READ WE WERE CALLED BY CTR ASKING IF WE HAD PASSED CHAIN. I BELIEVE THE CAPT ANSWERED YES, AND BEGAN A TURN TO THE L, FURTHER S. WE WERE STILL NOT IN RADAR CONTACT WHEN CTR CALLED US ASKING US TO CONFIRM OUR ALT OF 8000 FT. I REPLIED YES, AND GOT A QUICK CUT OFF OF THE LNY VOR TO SEE EXACTLY WHERE WE WERE. I POINTED TO MY APCH PLATE AND SAID TO THE CAPT 'WE'RE OVER HERE, SE OF LNY.' I THEN CALLED CTR ASKING FOR VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE JULLE 4 ARR. CTR DID NOT GIVE US VECTORS AT THAT TIME, AND ONCE AGAIN ASKED US TO CONFIRM OUR ALT. AFTER CONFIRMING 8000 FT BOTH THE CAPT AND I AGREED WE WERE WELL S OF COURSE, AND WE TURNED N IMMEDIATELY TO RECTIFY. ATC THEN ASKED IF WE SHOWED OURSELVES S OF LANAI. I REPLIED YES. WE FLEW THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WITHOUT INCIDENT. FACTORS WHICH I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OCCURRENCE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: THE CAPT'S UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE KAPALUA IFR DEP PROCS, AND HIS MISINTERP OF THE NAVAIDS USED. THE COMPANY HAD ONLY BEGUN FLTS TO KAPALUA MONTHS BEFORE, AND THE CAPT HAD BEEN UPGRADED ONLY WKS BEFORE. MY INEXPERIENCE FLYING IN THE LCL AREA. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SITUATIONALLY AWARE, AND SHOULD HAVE MORE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED OUR PLAN OF FLT AS WELL. (IT WASN'T UNTIL AFTER WE DEPARTED KAPALUA AND HAD BEGUN OUR TURN TO 220 DEGS THAT I SAW WE WERE FOLLOWING THE PRESCRIBED CLBING L TURN AFTER 1200 FT INSTEAD OF THE 1500 FT OVER THE SHORELINE.) STEPS THAT I BELIEVE COULD AID IN POSSIBLY PREVENTING OTHER SUCH OCCURRENCES ARE: NON-SCHEDULING OF RELATIVELY NEW FO WITH NEW CAPT. (A POLICY WHICH IS CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED BY OUR CHIEF PLT.) AN AREA FAMILIARIZATION CLASS INCORPORATED INTO INDOCTRINATION FOR THOSE PLTS NEW TO THE AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.