Narrative:

We arrived at rdg at XA05. On our in-range call we told rdg operations that we needed fuel. After shutdown, I noticed that we would need 600 pounds of fuel. I looked at my watch and realized that I would have time to grab a sandwich. The first officer and I then went into the restaurant. When I came out of the restaurant and into operations, I found that they had not pulled up a release or the WX packet. I then pulled up what was needed and proceeded to the aircraft. Due to the extra time taken to pull up the WX packet, I was running behind when I got to the aircraft. I immediately set about getting my ATIS, clearance and filling out the weight and balance form. Before I was through the passenger were being loaded. Due to that, I was just getting my clearance while the first officer was getting set in his seat. When going through the prestart checklist on fuel, I looked to see that the caps were secure. We taxied out, took off and climbed to cruise. While setting cruise power I noticed that we had not been refueled. I told the first officer then we discussed it and decided that if we did not have at least 700 pounds remaining when we crossed jst, we would land at jst. When we approached jst we had 600 pounds so I decided to land and refuel. At no time were the passenger in any increased danger. Once we realized we were short fuel, the passenger safety was the #1 concern, not our pride or employment. There were numerous contributing factors to this incident. The day prior, this crew had a 13 hour and 50 mins duty day, flew 7 hours and 52 mins, 7 legs. Then had an 8 hour and 20 min over night rest period with a 25 min van ride each way to and from the hotel. The reporting time on jul/xx/95 was XA55 am. The station not having the paperwork ready created an atmosphere that we were going to be behind the power curve and needed to hurry to catch up. That is when I should have slowed down to insure things were correct and accomplished. The old saying that 'you never have time to do it right, but you will always have time to correct it' is true. We had to take the time to make the refuel stop in jst. Supplemental information from acn 311681: at departure time I boarded the passenger and the captain and I started doing the before starting engine checks. Item #8 on the checklist involves verification of fuel caps secure and fuel quantity concurs with release. I verified cap right (duty as instructed by standardization manual) captain verified cap secure left fuel concurred with release. I assumed that he was correct I never looked at the release. Corrective action: no reduced rest, a verification of fuel quantity by both captain and first officer in the standardization.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LTT DEP STATION WITHOUT BEING FUELED.

Narrative: WE ARRIVED AT RDG AT XA05. ON OUR IN-RANGE CALL WE TOLD RDG OPS THAT WE NEEDED FUEL. AFTER SHUTDOWN, I NOTICED THAT WE WOULD NEED 600 LBS OF FUEL. I LOOKED AT MY WATCH AND REALIZED THAT I WOULD HAVE TIME TO GRAB A SANDWICH. THE FO AND I THEN WENT INTO THE RESTAURANT. WHEN I CAME OUT OF THE RESTAURANT AND INTO OPS, I FOUND THAT THEY HAD NOT PULLED UP A RELEASE OR THE WX PACKET. I THEN PULLED UP WHAT WAS NEEDED AND PROCEEDED TO THE ACFT. DUE TO THE EXTRA TIME TAKEN TO PULL UP THE WX PACKET, I WAS RUNNING BEHIND WHEN I GOT TO THE ACFT. I IMMEDIATELY SET ABOUT GETTING MY ATIS, CLRNC AND FILLING OUT THE WT AND BAL FORM. BEFORE I WAS THROUGH THE PAX WERE BEING LOADED. DUE TO THAT, I WAS JUST GETTING MY CLRNC WHILE THE FO WAS GETTING SET IN HIS SEAT. WHEN GOING THROUGH THE PRESTART CHKLIST ON FUEL, I LOOKED TO SEE THAT THE CAPS WERE SECURE. WE TAXIED OUT, TOOK OFF AND CLBED TO CRUISE. WHILE SETTING CRUISE PWR I NOTICED THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN REFUELED. I TOLD THE FO THEN WE DISCUSSED IT AND DECIDED THAT IF WE DID NOT HAVE AT LEAST 700 LBS REMAINING WHEN WE CROSSED JST, WE WOULD LAND AT JST. WHEN WE APCHED JST WE HAD 600 LBS SO I DECIDED TO LAND AND REFUEL. AT NO TIME WERE THE PAX IN ANY INCREASED DANGER. ONCE WE REALIZED WE WERE SHORT FUEL, THE PAX SAFETY WAS THE #1 CONCERN, NOT OUR PRIDE OR EMPLOYMENT. THERE WERE NUMEROUS CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT. THE DAY PRIOR, THIS CREW HAD A 13 HR AND 50 MINS DUTY DAY, FLEW 7 HRS AND 52 MINS, 7 LEGS. THEN HAD AN 8 HR AND 20 MIN OVER NIGHT REST PERIOD WITH A 25 MIN VAN RIDE EACH WAY TO AND FROM THE HOTEL. THE RPTING TIME ON JUL/XX/95 WAS XA55 AM. THE STATION NOT HAVING THE PAPERWORK READY CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE BEHIND THE PWR CURVE AND NEEDED TO HURRY TO CATCH UP. THAT IS WHEN I SHOULD HAVE SLOWED DOWN TO INSURE THINGS WERE CORRECT AND ACCOMPLISHED. THE OLD SAYING THAT 'YOU NEVER HAVE TIME TO DO IT RIGHT, BUT YOU WILL ALWAYS HAVE TIME TO CORRECT IT' IS TRUE. WE HAD TO TAKE THE TIME TO MAKE THE REFUEL STOP IN JST. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 311681: AT DEP TIME I BOARDED THE PAX AND THE CAPT AND I STARTED DOING THE BEFORE STARTING ENG CHKS. ITEM #8 ON THE CHKLIST INVOLVES VERIFICATION OF FUEL CAPS SECURE AND FUEL QUANTITY CONCURS WITH RELEASE. I VERIFIED CAP R (DUTY AS INSTRUCTED BY STANDARDIZATION MANUAL) CAPT VERIFIED CAP SECURE L FUEL CONCURRED WITH RELEASE. I ASSUMED THAT HE WAS CORRECT I NEVER LOOKED AT THE RELEASE. CORRECTIVE ACTION: NO REDUCED REST, A VERIFICATION OF FUEL QUANTITY BY BOTH CAPT AND FO IN THE STANDARDIZATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.