Narrative:

The captain and I were on a 3-DAY trip that is very tiring. The first day is an all night flight from sfo-bwi checking in at XA00 and arriving at XG15. Then we lay over for 26 hours before departing at XB15 for a bwi-pit-sfo flight. Although this seems like an adequate rest, I have observed the crews to be sluggish the last day. The captain I was flying with is very competent, but seemed a little 'uptight' and 'short' with the crew. The flight from pit-sfo was where the problem occurred. We had a full aircraft with just enough fuel to complete the flight, fly to the alternate and 45 mins reserve. The captain wanted to put more fuel on, but load control said they would have to bump passenger and bags. We decided to go with the fuel as dispatched. Although I was flying, the captain loaded the FMC (this not unusual). I normally check this after he is done. I remember checking the route, but I do not remember checking the amount of reserve fuel loaded into the weight page. We were delayed almost 1 hour off of the gate due to maintenance. This put everyone in a bad mood. We took off and all was normal. The captain and I were checking the fuel remaining with the FMC periodically. I remember looking at the release and determining that we needed 4300 pounds on landing at sfo to be 'legal.' the FMC was showing 5000 pounds all the way across the united states. About 300 mi out of sfo, we got an ACARS from our dispatcher asking us if we would have enough fuel at sfo. This surprised me and by the time I figured out what happened we were not in a good place to divert. (Our dispatch release shows alternate and reserve fuel in different places. I had added these 2 together, 3400 plus 900 equals 5300. And came up with 4300 pounds. I assume the reason the FMC had not alerted us is the captain had entered a number much lower than actually needed for reserve fuel.) the captain sent a reply to dispatch that we would land with 4200 pounds (which the FMC showed at this time). I agreed with this as sfo had good WX (2700 ft broken 12 mi) with many alternates close by. We proceeded on, but sfo was landing to the east and approach slowed us up and a long final left us with 3000 pounds at the gate. I do not know if the captain knew all the time if we would not have enough legal fuel, but I would have spoken up earlier about our lack of legal fuel had I known. At no time did I think the flight was not safe. The lack of normal rest and probably get homeitis were contributing factors. Also, my having flown with the captain before may have led me to trust his judgement too much.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT WITH LESS THAN REQUIRED MINIMUM FUEL.

Narrative: THE CAPT AND I WERE ON A 3-DAY TRIP THAT IS VERY TIRING. THE FIRST DAY IS AN ALL NIGHT FLT FROM SFO-BWI CHKING IN AT XA00 AND ARRIVING AT XG15. THEN WE LAY OVER FOR 26 HRS BEFORE DEPARTING AT XB15 FOR A BWI-PIT-SFO FLT. ALTHOUGH THIS SEEMS LIKE AN ADEQUATE REST, I HAVE OBSERVED THE CREWS TO BE SLUGGISH THE LAST DAY. THE CAPT I WAS FLYING WITH IS VERY COMPETENT, BUT SEEMED A LITTLE 'UPTIGHT' AND 'SHORT' WITH THE CREW. THE FLT FROM PIT-SFO WAS WHERE THE PROB OCCURRED. WE HAD A FULL ACFT WITH JUST ENOUGH FUEL TO COMPLETE THE FLT, FLY TO THE ALTERNATE AND 45 MINS RESERVE. THE CAPT WANTED TO PUT MORE FUEL ON, BUT LOAD CTL SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO BUMP PAX AND BAGS. WE DECIDED TO GO WITH THE FUEL AS DISPATCHED. ALTHOUGH I WAS FLYING, THE CAPT LOADED THE FMC (THIS NOT UNUSUAL). I NORMALLY CHK THIS AFTER HE IS DONE. I REMEMBER CHKING THE RTE, BUT I DO NOT REMEMBER CHKING THE AMOUNT OF RESERVE FUEL LOADED INTO THE WT PAGE. WE WERE DELAYED ALMOST 1 HR OFF OF THE GATE DUE TO MAINT. THIS PUT EVERYONE IN A BAD MOOD. WE TOOK OFF AND ALL WAS NORMAL. THE CAPT AND I WERE CHKING THE FUEL REMAINING WITH THE FMC PERIODICALLY. I REMEMBER LOOKING AT THE RELEASE AND DETERMINING THAT WE NEEDED 4300 LBS ON LNDG AT SFO TO BE 'LEGAL.' THE FMC WAS SHOWING 5000 LBS ALL THE WAY ACROSS THE UNITED STATES. ABOUT 300 MI OUT OF SFO, WE GOT AN ACARS FROM OUR DISPATCHER ASKING US IF WE WOULD HAVE ENOUGH FUEL AT SFO. THIS SURPRISED ME AND BY THE TIME I FIGURED OUT WHAT HAPPENED WE WERE NOT IN A GOOD PLACE TO DIVERT. (OUR DISPATCH RELEASE SHOWS ALTERNATE AND RESERVE FUEL IN DIFFERENT PLACES. I HAD ADDED THESE 2 TOGETHER, 3400 PLUS 900 EQUALS 5300. AND CAME UP WITH 4300 LBS. I ASSUME THE REASON THE FMC HAD NOT ALERTED US IS THE CAPT HAD ENTERED A NUMBER MUCH LOWER THAN ACTUALLY NEEDED FOR RESERVE FUEL.) THE CAPT SENT A REPLY TO DISPATCH THAT WE WOULD LAND WITH 4200 LBS (WHICH THE FMC SHOWED AT THIS TIME). I AGREED WITH THIS AS SFO HAD GOOD WX (2700 FT BROKEN 12 MI) WITH MANY ALTERNATES CLOSE BY. WE PROCEEDED ON, BUT SFO WAS LNDG TO THE E AND APCH SLOWED US UP AND A LONG FINAL LEFT US WITH 3000 LBS AT THE GATE. I DO NOT KNOW IF THE CAPT KNEW ALL THE TIME IF WE WOULD NOT HAVE ENOUGH LEGAL FUEL, BUT I WOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP EARLIER ABOUT OUR LACK OF LEGAL FUEL HAD I KNOWN. AT NO TIME DID I THINK THE FLT WAS NOT SAFE. THE LACK OF NORMAL REST AND PROBABLY GET HOMEITIS WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. ALSO, MY HAVING FLOWN WITH THE CAPT BEFORE MAY HAVE LED ME TO TRUST HIS JUDGEMENT TOO MUCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.