Narrative:

The flight was a charter from pdx to eko on nov/xx/94. Captain was PF, approximately 6700 total, 1700 in type, 60 as PIC. First officer was a new hire, approximately 1 month on line. Time in type unknown. Flight into eko was first time for captain, second time for first officer. During preflight brief, I discussed the fact that the company operation specifications did not allow for lda approachs, and if visual was not available, a VOR DME-B circling would be necessary to successfully complete the flight. Operation specifications dictate that any circling approach be conducted in conditions not less than 1000 ft 3 mi. Since I was a 'hi- mins' captain, the maneuver would be flown at 1200 ft to 3 1/2 mi. At departure time, WX was reported as 13 scattered M22 overcast 10 southwest, runway 34/30/0000/997. We discussed our concerns regarding icing conditions and terrain, noting the location of peaks near the airport. The 2600 ft difference in MSA altitude requirements was also mentioned, with myself expressing a desire to stay in the 'less mountainous' sector of the MSA. All normal procedures were conducted to level cruise. Contributing factors: in-range of eko, first officer picked up local WX from AWOS-3 which reported 22 scattered 27 broken 32 broken 10 southwest runway 36/31/0000/998. After that, communications was attempted with contract customer operations, but was unanswered. Since we had passenger requiring wheelchairs, I advised first officer to make another attempt closer to eko. As we approached eko, ZLC inquired if we would like the lda approach. After advising that we were unable lda, I asked what the minimum vectoring altitude was along the lda course, and was advised by center that it was 11000 ft MSL. Seeing that a visual approach was impossible, I instructed first officer to get the latest AWOS-3, and requested vectors to the bqu 241 degree radial 10 DME arc IAF, reasoning that I wanted to stay as far away as possible from the 11000 ft plus peaks just east of the airport. Normal descent check and approach briefing were accomplished prior to transition from FL180. Center cleared us down to 11000 ft as we approached the 10 DME arc. I was still concerned about the WX, and since we were above 10000 ft MSL, I told the first officer to check AWOS-3 once more, and give the contract operations 1 more try. Almost simultaneously, center advised: 'maintain 11000 ft until established on the 10 DME arc, cleared for the VOR-B approach. Contact elko tower 126.5.' I could see that the first officer was either getting latest WX or talking to contract operations, (which indeed was the case) and thought that he would be back up with me very soon, so I called the tower myself. They advised: 'report inbound.' the 10 DME arc (west) specifies 9500 ft MSL and as I approached 11000 ft the first officer advised that he was 'back with me.' the following events occurred in a time span of approximately 15 seconds. When we passed through 10500 ft, the first officer advised '1000 ft to go.' as we passed 9700 ft, I noticed that the flight mode annunciator did not show altitude arm. Since the digital flight guidance system did not capture altitude, and we were still descending at approximately 1000 FPM, I instructed the first officer to select altitude hold. When it was apparent that the autoplt would not level us in time, I disconnected the autoplt and hand flew the captain. Just as we were leveling off, the automatic throttles disconnected with the power set nearly idle. This was not immediately apparent, as I was attempting to keep the airplane from busting our initial approach segment altitude of 9500 ft. The resultant loss of airspeed was rather quick, and I was trying to figure out why we were losing speed. How it was discovered: as stated before, all this occurred within that very short time span, and I reacted to the speed loss by applying power and re-engaging autothrottles, which were now working normally. As I was 'fixing' our multiple problems, eko tower called and said ' radio check.' why he did this, I can't say, but I was still unable to get an altitude captain and was instructing my first officer to re-arm the altitude, when this call came from tower. I answered tower and was distraction to the point that I now had lost situational awareness, and for an inexplicable reason, the RMI made no sense to me. We were now at approximately. 8 DME and off the arc. We were in and out of IMC and as I made occasional visual ground contact, I looked out the first officer's window and saw complete 'black hole.' that is, I could not discern the ground, sky or even a horizon line. I asked the first officer what the MSA was for our sector and he said 12000 ft.' (which actually was the east arc published altitude.) during those last few seconds, I saw occasional indications on the radar altimeter 'tape' on the EFIS. Since we were supposed to be about 4000 ft AGL, and the tape doesn't start indicating until about 2500 ft AGL, combined with the 'black hole' I was looking at, my senses were telling me that something was definitely wrong. I became very concerned that we were in imminent danger of controled flight into terrain, even though there was no GPWS warning. I immediately called for climb power and told the first officer to set 12000 ft. As we climbed, and had no other distrs I was able to 're-acquire' my navigation awareness and realized that we were only a mi or so inside the arc, but were east of our intended track. I got the airplane re-established on the arc, descended back to 9500 ft MSL (south of the 241 degree radial) and completed the approach. The circling maneuver itself was rather close in, but again I was seeing the 'black hold' syndrome out the right side of the aircraft as we made our left downwind to runway 23. I was very apprehensive of making the downwind any further south of the runway than I was. The subsequent turn to base and final left us about a 1/4 mi north of the runway extended centerline. Winds were calm and it took minimal turning to get aligned with the runway. A normal landing was made, and we parked on the ramp. Perceptions, judgements, decisions: I believe that a combination of factors (crew inexperience, marginal WX, multiple distrs) was the cause of our problem. I may have pre-maturely initiated the climb to 12000 ft, but not being able to see the ground and the 'black hole' part of the ground I could see 'raised the red flag.' having been a check airman, ground and simulator instructor, 1 of my constant edicts to students was: 'when you do find yourself in trouble, don't hesitate to take corrective action now.' I genuinely felt at the time, that had I not initiated that climb, that I could run into 1 of those close-by peaks. I believe that if we were able to shoot the lda approach, none of this would have occurred.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF AN MLG BECAME DISORIENTED DURING DSCNT FOR A DME ARC APCH AND DSNDED BELOW THE MSA PRESCRIBED.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS A CHARTER FROM PDX TO EKO ON NOV/XX/94. CAPT WAS PF, APPROX 6700 TOTAL, 1700 IN TYPE, 60 AS PIC. FO WAS A NEW HIRE, APPROX 1 MONTH ON LINE. TIME IN TYPE UNKNOWN. FLT INTO EKO WAS FIRST TIME FOR CAPT, SECOND TIME FOR FO. DURING PREFLT BRIEF, I DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT THE COMPANY OP SPECS DID NOT ALLOW FOR LDA APCHS, AND IF VISUAL WAS NOT AVAILABLE, A VOR DME-B CIRCLING WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THE FLT. OP SPECS DICTATE THAT ANY CIRCLING APCH BE CONDUCTED IN CONDITIONS NOT LESS THAN 1000 FT 3 MI. SINCE I WAS A 'HI- MINS' CAPT, THE MANEUVER WOULD BE FLOWN AT 1200 FT TO 3 1/2 MI. AT DEP TIME, WX WAS RPTED AS 13 SCATTERED M22 OVCST 10 SW, RWY 34/30/0000/997. WE DISCUSSED OUR CONCERNS REGARDING ICING CONDITIONS AND TERRAIN, NOTING THE LOCATION OF PEAKS NEAR THE ARPT. THE 2600 FT DIFFERENCE IN MSA ALT REQUIREMENTS WAS ALSO MENTIONED, WITH MYSELF EXPRESSING A DESIRE TO STAY IN THE 'LESS MOUNTAINOUS' SECTOR OF THE MSA. ALL NORMAL PROCS WERE CONDUCTED TO LEVEL CRUISE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: IN-RANGE OF EKO, FO PICKED UP LCL WX FROM AWOS-3 WHICH RPTED 22 SCATTERED 27 BROKEN 32 BROKEN 10 SW RWY 36/31/0000/998. AFTER THAT, COMS WAS ATTEMPTED WITH CONTRACT CUSTOMER OPS, BUT WAS UNANSWERED. SINCE WE HAD PAX REQUIRING WHEELCHAIRS, I ADVISED FO TO MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT CLOSER TO EKO. AS WE APCHED EKO, ZLC INQUIRED IF WE WOULD LIKE THE LDA APCH. AFTER ADVISING THAT WE WERE UNABLE LDA, I ASKED WHAT THE MINIMUM VECTORING ALT WAS ALONG THE LDA COURSE, AND WAS ADVISED BY CTR THAT IT WAS 11000 FT MSL. SEEING THAT A VISUAL APCH WAS IMPOSSIBLE, I INSTRUCTED FO TO GET THE LATEST AWOS-3, AND REQUESTED VECTORS TO THE BQU 241 DEG RADIAL 10 DME ARC IAF, REASONING THAT I WANTED TO STAY AS FAR AWAY AS POSSIBLE FROM THE 11000 FT PLUS PEAKS JUST E OF THE ARPT. NORMAL DSCNT CHK AND APCH BRIEFING WERE ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO TRANSITION FROM FL180. CTR CLRED US DOWN TO 11000 FT AS WE APCHED THE 10 DME ARC. I WAS STILL CONCERNED ABOUT THE WX, AND SINCE WE WERE ABOVE 10000 FT MSL, I TOLD THE FO TO CHK AWOS-3 ONCE MORE, AND GIVE THE CONTRACT OPS 1 MORE TRY. ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY, CTR ADVISED: 'MAINTAIN 11000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON THE 10 DME ARC, CLRED FOR THE VOR-B APCH. CONTACT ELKO TWR 126.5.' I COULD SEE THAT THE FO WAS EITHER GETTING LATEST WX OR TALKING TO CONTRACT OPS, (WHICH INDEED WAS THE CASE) AND THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD BE BACK UP WITH ME VERY SOON, SO I CALLED THE TWR MYSELF. THEY ADVISED: 'RPT INBOUND.' THE 10 DME ARC (W) SPECIFIES 9500 FT MSL AND AS I APCHED 11000 FT THE FO ADVISED THAT HE WAS 'BACK WITH ME.' THE FOLLOWING EVENTS OCCURRED IN A TIME SPAN OF APPROX 15 SECONDS. WHEN WE PASSED THROUGH 10500 FT, THE FO ADVISED '1000 FT TO GO.' AS WE PASSED 9700 FT, I NOTICED THAT THE FLT MODE ANNUNCIATOR DID NOT SHOW ALT ARM. SINCE THE DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE SYS DID NOT CAPTURE ALT, AND WE WERE STILL DSNDING AT APPROX 1000 FPM, I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO SELECT ALT HOLD. WHEN IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE AUTOPLT WOULD NOT LEVEL US IN TIME, I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND HAND FLEW THE CAPT. JUST AS WE WERE LEVELING OFF, THE AUTO THROTTLES DISCONNECTED WITH THE PWR SET NEARLY IDLE. THIS WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARENT, AS I WAS ATTEMPTING TO KEEP THE AIRPLANE FROM BUSTING OUR INITIAL APCH SEGMENT ALT OF 9500 FT. THE RESULTANT LOSS OF AIRSPD WAS RATHER QUICK, AND I WAS TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHY WE WERE LOSING SPD. HOW IT WAS DISCOVERED: AS STATED BEFORE, ALL THIS OCCURRED WITHIN THAT VERY SHORT TIME SPAN, AND I REACTED TO THE SPD LOSS BY APPLYING PWR AND RE-ENGAGING AUTOTHROTTLES, WHICH WERE NOW WORKING NORMALLY. AS I WAS 'FIXING' OUR MULTIPLE PROBS, EKO TWR CALLED AND SAID ' RADIO CHK.' WHY HE DID THIS, I CAN'T SAY, BUT I WAS STILL UNABLE TO GET AN ALT CAPT AND WAS INSTRUCTING MY FO TO RE-ARM THE ALT, WHEN THIS CALL CAME FROM TWR. I ANSWERED TWR AND WAS DISTR TO THE POINT THAT I NOW HAD LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, AND FOR AN INEXPLICABLE REASON, THE RMI MADE NO SENSE TO ME. WE WERE NOW AT APPROX. 8 DME AND OFF THE ARC. WE WERE IN AND OUT OF IMC AND AS I MADE OCCASIONAL VISUAL GND CONTACT, I LOOKED OUT THE FO'S WINDOW AND SAW COMPLETE 'BLACK HOLE.' THAT IS, I COULD NOT DISCERN THE GND, SKY OR EVEN A HORIZON LINE. I ASKED THE FO WHAT THE MSA WAS FOR OUR SECTOR AND HE SAID 12000 FT.' (WHICH ACTUALLY WAS THE E ARC PUBLISHED ALT.) DURING THOSE LAST FEW SECONDS, I SAW OCCASIONAL INDICATIONS ON THE RADAR ALTIMETER 'TAPE' ON THE EFIS. SINCE WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE ABOUT 4000 FT AGL, AND THE TAPE DOESN'T START INDICATING UNTIL ABOUT 2500 FT AGL, COMBINED WITH THE 'BLACK HOLE' I WAS LOOKING AT, MY SENSES WERE TELLING ME THAT SOMETHING WAS DEFINITELY WRONG. I BECAME VERY CONCERNED THAT WE WERE IN IMMINENT DANGER OF CTLED FLT INTO TERRAIN, EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO GPWS WARNING. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED FOR CLB PWR AND TOLD THE FO TO SET 12000 FT. AS WE CLBED, AND HAD NO OTHER DISTRS I WAS ABLE TO 'RE-ACQUIRE' MY NAV AWARENESS AND REALIZED THAT WE WERE ONLY A MI OR SO INSIDE THE ARC, BUT WERE E OF OUR INTENDED TRACK. I GOT THE AIRPLANE RE-ESTABLISHED ON THE ARC, DSNDED BACK TO 9500 FT MSL (S OF THE 241 DEG RADIAL) AND COMPLETED THE APCH. THE CIRCLING MANEUVER ITSELF WAS RATHER CLOSE IN, BUT AGAIN I WAS SEEING THE 'BLACK HOLD' SYNDROME OUT THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT AS WE MADE OUR L DOWNWIND TO RWY 23. I WAS VERY APPREHENSIVE OF MAKING THE DOWNWIND ANY FURTHER S OF THE RWY THAN I WAS. THE SUBSEQUENT TURN TO BASE AND FINAL LEFT US ABOUT A 1/4 MI N OF THE RWY EXTENDED CTRLINE. WINDS WERE CALM AND IT TOOK MINIMAL TURNING TO GET ALIGNED WITH THE RWY. A NORMAL LNDG WAS MADE, AND WE PARKED ON THE RAMP. PERCEPTIONS, JUDGEMENTS, DECISIONS: I BELIEVE THAT A COMBINATION OF FACTORS (CREW INEXPERIENCE, MARGINAL WX, MULTIPLE DISTRS) WAS THE CAUSE OF OUR PROB. I MAY HAVE PRE-MATURELY INITIATED THE CLB TO 12000 FT, BUT NOT BEING ABLE TO SEE THE GND AND THE 'BLACK HOLE' PART OF THE GND I COULD SEE 'RAISED THE RED FLAG.' HAVING BEEN A CHK AIRMAN, GND AND SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR, 1 OF MY CONSTANT EDICTS TO STUDENTS WAS: 'WHEN YOU DO FIND YOURSELF IN TROUBLE, DON'T HESITATE TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION NOW.' I GENUINELY FELT AT THE TIME, THAT HAD I NOT INITIATED THAT CLB, THAT I COULD RUN INTO 1 OF THOSE CLOSE-BY PEAKS. I BELIEVE THAT IF WE WERE ABLE TO SHOOT THE LDA APCH, NONE OF THIS WOULD HAVE OCCURRED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.