Narrative:

On flight xa (atl to slc) we made a medical emergency landing at wichita (a passenger had an apparent heart attack). We made an overweight landing 371000 pounds verses maximum of 358000 pounds which is no big deal. In the confusion at ict (unable to contact company or ramp via radio, emergency medical team, flight attendant, and pilot paper work), we didn't research the overweight landing. The captain and so (flight engineer) stayed on the aircraft while I went inside to coordination a flight plan and fuel load. I had just finished speaking with the dispatcher (hung up) when the captain arrived in operations. He asked about the paper work and during the discussion we remembered the overweight landing. I started to look for a phone number to dispatch and the boss said not to worry about it. He didn't think any inspection or write-up was required. I told him I thought something needed to be done, log book, write-up, and inspection, but I didn't have a reference. We knew there was no company maintenance available, but I thought that contract maintenance was available. The boss was sure everything was ok and was concerned with the near 300 passenger and their connecting flts. We completed our paper work and checklists and took off for slc. En route the captain found the heavy weight landing section in our flight operations manual (fom). It said a write-up and inspection was to be made for overweight lndgs. At this point we knew we had messed up, and made the write-up inbound to slc. The boss called an atl chief pilot and filled out a cior (company report) for the incident(south). Problems: 1) too much happening. 2) little help or input from company primarily due to 3) poor communications. 4) concern with passenger connecting flts. 5) I was right, and let the captain talk me out of it because of all the above. 6) our company fom has so much stuff you almost feel uncomfortable making any decision. (It's pretty well laid out in the book). Corrective actions: basically, 1) don't let passenger concerns override filling the squares for maintenance of FAA, etc. 2) in an unusual situation, slow down until it looks normal, and use a pay phone for communications if necessary. We also exceeded 250 KT below 10000 ft in an effort to get the passenger on the ground in wichita. It may be illegal (I don't know), but the guy left the aircraft correctly. (Ie: alive). Supplemental information from acn 295319: L1011. Supplemental information from acn 295317: in the confusion at ict, unable to contact company or ramp via radio. The inadvertent omission of a write-up and inspection may have been averted by better radio coverage or an fom (on board each aircraft) that is easily idented.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AND ACR FLC DIVERTED ENRTE TO MEET A MEDICAL EMER, AND AFTER THE FACT, DISCOVERED THAT THEY HAD LANDED IN AN OVERWT CONDITION.

Narrative: ON FLT XA (ATL TO SLC) WE MADE A MEDICAL EMER LNDG AT WICHITA (A PAX HAD AN APPARENT HEART ATTACK). WE MADE AN OVERWT LNDG 371000 LBS VERSES MAX OF 358000 LBS WHICH IS NO BIG DEAL. IN THE CONFUSION AT ICT (UNABLE TO CONTACT COMPANY OR RAMP VIA RADIO, EMER MEDICAL TEAM, FLT ATTENDANT, AND PLT PAPER WORK), WE DIDN'T RESEARCH THE OVERWT LNDG. THE CAPT AND SO (FE) STAYED ON THE ACFT WHILE I WENT INSIDE TO COORD A FLT PLAN AND FUEL LOAD. I HAD JUST FINISHED SPEAKING WITH THE DISPATCHER (HUNG UP) WHEN THE CAPT ARRIVED IN OPS. HE ASKED ABOUT THE PAPER WORK AND DURING THE DISCUSSION WE REMEMBERED THE OVERWT LNDG. I STARTED TO LOOK FOR A PHONE NUMBER TO DISPATCH AND THE BOSS SAID NOT TO WORRY ABOUT IT. HE DIDN'T THINK ANY INSPECTION OR WRITE-UP WAS REQUIRED. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT SOMETHING NEEDED TO BE DONE, LOG BOOK, WRITE-UP, AND INSPECTION, BUT I DIDN'T HAVE A REF. WE KNEW THERE WAS NO COMPANY MAINT AVAILABLE, BUT I THOUGHT THAT CONTRACT MAINT WAS AVAILABLE. THE BOSS WAS SURE EVERYTHING WAS OK AND WAS CONCERNED WITH THE NEAR 300 PAX AND THEIR CONNECTING FLTS. WE COMPLETED OUR PAPER WORK AND CHKLISTS AND TOOK OFF FOR SLC. ENRTE THE CAPT FOUND THE HVY WT LNDG SECTION IN OUR FLT OPS MANUAL (FOM). IT SAID A WRITE-UP AND INSPECTION WAS TO BE MADE FOR OVERWT LNDGS. AT THIS POINT WE KNEW WE HAD MESSED UP, AND MADE THE WRITE-UP INBOUND TO SLC. THE BOSS CALLED AN ATL CHIEF PLT AND FILLED OUT A CIOR (COMPANY RPT) FOR THE INCIDENT(S). PROBS: 1) TOO MUCH HAPPENING. 2) LITTLE HELP OR INPUT FROM COMPANY PRIMARILY DUE TO 3) POOR COMS. 4) CONCERN WITH PAX CONNECTING FLTS. 5) I WAS RIGHT, AND LET THE CAPT TALK ME OUT OF IT BECAUSE OF ALL THE ABOVE. 6) OUR COMPANY FOM HAS SO MUCH STUFF YOU ALMOST FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE MAKING ANY DECISION. (IT'S PRETTY WELL LAID OUT IN THE BOOK). CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: BASICALLY, 1) DON'T LET PAX CONCERNS OVERRIDE FILLING THE SQUARES FOR MAINT OF FAA, ETC. 2) IN AN UNUSUAL SIT, SLOW DOWN UNTIL IT LOOKS NORMAL, AND USE A PAY PHONE FOR COMS IF NECESSARY. WE ALSO EXCEEDED 250 KT BELOW 10000 FT IN AN EFFORT TO GET THE PAX ON THE GND IN WICHITA. IT MAY BE ILLEGAL (I DON'T KNOW), BUT THE GUY LEFT THE ACFT CORRECTLY. (IE: ALIVE). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 295319: L1011. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 295317: IN THE CONFUSION AT ICT, UNABLE TO CONTACT COMPANY OR RAMP VIA RADIO. THE INADVERTENT OMISSION OF A WRITE-UP AND INSPECTION MAY HAVE BEEN AVERTED BY BETTER RADIO COVERAGE OR AN FOM (ON BOARD EACH ACFT) THAT IS EASILY IDENTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.