Narrative:

B727 dispatched with multiple fuel gauges inoperative. Due to my company's cost cutting efforts, contract ramp and fuel service personnel were not trained to refuel aircraft with inoperative fuel gauges. Fuel slip delivered to aircraft was out of tolerance and we were 800 pounds short. We finally found agent who was qualified to take pitch and rolls reading and properly fuel aircraft. My point here is that my carrier and probably other carriers cost cutting in the areas of maintenance and experienced personnel being replaced by low cost contract workers is eroding our cushion of safety below acceptable levels. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter flies for a major united states air carrier with domestic and foreign rtes. This incident happened at sat. One fuel tank gauge was inoperative both at the wing station and in the cockpit. Another gauge was inoperative at the refueler's wing station only. One of the xfeed valves was wired in the open position. All of these items were properly noted as maintenance carry-over items. No one at sat was properly trained to refuel the aircraft with this unusual combination of fuel tank problems. The reporter worked on the ramp as a refueler for a couple of yrs, so he was able to assist in properly fueling the aircraft. The reporter filed a captain's report with his air carrier but has had no satisfactory response. The reporter flew this aircraft for several days and ran into the same refueling problem at other stations. The reporter is on his union's safety committee and takes this situation very seriously.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CAPT FOUND THAT SEVERAL OF HIS COMPANY'S REFUELING PERSONNEL DID NOT KNOW HOW TO REFUEL HIS ACFT.

Narrative: B727 DISPATCHED WITH MULTIPLE FUEL GAUGES INOP. DUE TO MY COMPANY'S COST CUTTING EFFORTS, CONTRACT RAMP AND FUEL SVC PERSONNEL WERE NOT TRAINED TO REFUEL ACFT WITH INOP FUEL GAUGES. FUEL SLIP DELIVERED TO ACFT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WE WERE 800 LBS SHORT. WE FINALLY FOUND AGENT WHO WAS QUALIFIED TO TAKE PITCH AND ROLLS READING AND PROPERLY FUEL ACFT. MY POINT HERE IS THAT MY CARRIER AND PROBABLY OTHER CARRIERS COST CUTTING IN THE AREAS OF MAINT AND EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL BEING REPLACED BY LOW COST CONTRACT WORKERS IS ERODING OUR CUSHION OF SAFETY BELOW ACCEPTABLE LEVELS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES FOR A MAJOR UNITED STATES ACR WITH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN RTES. THIS INCIDENT HAPPENED AT SAT. ONE FUEL TANK GAUGE WAS INOP BOTH AT THE WING STATION AND IN THE COCKPIT. ANOTHER GAUGE WAS INOP AT THE REFUELER'S WING STATION ONLY. ONE OF THE XFEED VALVES WAS WIRED IN THE OPEN POS. ALL OF THESE ITEMS WERE PROPERLY NOTED AS MAINT CARRY-OVER ITEMS. NO ONE AT SAT WAS PROPERLY TRAINED TO REFUEL THE ACFT WITH THIS UNUSUAL COMBINATION OF FUEL TANK PROBS. THE RPTR WORKED ON THE RAMP AS A REFUELER FOR A COUPLE OF YRS, SO HE WAS ABLE TO ASSIST IN PROPERLY FUELING THE ACFT. THE RPTR FILED A CAPT'S RPT WITH HIS ACR BUT HAS HAD NO SATISFACTORY RESPONSE. THE RPTR FLEW THIS ACFT FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND RAN INTO THE SAME REFUELING PROB AT OTHER STATIONS. THE RPTR IS ON HIS UNION'S SAFETY COMMITTEE AND TAKES THIS SIT VERY SERIOUSLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.