Narrative:

On jul/xx/95 we departed ord for phl at XA00 in a B-757. The flight crew consisted of a check airman who occupied the first officer's seat and a captain who had just completed training and who occupied the captain's seat. The check airman was the captain of record. The new captain had been flying as PIC for 4 yrs in scheduled airline operations on a different type of airplane. The crew was at the end of the 4TH day of flying together. As the aircraft neared its destination, it was rerouted by ATC because of a line of thunderstorms, and descended at the request of ATC from FL410 to FL250 at 30 mi west of hgr VOR. At the top of descent, the check airman looked ahead over the tops of the clouds to see if any thunderstorms were visible. He was trying to get an idea of what the tops of the cells ahead might be, and also looking to see if he could tell if the cells were in the building stage or were mature with hammerheads. The line of thunderstorms was approximately over hgr in a position perpendicular to the path of flight. There was 1 cell directly on the route on the aircraft's radar, and it was entirely red. It was oval in shape, with no hooks or scallops. On either side of it there were other radar returns which were smaller and yellow in color. Other aircraft had passed through the area without incident, and it was the judgement of both pilots that they could also do so. As the aircraft got closer to the thunderstorms, the new captain turned on the seat belt sign, and ordered the flight attendants to stow all loose items, and seat themselves with their seat belts fastened. Then he slowed the airplane to the recommended speed for turbulence. The check pilot turned on the anti-ice heat for the engines since the aircraft was in light icing conditions. As the aircraft neared the large cell directly ahead, it broke out into the clear, and the pilots could clearly see the cell. It was in the building stage, and was compact. The pilots learned later that the top of the cell was at FL450. Both pilots looked the situation over, and each gave his opinion at the same time of which way was the best to deviate. The new captain thought that left was better, and the check pilot thought that right was better. However, in order to let the new captain exercise his own judgement, the check pilot quickly assessed the situation, and told the new captain to decide which way that he wanted to go, and then do it. The new captain clearly understood that the check pilot had given his permission to deviate either way, right or left, and that it was his decision to make. The new captain changed his mind about 3 times, and finally made a left turn which would take the airplane through a hole which showed clear sky on the other side. The check pilot assumed that the new captain had made a final decision because he held the heading for quite a while, and the airplane was too close to make a turn and pass the cell on the right. However, the new captain made a hard right turn, and declared that he had decided to pass the cell on the right. The check pilot knew that the airplane would not clear the cell. This was confirmed by the trend-vector indicator on the HSI which showed that the flight path would touch the corner of the return. The check pilot considered taking control of the airplane and turning back to the left, but realized that if he did so, the airplane would enter the cell near the center, instead of at the edge, so he let the right turn continue. The aircraft was hit by hail which shattered the outer panes of both forward windshields, caved in the radome, and damaged the engine spinners. The check pilot removed his oxygen mask from the storage compartment, and held it to his face. The crew asked for a lower altitude, declared an emergency, and proceeded to phl where the check pilot took control of the aircraft and landed normally. There are 2 factors which I as the check airman feel that are relevant to the failure of the airplane to clear the bad WX. The new cap supplemental inf O from acn T, who: was in control of the airplane, made a decision to turn right, so he could pass the cell on the south side, too late. I feel that a contributing factor to this was that a check airman was his copilot instead of a regular copilot. In this situation, the new pilot is constantly trying tooperate the airplane in such a manner that will please the check airman instead of just operating it according to what he thinks is good judgement. In this case, the new captain had it in the back of his mind that the check airman preferred to deviate to the right, even though the check airman had given him permission to make up his own mind, and act accordingly. After starting the deviation to the left, he had second thoughts, and decided to do it the way that he thought that the check airman preferred. In retrospect, there are 3 actions which I would have taken during this incident which I did not. First, I would have questioned the new captain about his final decision on which side that he planned to deviate instead of assuming that he had made up his mind. I assumed that he had made a final decision because he held the heading which would take us to the left for quite a while, and it was obvious to me that it was too late to turn right and deviate on the other side. I assumed that it was obvious to him also. Second, I would have increased the angle of bank to try to avoid the cell after the new captain started the turn. The turn was made on the autoplt, in heading select, with the bank angle set on automatic. The automatic setting gives less than the full 25 degree bank angle at high speeds. I could have changed the bank angle to manual 25 degrees. Or I could have disengaged the autoplt and turned manually at a greater angle of bank. Third, during descent, I would have raised the cabin altitude in order to decrease cabin differential pressure since we questioned the structural integrity of the windshields. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter check pilot says the incident probably would not have happened had it not been a training flight, because the trainee captain made a last min decision which the check pilot believes was to please him. After seeing the large buildup, both visually and on radar they had a discussion about the direction to turn to avoid the cell. Check pilot captain said right and trainee captain thought left. Check pilot thought trainee should have the opportunity to make the decision, but then the trainee couldn't decide. He turned left and right several times before getting close to the cell. Then, when it was really too late, he turned to the right and hit the edge of the rapidly building cell. Reporter says he could have probably salvaged the close-in turn by turning tighter with a greater bank angle to stay out of the cell. However, they went into the edge and sustained considerable damage from hail. Reporter says 'it was like rocks being dumped on the airplane.' though they were in the cell for only 20 seconds, they were surprised by the damage. Turbulence was only mdt and there were no injuries.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: IN FLT ENCOUNTER WX. HAIL DAMAGE. FLYING TOO CLOSE TO TSTM CELL.

Narrative: ON JUL/XX/95 WE DEPARTED ORD FOR PHL AT XA00 IN A B-757. THE FLC CONSISTED OF A CHK AIRMAN WHO OCCUPIED THE FO'S SEAT AND A CAPT WHO HAD JUST COMPLETED TRAINING AND WHO OCCUPIED THE CAPT'S SEAT. THE CHK AIRMAN WAS THE CAPT OF RECORD. THE NEW CAPT HAD BEEN FLYING AS PIC FOR 4 YRS IN SCHEDULED AIRLINE OPS ON A DIFFERENT TYPE OF AIRPLANE. THE CREW WAS AT THE END OF THE 4TH DAY OF FLYING TOGETHER. AS THE ACFT NEARED ITS DEST, IT WAS REROUTED BY ATC BECAUSE OF A LINE OF TSTMS, AND DSNDED AT THE REQUEST OF ATC FROM FL410 TO FL250 AT 30 MI W OF HGR VOR. AT THE TOP OF DSCNT, THE CHK AIRMAN LOOKED AHEAD OVER THE TOPS OF THE CLOUDS TO SEE IF ANY TSTMS WERE VISIBLE. HE WAS TRYING TO GET AN IDEA OF WHAT THE TOPS OF THE CELLS AHEAD MIGHT BE, AND ALSO LOOKING TO SEE IF HE COULD TELL IF THE CELLS WERE IN THE BUILDING STAGE OR WERE MATURE WITH HAMMERHEADS. THE LINE OF TSTMS WAS APPROX OVER HGR IN A POS PERPENDICULAR TO THE PATH OF FLT. THERE WAS 1 CELL DIRECTLY ON THE RTE ON THE ACFT'S RADAR, AND IT WAS ENTIRELY RED. IT WAS OVAL IN SHAPE, WITH NO HOOKS OR SCALLOPS. ON EITHER SIDE OF IT THERE WERE OTHER RADAR RETURNS WHICH WERE SMALLER AND YELLOW IN COLOR. OTHER ACFT HAD PASSED THROUGH THE AREA WITHOUT INCIDENT, AND IT WAS THE JUDGEMENT OF BOTH PLTS THAT THEY COULD ALSO DO SO. AS THE ACFT GOT CLOSER TO THE TSTMS, THE NEW CAPT TURNED ON THE SEAT BELT SIGN, AND ORDERED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO STOW ALL LOOSE ITEMS, AND SEAT THEMSELVES WITH THEIR SEAT BELTS FASTENED. THEN HE SLOWED THE AIRPLANE TO THE RECOMMENDED SPD FOR TURB. THE CHK PLT TURNED ON THE ANTI-ICE HEAT FOR THE ENGS SINCE THE ACFT WAS IN LIGHT ICING CONDITIONS. AS THE ACFT NEARED THE LARGE CELL DIRECTLY AHEAD, IT BROKE OUT INTO THE CLR, AND THE PLTS COULD CLRLY SEE THE CELL. IT WAS IN THE BUILDING STAGE, AND WAS COMPACT. THE PLTS LEARNED LATER THAT THE TOP OF THE CELL WAS AT FL450. BOTH PLTS LOOKED THE SIT OVER, AND EACH GAVE HIS OPINION AT THE SAME TIME OF WHICH WAY WAS THE BEST TO DEVIATE. THE NEW CAPT THOUGHT THAT L WAS BETTER, AND THE CHK PLT THOUGHT THAT R WAS BETTER. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO LET THE NEW CAPT EXERCISE HIS OWN JUDGEMENT, THE CHK PLT QUICKLY ASSESSED THE SIT, AND TOLD THE NEW CAPT TO DECIDE WHICH WAY THAT HE WANTED TO GO, AND THEN DO IT. THE NEW CAPT CLRLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CHK PLT HAD GIVEN HIS PERMISSION TO DEVIATE EITHER WAY, R OR L, AND THAT IT WAS HIS DECISION TO MAKE. THE NEW CAPT CHANGED HIS MIND ABOUT 3 TIMES, AND FINALLY MADE A L TURN WHICH WOULD TAKE THE AIRPLANE THROUGH A HOLE WHICH SHOWED CLR SKY ON THE OTHER SIDE. THE CHK PLT ASSUMED THAT THE NEW CAPT HAD MADE A FINAL DECISION BECAUSE HE HELD THE HDG FOR QUITE A WHILE, AND THE AIRPLANE WAS TOO CLOSE TO MAKE A TURN AND PASS THE CELL ON THE R. HOWEVER, THE NEW CAPT MADE A HARD R TURN, AND DECLARED THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO PASS THE CELL ON THE R. THE CHK PLT KNEW THAT THE AIRPLANE WOULD NOT CLR THE CELL. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY THE TREND-VECTOR INDICATOR ON THE HSI WHICH SHOWED THAT THE FLT PATH WOULD TOUCH THE CORNER OF THE RETURN. THE CHK PLT CONSIDERED TAKING CTL OF THE AIRPLANE AND TURNING BACK TO THE L, BUT REALIZED THAT IF HE DID SO, THE AIRPLANE WOULD ENTER THE CELL NEAR THE CTR, INSTEAD OF AT THE EDGE, SO HE LET THE R TURN CONTINUE. THE ACFT WAS HIT BY HAIL WHICH SHATTERED THE OUTER PANES OF BOTH FORWARD WINDSHIELDS, CAVED IN THE RADOME, AND DAMAGED THE ENG SPINNERS. THE CHK PLT REMOVED HIS OXYGEN MASK FROM THE STORAGE COMPARTMENT, AND HELD IT TO HIS FACE. THE CREW ASKED FOR A LOWER ALT, DECLARED AN EMER, AND PROCEEDED TO PHL WHERE THE CHK PLT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND LANDED NORMALLY. THERE ARE 2 FACTORS WHICH I AS THE CHK AIRMAN FEEL THAT ARE RELEVANT TO THE FAILURE OF THE AIRPLANE TO CLR THE BAD WX. THE NEW CAP SUPPLEMENTAL INF O FROM ACN T, WHO: WAS IN CTL OF THE AIRPLANE, MADE A DECISION TO TURN R, SO HE COULD PASS THE CELL ON THE S SIDE, TOO LATE. I FEEL THAT A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS WAS THAT A CHK AIRMAN WAS HIS COPLT INSTEAD OF A REGULAR COPLT. IN THIS SIT, THE NEW PLT IS CONSTANTLY TRYING TOOPERATE THE AIRPLANE IN SUCH A MANNER THAT WILL PLEASE THE CHK AIRMAN INSTEAD OF JUST OPERATING IT ACCORDING TO WHAT HE THINKS IS GOOD JUDGEMENT. IN THIS CASE, THE NEW CAPT HAD IT IN THE BACK OF HIS MIND THAT THE CHK AIRMAN PREFERRED TO DEVIATE TO THE R, EVEN THOUGH THE CHK AIRMAN HAD GIVEN HIM PERMISSION TO MAKE UP HIS OWN MIND, AND ACT ACCORDINGLY. AFTER STARTING THE DEV TO THE L, HE HAD SECOND THOUGHTS, AND DECIDED TO DO IT THE WAY THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE CHK AIRMAN PREFERRED. IN RETROSPECT, THERE ARE 3 ACTIONS WHICH I WOULD HAVE TAKEN DURING THIS INCIDENT WHICH I DID NOT. FIRST, I WOULD HAVE QUESTIONED THE NEW CAPT ABOUT HIS FINAL DECISION ON WHICH SIDE THAT HE PLANNED TO DEVIATE INSTEAD OF ASSUMING THAT HE HAD MADE UP HIS MIND. I ASSUMED THAT HE HAD MADE A FINAL DECISION BECAUSE HE HELD THE HDG WHICH WOULD TAKE US TO THE L FOR QUITE A WHILE, AND IT WAS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT IT WAS TOO LATE TO TURN R AND DEVIATE ON THE OTHER SIDE. I ASSUMED THAT IT WAS OBVIOUS TO HIM ALSO. SECOND, I WOULD HAVE INCREASED THE ANGLE OF BANK TO TRY TO AVOID THE CELL AFTER THE NEW CAPT STARTED THE TURN. THE TURN WAS MADE ON THE AUTOPLT, IN HDG SELECT, WITH THE BANK ANGLE SET ON AUTOMATIC. THE AUTOMATIC SETTING GIVES LESS THAN THE FULL 25 DEG BANK ANGLE AT HIGH SPDS. I COULD HAVE CHANGED THE BANK ANGLE TO MANUAL 25 DEGS. OR I COULD HAVE DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND TURNED MANUALLY AT A GREATER ANGLE OF BANK. THIRD, DURING DSCNT, I WOULD HAVE RAISED THE CABIN ALT IN ORDER TO DECREASE CABIN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SINCE WE QUESTIONED THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE WINDSHIELDS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR CHK PLT SAYS THE INCIDENT PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED HAD IT NOT BEEN A TRAINING FLT, BECAUSE THE TRAINEE CAPT MADE A LAST MIN DECISION WHICH THE CHK PLT BELIEVES WAS TO PLEASE HIM. AFTER SEEING THE LARGE BUILDUP, BOTH VISUALLY AND ON RADAR THEY HAD A DISCUSSION ABOUT THE DIRECTION TO TURN TO AVOID THE CELL. CHK PLT CAPT SAID R AND TRAINEE CAPT THOUGHT L. CHK PLT THOUGHT TRAINEE SHOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE DECISION, BUT THEN THE TRAINEE COULDN'T DECIDE. HE TURNED L AND R SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE GETTING CLOSE TO THE CELL. THEN, WHEN IT WAS REALLY TOO LATE, HE TURNED TO THE R AND HIT THE EDGE OF THE RAPIDLY BUILDING CELL. RPTR SAYS HE COULD HAVE PROBABLY SALVAGED THE CLOSE-IN TURN BY TURNING TIGHTER WITH A GREATER BANK ANGLE TO STAY OUT OF THE CELL. HOWEVER, THEY WENT INTO THE EDGE AND SUSTAINED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE FROM HAIL. RPTR SAYS 'IT WAS LIKE ROCKS BEING DUMPED ON THE AIRPLANE.' THOUGH THEY WERE IN THE CELL FOR ONLY 20 SECONDS, THEY WERE SURPRISED BY THE DAMAGE. TURB WAS ONLY MDT AND THERE WERE NO INJURIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.