Narrative:

In jan/xx/95, I preflted a baron 58PA in the lighted hangar for a planned XA00 am charter departure. After preflting, the hangar door was opened and a towbar was attached to pull the airplane out of the hangar onto the ramp. It was still dark at approximately XA45 am. My boss, mr X (owner/operator, chief pilot and director of operations), pulled the plane by the towbar, I pulled by the propeller. He instructed me to go around to the cabin and lock the brakes while he held the towbar. The passenger arrived immediately thereafter. They were loaded into the aft door and I briefed them. After I got into the aircraft, he got into the 'copilot's' seat. After I completed the 'before starting' checklist, I started the engines. I taxied to runway 26 at boulder, co (1v5) and I completed the remaining checklists and departed uneventfully. I cycled the landing gear and a thump was heard. I elected to crank the gear down. It only cranked about 1/4 of the way down. I then cycled it down with the motor. I elected to go to an airport that would provide more assistance. Jeffco (bjc) was ultimately decided upon where the tower informed me the towbar was still attached. I circled until the fire trucks arrived. Suspecting a nose gear failure, the emergency checklist was used prior to and again during final. After landing, the nose collapsed after the aircraft had substantially slowed on rollout. Everyone was immediately disembarked. There were no injuries to anyone aboard. Although I was PIC of the flight, I was also performing my duties in a subordinate position to X. When I took my instructions to lock the brakes, the indication to me was that mr. X as a competent pilot with twice my total time, would complete the repositioning of the airplane by removing the towbar. I was led to believe that mr X was assuming responsibility for this function. The problem then specifically arose when the towbar was not removed from the aircraft, bur rather set on the ground. The chain of events leading to the problem all occurred in darkness. The towbar was not visible. Under no circumstances will the owner operator impose subordination on the PIC that could tend to deviate him from the crucial phase of the preparation of a flight. Sufficient and competent assistance to be made available to PIC for proper preparation and relocation of the aircraft prior to the arrival of passenger. The PIC will make a full 360 degree walk around immediately prior to entering the cabin 1 additional time even after a thorough preflight has been performed. As far as human performance considerations, I feel the situation was handled with good judgement by my electing to go to a class D airport that would provide more assistance with a visual check of my situation, a longer runway, calling the fire trucks, and the use of the poh/afm emergency checklist anticipating gear failure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BEECH BARON 58 PERFORMS TKOF WITH TOWBAR ATTACHED.

Narrative: IN JAN/XX/95, I PREFLTED A BARON 58PA IN THE LIGHTED HANGAR FOR A PLANNED XA00 AM CHARTER DEP. AFTER PREFLTING, THE HANGAR DOOR WAS OPENED AND A TOWBAR WAS ATTACHED TO PULL THE AIRPLANE OUT OF THE HANGAR ONTO THE RAMP. IT WAS STILL DARK AT APPROX XA45 AM. MY BOSS, MR X (OWNER/OPERATOR, CHIEF PLT AND DIRECTOR OF OPS), PULLED THE PLANE BY THE TOWBAR, I PULLED BY THE PROP. HE INSTRUCTED ME TO GAR TO THE CABIN AND LOCK THE BRAKES WHILE HE HELD THE TOWBAR. THE PAX ARRIVED IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. THEY WERE LOADED INTO THE AFT DOOR AND I BRIEFED THEM. AFTER I GOT INTO THE ACFT, HE GOT INTO THE 'COPLT'S' SEAT. AFTER I COMPLETED THE 'BEFORE STARTING' CHKLIST, I STARTED THE ENGS. I TAXIED TO RWY 26 AT BOULDER, CO (1V5) AND I COMPLETED THE REMAINING CHKLISTS AND DEPARTED UNEVENTFULLY. I CYCLED THE LNDG GEAR AND A THUMP WAS HEARD. I ELECTED TO CRANK THE GEAR DOWN. IT ONLY CRANKED ABOUT 1/4 OF THE WAY DOWN. I THEN CYCLED IT DOWN WITH THE MOTOR. I ELECTED TO GO TO AN ARPT THAT WOULD PROVIDE MORE ASSISTANCE. JEFFCO (BJC) WAS ULTIMATELY DECIDED UPON WHERE THE TWR INFORMED ME THE TOWBAR WAS STILL ATTACHED. I CIRCLED UNTIL THE FIRE TRUCKS ARRIVED. SUSPECTING A NOSE GEAR FAILURE, THE EMER CHKLIST WAS USED PRIOR TO AND AGAIN DURING FINAL. AFTER LNDG, THE NOSE COLLAPSED AFTER THE ACFT HAD SUBSTANTIALLY SLOWED ON ROLLOUT. EVERYONE WAS IMMEDIATELY DISEMBARKED. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO ANYONE ABOARD. ALTHOUGH I WAS PIC OF THE FLT, I WAS ALSO PERFORMING MY DUTIES IN A SUBORDINATE POS TO X. WHEN I TOOK MY INSTRUCTIONS TO LOCK THE BRAKES, THE INDICATION TO ME WAS THAT MR. X AS A COMPETENT PLT WITH TWICE MY TOTAL TIME, WOULD COMPLETE THE REPOSITIONING OF THE AIRPLANE BY REMOVING THE TOWBAR. I WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT MR X WAS ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS FUNCTION. THE PROB THEN SPECIFICALLY AROSE WHEN THE TOWBAR WAS NOT REMOVED FROM THE ACFT, BUR RATHER SET ON THE GND. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE PROB ALL OCCURRED IN DARKNESS. THE TOWBAR WAS NOT VISIBLE. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL THE OWNER OPERATOR IMPOSE SUBORDINATION ON THE PIC THAT COULD TEND TO DEVIATE HIM FROM THE CRUCIAL PHASE OF THE PREPARATION OF A FLT. SUFFICIENT AND COMPETENT ASSISTANCE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO PIC FOR PROPER PREPARATION AND RELOCATION OF THE ACFT PRIOR TO THE ARR OF PAX. THE PIC WILL MAKE A FULL 360 DEG WALK AROUND IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO ENTERING THE CABIN 1 ADDITIONAL TIME EVEN AFTER A THOROUGH PREFLT HAS BEEN PERFORMED. AS FAR AS HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS, I FEEL THE SIT WAS HANDLED WITH GOOD JUDGEMENT BY MY ELECTING TO GO TO A CLASS D ARPT THAT WOULD PROVIDE MORE ASSISTANCE WITH A VISUAL CHK OF MY SIT, A LONGER RWY, CALLING THE FIRE TRUCKS, AND THE USE OF THE POH/AFM EMER CHKLIST ANTICIPATING GEAR FAILURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.