Narrative:

We had arrived in dtw at xa:00 local time with the intention of doing a charter to mexico city with a scheduled departure at XX30 local. After many delays, this flight was canceled and were advised to contact the company. By this time, it was XX00 local time. Up until the time of the cancellation, the before start checklist had been completed. While the captain was inside the operations office obtaining a new release, the ground crew advised me and the flight engineer that they would like to push us back in order to allow another flight room to depart. At that time I released the parking brake. After the pushback was complete, I reset the parking brake in conjunction with the flight engineer. I turned the auxiliary hydraulic pump to build up the brake pressure. At which time I depressed my foot brakes while the flight engine pulled the parking brake knob on the steering tiller to reset the parking brake. When the captain returned with the new paperwork, we needed a few mins to get prepared (ie, new load manifest, new clearance, etc). During this time, 1 of the ground crew advised us that a chock was stuck under the nose gear. He asked the captain to jiggle the steering tiller in the hopes of freeing the chock. At no time were we advised that the chocks would be completely removed. When all doors had been closed, we proceeded with the engine starts. While the captain did the starts, I monitored engine parameters. It was while starting the 4TH and last engine that I felt as if we were moving. At almost the same time that stepped on the brakes, we made contact with the air start cart. The air cart was wedged under the radome but luckily the damage was minimal and no one was injured on the ground. Factors which contributed to the incident in my opinion are: 1) a failure to reread the checklist to ensure everything was still in place for departure. 2) premature removal of the chocks. 3) lack of a headset for ground to cockpit communications. 4) poor lighting and rain on the windshield which made it difficult to see the ground crew and to detect movement. 5) fatigue caused by the long delay on the ground. (Approximately 9 hours.) in the future, I as a first officer will not take things for granted as having been done or completed. If we have a lengthy delay, I'll suggest we reread the appropriate checklist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT ROLLS INTO START CART DURING ENG START.

Narrative: WE HAD ARRIVED IN DTW AT XA:00 LCL TIME WITH THE INTENTION OF DOING A CHARTER TO MEXICO CITY WITH A SCHEDULED DEP AT XX30 LCL. AFTER MANY DELAYS, THIS FLT WAS CANCELED AND WERE ADVISED TO CONTACT THE COMPANY. BY THIS TIME, IT WAS XX00 LCL TIME. UP UNTIL THE TIME OF THE CANCELLATION, THE BEFORE START CHKLIST HAD BEEN COMPLETED. WHILE THE CAPT WAS INSIDE THE OPS OFFICE OBTAINING A NEW RELEASE, THE GND CREW ADVISED ME AND THE FE THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO PUSH US BACK IN ORDER TO ALLOW ANOTHER FLT ROOM TO DEPART. AT THAT TIME I RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE. AFTER THE PUSHBACK WAS COMPLETE, I RESET THE PARKING BRAKE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FE. I TURNED THE AUX HYD PUMP TO BUILD UP THE BRAKE PRESSURE. AT WHICH TIME I DEPRESSED MY FOOT BRAKES WHILE THE FLT ENG PULLED THE PARKING BRAKE KNOB ON THE STEERING TILLER TO RESET THE PARKING BRAKE. WHEN THE CAPT RETURNED WITH THE NEW PAPERWORK, WE NEEDED A FEW MINS TO GET PREPARED (IE, NEW LOAD MANIFEST, NEW CLRNC, ETC). DURING THIS TIME, 1 OF THE GND CREW ADVISED US THAT A CHOCK WAS STUCK UNDER THE NOSE GEAR. HE ASKED THE CAPT TO JIGGLE THE STEERING TILLER IN THE HOPES OF FREEING THE CHOCK. AT NO TIME WERE WE ADVISED THAT THE CHOCKS WOULD BE COMPLETELY REMOVED. WHEN ALL DOORS HAD BEEN CLOSED, WE PROCEEDED WITH THE ENG STARTS. WHILE THE CAPT DID THE STARTS, I MONITORED ENG PARAMETERS. IT WAS WHILE STARTING THE 4TH AND LAST ENG THAT I FELT AS IF WE WERE MOVING. AT ALMOST THE SAME TIME THAT STEPPED ON THE BRAKES, WE MADE CONTACT WITH THE AIR START CART. THE AIR CART WAS WEDGED UNDER THE RADOME BUT LUCKILY THE DAMAGE WAS MINIMAL AND NO ONE WAS INJURED ON THE GND. FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT IN MY OPINION ARE: 1) A FAILURE TO REREAD THE CHKLIST TO ENSURE EVERYTHING WAS STILL IN PLACE FOR DEP. 2) PREMATURE REMOVAL OF THE CHOCKS. 3) LACK OF A HEADSET FOR GND TO COCKPIT COMS. 4) POOR LIGHTING AND RAIN ON THE WINDSHIELD WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT TO SEE THE GND CREW AND TO DETECT MOVEMENT. 5) FATIGUE CAUSED BY THE LONG DELAY ON THE GND. (APPROX 9 HRS.) IN THE FUTURE, I AS A FO WILL NOT TAKE THINGS FOR GRANTED AS HAVING BEEN DONE OR COMPLETED. IF WE HAVE A LENGTHY DELAY, I'LL SUGGEST WE REREAD THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.