Narrative:

On apr/thu/95 I was first officer on a flight into seattle, wa. The captain was the PF. We'd been cleared for the ILS runway 16R approach and told to maintain 170 KTS to the OM. At some point outside the marker we descended through the bases into VMC and I called, 'airport in sight.' not hearing any response from the captain I assumed he was planning to remain 'on the gauges' in order to prepare for a scheduled proficiency check the following morning. Airspeed began to decay below the 170 KTS assigned. I crosschecked our airspeed indicators and checked our distance marker. Since we were slowing I assumed the captain was not only concentrating on centered localizer and GS needles, but also slowing to 'profile' airspeed. About this time we were handed off to tower. My previous glance at the DME showed us about 1.5 mi to the marker and now I believe we were less than a mi when told to contact tower. I wrongly assumed that because of the handoff and our closing proximity to the OM (the clearance limit) that it was too late to call for airspeed correction, that in a matter of seconds it would no longer be a factor. Shortly after we changed over to tower a company flight checked on and was told....'flight X go around...50 KTS overtake!! The captain although, experienced in the metroliner (9 yrs, 7 yrs as captain) had previously not completed transition training to another type (glass cockpit, computer screens, etc) and felt as though he was being scrutinized because of the failure to pass transition training. He mentioned his upcoming proficiency check several times and even though still in the metroliner he seemed concerned . I should not have, hesitated calling for airspeed correction, assumed the captain's intention regarding 'profile airspeed,' been swayed by captain's concern regarding prior transition training and upcoming proficiency check. I should have called 'airspeed' at the first sign of slowing, asked the captain if he heard the airspeed restr then called ATC to repeat if he hadn't heard it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SPD RESTR - THE LEAD ACR WAS ASSIGNED A MINIMUM SPD, BUT THE CAPT SLOWED AND THE SECOND ACR HAD TO GAR.

Narrative: ON APR/THU/95 I WAS FO ON A FLT INTO SEATTLE, WA. THE CAPT WAS THE PF. WE'D BEEN CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 16R APCH AND TOLD TO MAINTAIN 170 KTS TO THE OM. AT SOME POINT OUTSIDE THE MARKER WE DSNDED THROUGH THE BASES INTO VMC AND I CALLED, 'ARPT IN SIGHT.' NOT HEARING ANY RESPONSE FROM THE CAPT I ASSUMED HE WAS PLANNING TO REMAIN 'ON THE GAUGES' IN ORDER TO PREPARE FOR A SCHEDULED PROFICIENCY CHK THE FOLLOWING MORNING. AIRSPD BEGAN TO DECAY BELOW THE 170 KTS ASSIGNED. I XCHKED OUR AIRSPD INDICATORS AND CHKED OUR DISTANCE MARKER. SINCE WE WERE SLOWING I ASSUMED THE CAPT WAS NOT ONLY CONCENTRATING ON CTRED LOC AND GS NEEDLES, BUT ALSO SLOWING TO 'PROFILE' AIRSPD. ABOUT THIS TIME WE WERE HANDED OFF TO TWR. MY PREVIOUS GLANCE AT THE DME SHOWED US ABOUT 1.5 MI TO THE MARKER AND NOW I BELIEVE WE WERE LESS THAN A MI WHEN TOLD TO CONTACT TWR. I WRONGLY ASSUMED THAT BECAUSE OF THE HDOF AND OUR CLOSING PROX TO THE OM (THE CLRNC LIMIT) THAT IT WAS TOO LATE TO CALL FOR AIRSPD CORRECTION, THAT IN A MATTER OF SECONDS IT WOULD NO LONGER BE A FACTOR. SHORTLY AFTER WE CHANGED OVER TO TWR A COMPANY FLT CHKED ON AND WAS TOLD....'FLT X GO AROUND...50 KTS OVERTAKE!! THE CAPT ALTHOUGH, EXPERIENCED IN THE METROLINER (9 YRS, 7 YRS AS CAPT) HAD PREVIOUSLY NOT COMPLETED TRANSITION TRAINING TO ANOTHER TYPE (GLASS COCKPIT, COMPUTER SCREENS, ETC) AND FELT AS THOUGH HE WAS BEING SCRUTINIZED BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO PASS TRANSITION TRAINING. HE MENTIONED HIS UPCOMING PROFICIENCY CHK SEVERAL TIMES AND EVEN THOUGH STILL IN THE METROLINER HE SEEMED CONCERNED . I SHOULD NOT HAVE, HESITATED CALLING FOR AIRSPD CORRECTION, ASSUMED THE CAPT'S INTENTION REGARDING 'PROFILE AIRSPD,' BEEN SWAYED BY CAPT'S CONCERN REGARDING PRIOR TRANSITION TRAINING AND UPCOMING PROFICIENCY CHK. I SHOULD HAVE CALLED 'AIRSPD' AT THE FIRST SIGN OF SLOWING, ASKED THE CAPT IF HE HEARD THE AIRSPD RESTR THEN CALLED ATC TO REPEAT IF HE HADN'T HEARD IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.