Narrative:

The altitude deviation took place as part of the SID for runway 28 at millville, nj (miv). The SID called for an initial altitude of 2500 ft but we mistakenly understood 4000 ft and put 4000 ft in the altitude alerter. The events that followed up to the deviation were as follows: after my first officer picked up the clearance he briefed me on it but did not mention the SID. I confirmed with him that we would be making a left turn direct to leeah intersection, he agreed. Just prior to taking the runway I realized he hadn't put our initial altitude in the alerter. I asked him what it was and he said 4000 ft, so I set 4000 ft in the alerter and he confirmed the alerter setting. I then noticed on his clearance that he had written 'L2.' I asked what that was and he said a SID. I scrambled to look at the SID for we were approaching our clearance void-time. I got the 400 ft, then right turn to 40 degrees to intercept sie R-333, so we departed. Climbing out of 3000 ft atlantic city approach informed us we were supposed to be at 2500 ft, but said to go ahead and climb to 4000 ft. In talking with the first officer afterwards he said he had looked at the SID but failed to notice the 2500 ft in the 'thence' section. He assumes he got the 4000 ft altitude from glancing down at the SID and confusing the 400 ft and 40 degree for a 4000 ft altitude. This situation could have been avoided if I would have stopped the error chain in setting up the departure. I should have asked for another void time and used the additional time to follow proper cockpit resource management procedures and to help my first officer get 'caught up.' supplemental information from acn 294701: once we had started the engines I got our clearance and void time, we were using the speakers so it was heard by both of us. I copied it down. I called out the checklist and handled the radio and the captain taxied approximately 1/3 the way to the runway the captain decided that I should fly this leg and I handed him the clearance and the departure plate. He required that, I run the checklist while he checked the departure. We were distracted by a helicopter maneuvering on the taxiway in front of us. At this point he changed the navigation set up, but I presumed it was due to the change in our clearance by ATC (smyrna trans dropped) we arrived at the hold with 5 mins left on our void time, but the captain was concerned to departure before a gulfstream doing touch and goes returned, on taking the runway I recall the captain confirming 400 ft then right to 040 degrees which I confirmed. He recalls confirming 4000 ft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALTDEV -- SID.

Narrative: THE ALTDEV TOOK PLACE AS PART OF THE SID FOR RWY 28 AT MILLVILLE, NJ (MIV). THE SID CALLED FOR AN INITIAL ALT OF 2500 FT BUT WE MISTAKENLY UNDERSTOOD 4000 FT AND PUT 4000 FT IN THE ALT ALERTER. THE EVENTS THAT FOLLOWED UP TO THE DEV WERE AS FOLLOWS: AFTER MY FO PICKED UP THE CLRNC HE BRIEFED ME ON IT BUT DID NOT MENTION THE SID. I CONFIRMED WITH HIM THAT WE WOULD BE MAKING A L TURN DIRECT TO LEEAH INTXN, HE AGREED. JUST PRIOR TO TAKING THE RWY I REALIZED HE HADN'T PUT OUR INITIAL ALT IN THE ALERTER. I ASKED HIM WHAT IT WAS AND HE SAID 4000 FT, SO I SET 4000 FT IN THE ALERTER AND HE CONFIRMED THE ALERTER SETTING. I THEN NOTICED ON HIS CLRNC THAT HE HAD WRITTEN 'L2.' I ASKED WHAT THAT WAS AND HE SAID A SID. I SCRAMBLED TO LOOK AT THE SID FOR WE WERE APCHING OUR CLRNC VOID-TIME. I GOT THE 400 FT, THEN RIGHT TURN TO 40 DEGS TO INTERCEPT SIE R-333, SO WE DEPARTED. CLBING OUT OF 3000 FT ATLANTIC CITY APCH INFORMED US WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 2500 FT, BUT SAID TO GO AHEAD AND CLB TO 4000 FT. IN TALKING WITH THE FO AFTERWARDS HE SAID HE HAD LOOKED AT THE SID BUT FAILED TO NOTICE THE 2500 FT IN THE 'THENCE' SECTION. HE ASSUMES HE GOT THE 4000 FT ALT FROM GLANCING DOWN AT THE SID AND CONFUSING THE 400 FT AND 40 DEG FOR A 4000 FT ALT. THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF I WOULD HAVE STOPPED THE ERROR CHAIN IN SETTING UP THE DEP. I SHOULD HAVE ASKED FOR ANOTHER VOID TIME AND USED THE ADDITIONAL TIME TO FOLLOW PROPER COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT PROCS AND TO HELP MY FO GET 'CAUGHT UP.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 294701: ONCE WE HAD STARTED THE ENGS I GOT OUR CLRNC AND VOID TIME, WE WERE USING THE SPEAKERS SO IT WAS HEARD BY BOTH OF US. I COPIED IT DOWN. I CALLED OUT THE CHKLIST AND HANDLED THE RADIO AND THE CAPT TAXIED APPROX 1/3 THE WAY TO THE RWY THE CAPT DECIDED THAT I SHOULD FLY THIS LEG AND I HANDED HIM THE CLRNC AND THE DEP PLATE. HE REQUIRED THAT, I RUN THE CHKLIST WHILE HE CHKED THE DEP. WE WERE DISTRACTED BY A HELI MANEUVERING ON THE TXWY IN FRONT OF US. AT THIS POINT HE CHANGED THE NAV SET UP, BUT I PRESUMED IT WAS DUE TO THE CHANGE IN OUR CLRNC BY ATC (SMYRNA TRANS DROPPED) WE ARRIVED AT THE HOLD WITH 5 MINS LEFT ON OUR VOID TIME, BUT THE CAPT WAS CONCERNED TO DEP BEFORE A GULFSTREAM DOING TOUCH AND GOES RETURNED, ON TAKING THE RWY I RECALL THE CAPT CONFIRMING 400 FT THEN RIGHT TO 040 DEGS WHICH I CONFIRMED. HE RECALLS CONFIRMING 4000 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.