Narrative:

After a visual approach and landing on dfw runway 17L tower told us 'exit 1ST highspd and hold short runway 17R on taxiway el. I'll tell you what air carrier X, this is kind of non-standard but continue down to taxiway em and hold short, taxiway el is getting kind of crowded.' what he later said he wanted was for us to still exit the 1ST highspd, continue down taxiway M to taxiway em and hold short runway 17R. I took it to mean continue down the runway to taxiway em. By the time I realized I could not reach taxiway em directly from the runway I was past the 1ST highspd. I was about to turn right on a 90 degree taxiway el to get off the runway as soon as possible when the controller came on and said 'do you have the highspd made?' my first officer keyed up and said yes. At that point I thought for some reason he wanted us to continue to the next highspd and exit because we were well past the 1ST highspd. I expedited to the 2ND highspd and exited but not before tower had to make an air carrier on short final go around. After we exited the controller explained what he had wanted us to do and that the highspd we exited on was closed. There were no barricades or markings on the taxiway showing it closed that I saw. For the past couple of days the dfw ATIS had said the 2ND highspd for runway 17L was closed. On the current ATIS I had listened to on the way into dfw, I was listening for the announcement that the 2ND highspd for runway 17L was closed since I knew we would be landing on that runway but did not hear it. I am a new captain in an aircraft that is new to me out of an airport that is new to me. I feel the controller gave me confusing instructions during a critical phase of operation. These 2 things I feel were the main contributing factors to this incident. I also feel that because I was in doubt I followed the controller's last instructions to the word rather than reading in what I thought he might have really wanted. Supplemental information from acn 310110: the captain copied the ATIS at dfw, which included the NOTAM: 'runway 17L 2ND highspd taxiway closed,' but the captain made no mention of it, nor did he copy it down. I briefed the approach, including that we would make the 1ST highspd taxiway, since the 2ND highspd was closed. Tower said, 'make the 1ST highspd and hold short at echo lima -- no, we're backed up there, go on down and hold short at echo microphone.' I read back 'hold short at echo microphone,' I knew what he meant, since I've been flying out of dfw for a yr. I told the captain 'make the highspd' as I pointed to it, but he continued down the runway. We finally cleared the runway at the 3RD highspd, some 8000 ft down the runway. The tower advised us of our lack of clearance compliance, and I said we misunderstood and were sorry. Why did this happen? 1ST, the captain's lack of experience at dfw was a major contributing factor. Had he known dfw better, he would have known you can't get to taxiway em from the 2ND highspd, since it was closed. The captain said that he didn't know the 2ND highspd was closed. How? There was no excuse for that, except inattn. The captain didn't follow my guidance to make the 1ST highspd or the next 90 degree turn because he thought he knew what he was doing and was right. I asked the captain if he thought I had done anything wrong, and he said that I had not. What's an first officer to do? On the ground I'm a hostage, and I can be only so assertive in the few seconds it takes to drive past a taxiway. Lesson learned by the captain, I hope: listen up to your first officer, he's been doing this a yr longer than you!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NON ADHERENCE TO ATC INSTRUCTION BY PIC IN EMB-110. FAILS TO MAKE HIGHSPD TURN OFF DURING LNDG PROC ROLLOUT.

Narrative: AFTER A VISUAL APCH AND LNDG ON DFW RWY 17L TWR TOLD US 'EXIT 1ST HIGHSPD AND HOLD SHORT RWY 17R ON TXWY EL. I'LL TELL YOU WHAT ACR X, THIS IS KIND OF NON-STANDARD BUT CONTINUE DOWN TO TXWY EM AND HOLD SHORT, TXWY EL IS GETTING KIND OF CROWDED.' WHAT HE LATER SAID HE WANTED WAS FOR US TO STILL EXIT THE 1ST HIGHSPD, CONTINUE DOWN TXWY M TO TXWY EM AND HOLD SHORT RWY 17R. I TOOK IT TO MEAN CONTINUE DOWN THE RWY TO TXWY EM. BY THE TIME I REALIZED I COULD NOT REACH TXWY EM DIRECTLY FROM THE RWY I WAS PAST THE 1ST HIGHSPD. I WAS ABOUT TO TURN R ON A 90 DEG TXWY EL TO GET OFF THE RWY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHEN THE CTLR CAME ON AND SAID 'DO YOU HAVE THE HIGHSPD MADE?' MY FO KEYED UP AND SAID YES. AT THAT POINT I THOUGHT FOR SOME REASON HE WANTED US TO CONTINUE TO THE NEXT HIGHSPD AND EXIT BECAUSE WE WERE WELL PAST THE 1ST HIGHSPD. I EXPEDITED TO THE 2ND HIGHSPD AND EXITED BUT NOT BEFORE TWR HAD TO MAKE AN ACR ON SHORT FINAL GAR. AFTER WE EXITED THE CTLR EXPLAINED WHAT HE HAD WANTED US TO DO AND THAT THE HIGHSPD WE EXITED ON WAS CLOSED. THERE WERE NO BARRICADES OR MARKINGS ON THE TXWY SHOWING IT CLOSED THAT I SAW. FOR THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS THE DFW ATIS HAD SAID THE 2ND HIGHSPD FOR RWY 17L WAS CLOSED. ON THE CURRENT ATIS I HAD LISTENED TO ON THE WAY INTO DFW, I WAS LISTENING FOR THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE 2ND HIGHSPD FOR RWY 17L WAS CLOSED SINCE I KNEW WE WOULD BE LNDG ON THAT RWY BUT DID NOT HEAR IT. I AM A NEW CAPT IN AN ACFT THAT IS NEW TO ME OUT OF AN ARPT THAT IS NEW TO ME. I FEEL THE CTLR GAVE ME CONFUSING INSTRUCTIONS DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF OP. THESE 2 THINGS I FEEL WERE THE MAIN CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT. I ALSO FEEL THAT BECAUSE I WAS IN DOUBT I FOLLOWED THE CTLR'S LAST INSTRUCTIONS TO THE WORD RATHER THAN READING IN WHAT I THOUGHT HE MIGHT HAVE REALLY WANTED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 310110: THE CAPT COPIED THE ATIS AT DFW, WHICH INCLUDED THE NOTAM: 'RWY 17L 2ND HIGHSPD TXWY CLOSED,' BUT THE CAPT MADE NO MENTION OF IT, NOR DID HE COPY IT DOWN. I BRIEFED THE APCH, INCLUDING THAT WE WOULD MAKE THE 1ST HIGHSPD TXWY, SINCE THE 2ND HIGHSPD WAS CLOSED. TWR SAID, 'MAKE THE 1ST HIGHSPD AND HOLD SHORT AT ECHO LIMA -- NO, WE'RE BACKED UP THERE, GO ON DOWN AND HOLD SHORT AT ECHO MIKE.' I READ BACK 'HOLD SHORT AT ECHO MIKE,' I KNEW WHAT HE MEANT, SINCE I'VE BEEN FLYING OUT OF DFW FOR A YR. I TOLD THE CAPT 'MAKE THE HIGHSPD' AS I POINTED TO IT, BUT HE CONTINUED DOWN THE RWY. WE FINALLY CLRED THE RWY AT THE 3RD HIGHSPD, SOME 8000 FT DOWN THE RWY. THE TWR ADVISED US OF OUR LACK OF CLRNC COMPLIANCE, AND I SAID WE MISUNDERSTOOD AND WERE SORRY. WHY DID THIS HAPPEN? 1ST, THE CAPT'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE AT DFW WAS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. HAD HE KNOWN DFW BETTER, HE WOULD HAVE KNOWN YOU CAN'T GET TO TXWY EM FROM THE 2ND HIGHSPD, SINCE IT WAS CLOSED. THE CAPT SAID THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW THE 2ND HIGHSPD WAS CLOSED. HOW? THERE WAS NO EXCUSE FOR THAT, EXCEPT INATTN. THE CAPT DIDN'T FOLLOW MY GUIDANCE TO MAKE THE 1ST HIGHSPD OR THE NEXT 90 DEG TURN BECAUSE HE THOUGHT HE KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING AND WAS RIGHT. I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE THOUGHT I HAD DONE ANYTHING WRONG, AND HE SAID THAT I HAD NOT. WHAT'S AN FO TO DO? ON THE GND I'M A HOSTAGE, AND I CAN BE ONLY SO ASSERTIVE IN THE FEW SECONDS IT TAKES TO DRIVE PAST A TXWY. LESSON LEARNED BY THE CAPT, I HOPE: LISTEN UP TO YOUR FO, HE'S BEEN DOING THIS A YR LONGER THAN YOU!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.