Narrative:

After fueling the aircraft at dallas, the marshaller indicated the stuck fuel truck off the right wing and motioned that we would have to taxi to the left to avoid the truck. I looked at the wing and it seemed to be 5-10 ft from the truck and turning left as we taxied should clear us by that distance. The captain asked about clearance and I told him about the truck, where it was, how far away from the wing it appeared to be, and that I thought we would clear. I opened the window to watch and as we started to taxi we appeared clear. I looked forward to check the marshaller since he had a better view and perspective and then looked back at the wing. The wing appeared to get a little closer, but still clear, and at the same time noticed the wheels of the truck turning toward the aircraft like the driver was still trying to move the truck. I immediately yelled 'stop' 3 times as I turned back into the cockpit. The captain slammed on the brakes as soon as he heard me yell to stop, but probably did not hear the yell until the second or third yell due to the engine noise in the cockpit due to the window being open and me facing outside when I started to yell to stop. I told the captain about the truck tires turning and the wing getting closer is why I yelled to stop, but were still clear of the truck. While turning back outside I noticed the marshaller was still indicating a left turn and that we were clear. From the time I started yelling to the time the aircraft was stopped was only about a second or 2, and the nosewheel had traveled only a foot or 2. My impression when I started yelling was that we would remain clear and not going to be close. When I did look out, the wing appeared a little above the truck but not touching. I do not know whether the driver was attempting to or did lurch the truck (trying to free the brakes and back around the wing) and actually moved the vehicle, but when I started yelling, the wing was clear and not above the truck. The captain asked if we could still taxi out, I looked again and told the captain how close we were. We agreed that there was no way to taxi the aircraft. The captain set the brakes, unbuckled his seat belt, and looked out the right window. He saw how close the truck appeared and shut the engines down. Captain, maintenance, and ground people looked at the wing. The captain called the fire truck, but they were very slow to respond. Some passenger kept asking about the fire truck and we repeated that it had been called and was on its way. Maintenance inspected the wing, found no damage, signed the logbook, and the flight proceeded normally, after the delay to move the truck. Suggestions to prevent a recurrence: organization and planning of trips to prevent undue stress and pressure on crew that can effect the decision making process. Better guidelines and limits outlined in the operations manual of supplemental and on demand carriers (ie, 100 ft from any fuel truck).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INITIAL TAXI WAS TOO CLOSE TO TRUCK, STOPPED ACFT AND SHUT DOWN.

Narrative: AFTER FUELING THE ACFT AT DALLAS, THE MARSHALLER INDICATED THE STUCK FUEL TRUCK OFF THE R WING AND MOTIONED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO TAXI TO THE L TO AVOID THE TRUCK. I LOOKED AT THE WING AND IT SEEMED TO BE 5-10 FT FROM THE TRUCK AND TURNING L AS WE TAXIED SHOULD CLR US BY THAT DISTANCE. THE CAPT ASKED ABOUT CLRNC AND I TOLD HIM ABOUT THE TRUCK, WHERE IT WAS, HOW FAR AWAY FROM THE WING IT APPEARED TO BE, AND THAT I THOUGHT WE WOULD CLR. I OPENED THE WINDOW TO WATCH AND AS WE STARTED TO TAXI WE APPEARED CLR. I LOOKED FORWARD TO CHK THE MARSHALLER SINCE HE HAD A BETTER VIEW AND PERSPECTIVE AND THEN LOOKED BACK AT THE WING. THE WING APPEARED TO GET A LITTLE CLOSER, BUT STILL CLR, AND AT THE SAME TIME NOTICED THE WHEELS OF THE TRUCK TURNING TOWARD THE ACFT LIKE THE DRIVER WAS STILL TRYING TO MOVE THE TRUCK. I IMMEDIATELY YELLED 'STOP' 3 TIMES AS I TURNED BACK INTO THE COCKPIT. THE CAPT SLAMMED ON THE BRAKES AS SOON AS HE HEARD ME YELL TO STOP, BUT PROBABLY DID NOT HEAR THE YELL UNTIL THE SECOND OR THIRD YELL DUE TO THE ENG NOISE IN THE COCKPIT DUE TO THE WINDOW BEING OPEN AND ME FACING OUTSIDE WHEN I STARTED TO YELL TO STOP. I TOLD THE CAPT ABOUT THE TRUCK TIRES TURNING AND THE WING GETTING CLOSER IS WHY I YELLED TO STOP, BUT WERE STILL CLR OF THE TRUCK. WHILE TURNING BACK OUTSIDE I NOTICED THE MARSHALLER WAS STILL INDICATING A L TURN AND THAT WE WERE CLR. FROM THE TIME I STARTED YELLING TO THE TIME THE ACFT WAS STOPPED WAS ONLY ABOUT A SECOND OR 2, AND THE NOSEWHEEL HAD TRAVELED ONLY A FOOT OR 2. MY IMPRESSION WHEN I STARTED YELLING WAS THAT WE WOULD REMAIN CLR AND NOT GOING TO BE CLOSE. WHEN I DID LOOK OUT, THE WING APPEARED A LITTLE ABOVE THE TRUCK BUT NOT TOUCHING. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE DRIVER WAS ATTEMPTING TO OR DID LURCH THE TRUCK (TRYING TO FREE THE BRAKES AND BACK AROUND THE WING) AND ACTUALLY MOVED THE VEHICLE, BUT WHEN I STARTED YELLING, THE WING WAS CLR AND NOT ABOVE THE TRUCK. THE CAPT ASKED IF WE COULD STILL TAXI OUT, I LOOKED AGAIN AND TOLD THE CAPT HOW CLOSE WE WERE. WE AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO TAXI THE ACFT. THE CAPT SET THE BRAKES, UNBUCKLED HIS SEAT BELT, AND LOOKED OUT THE R WINDOW. HE SAW HOW CLOSE THE TRUCK APPEARED AND SHUT THE ENGS DOWN. CAPT, MAINT, AND GND PEOPLE LOOKED AT THE WING. THE CAPT CALLED THE FIRE TRUCK, BUT THEY WERE VERY SLOW TO RESPOND. SOME PAX KEPT ASKING ABOUT THE FIRE TRUCK AND WE REPEATED THAT IT HAD BEEN CALLED AND WAS ON ITS WAY. MAINT INSPECTED THE WING, FOUND NO DAMAGE, SIGNED THE LOGBOOK, AND THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY, AFTER THE DELAY TO MOVE THE TRUCK. SUGGESTIONS TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE: ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING OF TRIPS TO PREVENT UNDUE STRESS AND PRESSURE ON CREW THAT CAN EFFECT THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. BETTER GUIDELINES AND LIMITS OUTLINED IN THE OPS MANUAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL AND ON DEMAND CARRIERS (IE, 100 FT FROM ANY FUEL TRUCK).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.