Narrative:

B757 at FL350, a few min west of PDT. Destination was pdx. EICAS warning right oil filter bypass came on. We assumed the blockage could be due to metal pieces in the pratt and whitneys oil system (later confirmed by the mechanics on the ground) when we ran the cockpit operating manual procedure. By the end of the procedure the engine was at idle power and the warning was still on, the next step was to perform an in-flight shutdown. We had already gotten clearance for lower when we prepared to go to idle power. We were just a few mi from our FMC top of descent path. Our jump seater (dispatch qualified) checked MEA's, while we discussed deviating to geg or mwh or even PDT and called our dispatcher and maintenance control people. Although we were in the descent phase and kept our focus on pdx as a destination, the shadow of 'should we divert' lingered for quite awhile during the process, probably because of all the industry and operations discussion about the necessity to divert with any problem (mainly to minimize cruise time) with 2 engine aircraft. In the heat of a shutdown in the dark of the night over high terrain it's a hard thing to dismiss. We declared an emergency with ATC and could not have asked for any better help. The flight attendants were brought into the loop: we would be making a single engine landing, the equipment, with all their flashing lights, would be standing by the runway when we landed, but unless something changed there would be no special preparation except for them to be a couple of clicks up on normal alertness until we were stopped on the ground. The engine was shut down and a relatively normal descent and visual approach and landing. None of the passenger said that they even had an inkling that anything unusual was going on, although the light shift during the power change when the APU came on line should have turned a couple of heads. The process of being sure that all those who are required to be notified and brought into the loop seems like much more of an effort than the actual flying part: probably in contrast to the training procedures, which is probably the way it should be. In retrospect, we all felt that cockpit resource management was very effective during this process. All the 'legal' brouhaha about diverting a 2 engine airplane caused the greatest distraction, will the second guessers find something we didn't? Finally, we were curious if the pratt engines have a much greater shutdown rate than the roll's, what are the odds of it happening again in this career or lifetime, with our present reliability?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 ENG SHUT DOWN DURING HIGH ALT CRUISE.

Narrative: B757 AT FL350, A FEW MIN W OF PDT. DEST WAS PDX. EICAS WARNING R OIL FILTER BYPASS CAME ON. WE ASSUMED THE BLOCKAGE COULD BE DUE TO METAL PIECES IN THE PRATT AND WHITNEYS OIL SYS (LATER CONFIRMED BY THE MECHS ON THE GND) WHEN WE RAN THE COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL PROC. BY THE END OF THE PROC THE ENG WAS AT IDLE PWR AND THE WARNING WAS STILL ON, THE NEXT STEP WAS TO PERFORM AN INFLT SHUTDOWN. WE HAD ALREADY GOTTEN CLRNC FOR LOWER WHEN WE PREPARED TO GO TO IDLE PWR. WE WERE JUST A FEW MI FROM OUR FMC TOP OF DSCNT PATH. OUR JUMP SEATER (DISPATCH QUALIFIED) CHKED MEA'S, WHILE WE DISCUSSED DEVIATING TO GEG OR MWH OR EVEN PDT AND CALLED OUR DISPATCHER AND MAINT CTL PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH WE WERE IN THE DSCNT PHASE AND KEPT OUR FOCUS ON PDX AS A DEST, THE SHADOW OF 'SHOULD WE DIVERT' LINGERED FOR QUITE AWHILE DURING THE PROCESS, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF ALL THE INDUSTRY AND OPS DISCUSSION ABOUT THE NECESSITY TO DIVERT WITH ANY PROB (MAINLY TO MINIMIZE CRUISE TIME) WITH 2 ENG ACFT. IN THE HEAT OF A SHUTDOWN IN THE DARK OF THE NIGHT OVER HIGH TERRAIN IT'S A HARD THING TO DISMISS. WE DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC AND COULD NOT HAVE ASKED FOR ANY BETTER HELP. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE BROUGHT INTO THE LOOP: WE WOULD BE MAKING A SINGLE ENG LNDG, THE EQUIP, WITH ALL THEIR FLASHING LIGHTS, WOULD BE STANDING BY THE RWY WHEN WE LANDED, BUT UNLESS SOMETHING CHANGED THERE WOULD BE NO SPECIAL PREPARATION EXCEPT FOR THEM TO BE A COUPLE OF CLICKS UP ON NORMAL ALERTNESS UNTIL WE WERE STOPPED ON THE GND. THE ENG WAS SHUT DOWN AND A RELATIVELY NORMAL DSCNT AND VISUAL APCH AND LNDG. NONE OF THE PAX SAID THAT THEY EVEN HAD AN INKLING THAT ANYTHING UNUSUAL WAS GOING ON, ALTHOUGH THE LIGHT SHIFT DURING THE PWR CHANGE WHEN THE APU CAME ON LINE SHOULD HAVE TURNED A COUPLE OF HEADS. THE PROCESS OF BEING SURE THAT ALL THOSE WHO ARE REQUIRED TO BE NOTIFIED AND BROUGHT INTO THE LOOP SEEMS LIKE MUCH MORE OF AN EFFORT THAN THE ACTUAL FLYING PART: PROBABLY IN CONTRAST TO THE TRAINING PROCS, WHICH IS PROBABLY THE WAY IT SHOULD BE. IN RETROSPECT, WE ALL FELT THAT COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT WAS VERY EFFECTIVE DURING THIS PROCESS. ALL THE 'LEGAL' BROUHAHA ABOUT DIVERTING A 2 ENG AIRPLANE CAUSED THE GREATEST DISTR, WILL THE SECOND GUESSERS FIND SOMETHING WE DIDN'T? FINALLY, WE WERE CURIOUS IF THE PRATT ENGS HAVE A MUCH GREATER SHUTDOWN RATE THAN THE ROLL'S, WHAT ARE THE ODDS OF IT HAPPENING AGAIN IN THIS CAREER OR LIFETIME, WITH OUR PRESENT RELIABILITY?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.