Narrative:

I was serving as first officer for a scheduled air carrier operation from atl to msp. Our company procedures permitted pwrback operations from our gate. Clearance from ramp control prior to pwrback was required. (The ramp at atl is controled by operation-X, not ATC.) (it should be noted that both the captain and myself have many yrs and thousands of hours of time in the B727. However, we only operate to atl 3-5 times per yr, on average.) prior to engine start, I called ramp control to inform ramp that we would be starting engines. Ramp 'rogered' the advisory. At that point I believed ramp said, 'call when ready to taxi.' I interpreted that clearance as approval to pwrback (the captain was not monitoring the frequency). We started all engines and commenced the pwrback. As we began to move, an md-80 next to us received clearance to pwrback. At that point ramp control saw a conflict. Ramp asked us if we were pwring back. I responded in the affirmative and the md-80 was told to stop his pwrback. Once our pwrback was complete ramp cleared us to taxi to the north hold point. We were still monitoring ramp frequency when ramp control cleared the md-80 to pwrback. Ramp told the md-80 the reason his pwrback clearance was canceled was because our jet didn't 'get a call in' prior to pwring back. This caught us by surprise. A discussion ensued. I called ground control and received clearance to runway 8R (north parallel) via taxiway east (outer taxiway). Both the captain and myself had airport diagrams clipped to our approach plate holders. In the diagram it is easy to confuse the inner taxiway (F) for taxiway east. The captain taxied left onto taxiway F (inner) and was subsequently cleared by ground to join taxiway east at the next intersection. I scanned the diagram again and realized our error. Ground control never queried us. These 2 events, though separate, are still related. The bedrock issues: backup and communication. Prior to pwrback the captain failed to back me up on ramp frequency. This resulted in a communication breakdown between myself and the controller (normally the captain and so monitor all communications). Once the pwrback anomaly was recognized, I became distracted, thus degrading my backup effectiveness for ground taxi. This situation clearly illustrates how 1 mistake can lead to another. That's when we're most vulnerable.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT PWRS BACK WITHOUT PROPER CLRNC, THEN HAS TXWY EXCURSION ON RTE TO RWY.

Narrative: I WAS SERVING AS FO FOR A SCHEDULED ACR OP FROM ATL TO MSP. OUR COMPANY PROCS PERMITTED PWRBACK OPS FROM OUR GATE. CLRNC FROM RAMP CTL PRIOR TO PWRBACK WAS REQUIRED. (THE RAMP AT ATL IS CTLED BY OP-X, NOT ATC.) (IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT BOTH THE CAPT AND MYSELF HAVE MANY YRS AND THOUSANDS OF HRS OF TIME IN THE B727. HOWEVER, WE ONLY OPERATE TO ATL 3-5 TIMES PER YR, ON AVERAGE.) PRIOR TO ENG START, I CALLED RAMP CTL TO INFORM RAMP THAT WE WOULD BE STARTING ENGS. RAMP 'ROGERED' THE ADVISORY. AT THAT POINT I BELIEVED RAMP SAID, 'CALL WHEN READY TO TAXI.' I INTERPRETED THAT CLRNC AS APPROVAL TO PWRBACK (THE CAPT WAS NOT MONITORING THE FREQ). WE STARTED ALL ENGS AND COMMENCED THE PWRBACK. AS WE BEGAN TO MOVE, AN MD-80 NEXT TO US RECEIVED CLRNC TO PWRBACK. AT THAT POINT RAMP CTL SAW A CONFLICT. RAMP ASKED US IF WE WERE PWRING BACK. I RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AND THE MD-80 WAS TOLD TO STOP HIS PWRBACK. ONCE OUR PWRBACK WAS COMPLETE RAMP CLRED US TO TAXI TO THE N HOLD POINT. WE WERE STILL MONITORING RAMP FREQ WHEN RAMP CTL CLRED THE MD-80 TO PWRBACK. RAMP TOLD THE MD-80 THE REASON HIS PWRBACK CLRNC WAS CANCELED WAS BECAUSE OUR JET DIDN'T 'GET A CALL IN' PRIOR TO PWRING BACK. THIS CAUGHT US BY SURPRISE. A DISCUSSION ENSUED. I CALLED GND CTL AND RECEIVED CLRNC TO RWY 8R (N PARALLEL) VIA TXWY E (OUTER TXWY). BOTH THE CAPT AND MYSELF HAD ARPT DIAGRAMS CLIPPED TO OUR APCH PLATE HOLDERS. IN THE DIAGRAM IT IS EASY TO CONFUSE THE INNER TXWY (F) FOR TXWY E. THE CAPT TAXIED L ONTO TXWY F (INNER) AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED BY GND TO JOIN TXWY E AT THE NEXT INTXN. I SCANNED THE DIAGRAM AGAIN AND REALIZED OUR ERROR. GND CTL NEVER QUERIED US. THESE 2 EVENTS, THOUGH SEPARATE, ARE STILL RELATED. THE BEDROCK ISSUES: BACKUP AND COM. PRIOR TO PWRBACK THE CAPT FAILED TO BACK ME UP ON RAMP FREQ. THIS RESULTED IN A COM BREAKDOWN BTWN MYSELF AND THE CTLR (NORMALLY THE CAPT AND SO MONITOR ALL COMS). ONCE THE PWRBACK ANOMALY WAS RECOGNIZED, I BECAME DISTRACTED, THUS DEGRADING MY BACKUP EFFECTIVENESS FOR GND TAXI. THIS SIT CLRLY ILLUSTRATES HOW 1 MISTAKE CAN LEAD TO ANOTHER. THAT'S WHEN WE'RE MOST VULNERABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.