Narrative:

Aircraft is an lr-36, operated by an far-135 charter company. We were on company business, operating under far-91. 3 company personnel (including pilots) and 3 guests were en route, fmy direct yip, at FL450/0,077 imn. There were clusters of thunderstorms around 20 NM west of dqn and over toledo and east, with tops to FL350. Approaching dqn from the south, we were well clear of the cells, but I asked ZOB to keep us high as long as possible, due to reported low level turbulence. About 50 NM south of dqn, #2 engine fuel computer automatic mode failed. It was ctlable in manual mode. I opted to delay bringing the engine back to 50-60 percent N1 (to reset, per emergency checklist) until we were within the probable relight envelope and better able to afford a descent. (From our radar picture and visual sighting of lightning east and west of our course, FL350 and below looked safer north of dqn than south of dqn.) while reducing power during the descent, about 75 NM north of dqn, #2 would not respond to throttle and ran to 100.5 percent N1. At that point, I shut it down, declared an emergency, and received clearance direct to yip for the ILS runway 5. He had obtained yip ATIS. At FL180, he called '.54.' I said '30.54?' he said 'yeah.' (it was 29.54.) as we descended about 500 ft below our assigned 2400 ft, yip tower called a low altitude alert. At that point, we had ground contact, and my first officer told yip tower that we'd remain VFR. (He hadn't consulted me about that.) I immediately climbed back to 2400 ft, as the visibility looked too marginal for dodging towers in a jet. We landed, without further incident. There were several things I could've done differently. (Example: don't fly over an area of suspected severe turbulence that you'd rather not descend into.) ATC could've been a lot more flexible. (About 100 NM before the engine shut down, we had to beg and plead repeatedly, to stay above the rough stuff, instead of plunging down early on their 'standard' descent. We did it their way, rather than declare an emergency to stay high. I doubt that their traffic into dtw was that bad, at XA30 on a sunday night). My first officer has 3000 lear jet hours but practically no training or experience in lr-30 series. He is not a line pilot. He flies very seldom. His meanderings through both normal and abnormal checklists were very slow and incomplete, at a time when I was too busy to do his job. Recurrent first officer training would be 'nice.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN AND ALTDEV.

Narrative: ACFT IS AN LR-36, OPERATED BY AN FAR-135 CHARTER COMPANY. WE WERE ON COMPANY BUSINESS, OPERATING UNDER FAR-91. 3 COMPANY PERSONNEL (INCLUDING PLTS) AND 3 GUESTS WERE ENRTE, FMY DIRECT YIP, AT FL450/0,077 IMN. THERE WERE CLUSTERS OF TSTMS AROUND 20 NM W OF DQN AND OVER TOLEDO AND E, WITH TOPS TO FL350. APCHING DQN FROM THE S, WE WERE WELL CLR OF THE CELLS, BUT I ASKED ZOB TO KEEP US HIGH AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, DUE TO RPTED LOW LEVEL TURB. ABOUT 50 NM S OF DQN, #2 ENG FUEL COMPUTER AUTOMATIC MODE FAILED. IT WAS CTLABLE IN MANUAL MODE. I OPTED TO DELAY BRINGING THE ENG BACK TO 50-60 PERCENT N1 (TO RESET, PER EMER CHKLIST) UNTIL WE WERE WITHIN THE PROBABLE RELIGHT ENVELOPE AND BETTER ABLE TO AFFORD A DSCNT. (FROM OUR RADAR PICTURE AND VISUAL SIGHTING OF LIGHTNING E AND W OF OUR COURSE, FL350 AND BELOW LOOKED SAFER N OF DQN THAN S OF DQN.) WHILE REDUCING PWR DURING THE DSCNT, ABOUT 75 NM N OF DQN, #2 WOULD NOT RESPOND TO THROTTLE AND RAN TO 100.5 PERCENT N1. AT THAT POINT, I SHUT IT DOWN, DECLARED AN EMER, AND RECEIVED CLRNC DIRECT TO YIP FOR THE ILS RWY 5. HE HAD OBTAINED YIP ATIS. AT FL180, HE CALLED '.54.' I SAID '30.54?' HE SAID 'YEAH.' (IT WAS 29.54.) AS WE DSNDED ABOUT 500 FT BELOW OUR ASSIGNED 2400 FT, YIP TWR CALLED A LOW ALT ALERT. AT THAT POINT, WE HAD GND CONTACT, AND MY FO TOLD YIP TWR THAT WE'D REMAIN VFR. (HE HADN'T CONSULTED ME ABOUT THAT.) I IMMEDIATELY CLBED BACK TO 2400 FT, AS THE VISIBILITY LOOKED TOO MARGINAL FOR DODGING TWRS IN A JET. WE LANDED, WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THERE WERE SEVERAL THINGS I COULD'VE DONE DIFFERENTLY. (EXAMPLE: DON'T FLY OVER AN AREA OF SUSPECTED SEVERE TURB THAT YOU'D RATHER NOT DSND INTO.) ATC COULD'VE BEEN A LOT MORE FLEXIBLE. (ABOUT 100 NM BEFORE THE ENG SHUT DOWN, WE HAD TO BEG AND PLEAD REPEATEDLY, TO STAY ABOVE THE ROUGH STUFF, INSTEAD OF PLUNGING DOWN EARLY ON THEIR 'STANDARD' DSCNT. WE DID IT THEIR WAY, RATHER THAN DECLARE AN EMER TO STAY HIGH. I DOUBT THAT THEIR TFC INTO DTW WAS THAT BAD, AT XA30 ON A SUNDAY NIGHT). MY FO HAS 3000 LEAR JET HRS BUT PRACTICALLY NO TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE IN LR-30 SERIES. HE IS NOT A LINE PLT. HE FLIES VERY SELDOM. HIS MEANDERINGS THROUGH BOTH NORMAL AND ABNORMAL CHKLISTS WERE VERY SLOW AND INCOMPLETE, AT A TIME WHEN I WAS TOO BUSY TO DO HIS JOB. RECURRENT FO TRAINING WOULD BE 'NICE.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.