Narrative:

Student and I were on a simulated IFR cross country flight from gfk-vcy-far-gfk. En route to vcy, we experienced nothing unusual. At vcy the student executed 2 turns in holding followed by the NDB approach runway 31 vcy. Upon missed approach we proceeded to fargo. Somewhere en route to fargo I noticed a light surge of electrical power. (The lights dimmed slightly, I heard a faint squeal in the headset -- my student did not indicate that he heard this.) I monitored the ammeter, it was indicating between zero-50. I thought it appeared normal. This electrical surge would occur approximately 5 more times before we would lose all electrical power. We were cleared for the 10 DME arc at fargo. Once established on the arc (maybe 5 min prior to losing electrical) we could hear the strobes noise over our headset. On the arc we were 'cleared pd to 2500 ft cleared VOR runway 35 approach.' I was monitoring the ammeter thinking it was looking a bit low. We had begun a descent and were descending through approximately 3000 ft while turning to intercept the final approach course when we got a final surge of power. This surge was fairly strong. The lights got bright and we could hear the surge over the headset. At this point the lights from our radios (communication/navigation) all flashed approximately 2-3 times. We could hear fargo calling us. I tried to transmit back. I squawked 7600 on transponder, tried to transmit again before everything went dead. We continued inbound descending no lower than 2500 ft MSL. We went through the emergency procedure and did some trouble-shooting, ie, unplugging headset, used microphone to transmit. We were unable to restore electrical power. As we continued towards the airport we discussed landing at fargo but I had some concerns as our gear was still in the well. We had no way of knowing if the gear was down and locked. We could not contact tower to have them verify this. The WX was severe clear and we could see traffic behind us to the southeast approximately 15-20 mi. After discussing this with the student I elected to depart the pattern at about 5 mi south of the airport -- we departed to the northwest. We had turned everything off at this point. I thought that possibly the battery might recharge itself enough to make a radio transmit. We tried to contact far approach 2-3 times to no avail. I believe I was being overly anxious in turning the battery master back on. We could hear fargo approach but each time we tried to transmit the radio went blank. We let the battery master situation for another maybe 10 mins. At this point I decided to try gfk approach. We were able to make contact with them and explained our situation. I informed them I would shut off my battery master until I was closer. After shutting off the radio and battery master I turned back on to ask gfk approach to please contact far and inform them of our problem. I was informed they had already taken care of this. I shut down battery master. At about 15 south of gfk, I turned on battery master and made contact with gfk approach informed them of our position and the need to execute a fly by if we did not confirm (by light indication ) gear down and locked. I told them I would call back at 5 mi south of airport. I was informed to contact tower at that point and they would inform tower of our needs. We extended the gear at that point, noted 3 green down and locked, then shut off battery master. At 5 mi south of gfk we contacted tower, told them we had 3 green down and locked and a low pass would not be needed. They cleared us to land runway 17L. We landed with no problems. When we tried to contact ground after we were clear of runway, we were unable to establish voice communication. We received light gun signals to taxi to parking. In conclusion, I made the decision to return to gfk based on the following reasons: 1) the gear was not down and locked, we would have no positive indication of it being down and locked. We could not contact tower to verify. 2) we had known traffic behind us. If we were to land gear up, we would be tying up the runway. In addition to that, we had no lights on the aircraft, a possibility of aircraft behind us landing on top of us. 3) there was no indication of an electrical fire. 4) we had crash and rescue equipment available at gfk. We had maintenance facilities available at gfk. (Gfk being our base). 6) we made several attempts to contact fargo to no avail. Eventually we were able to make contact with gfk approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR WITH STUDENT ON IFR XCOUNTRY HAS ELECTRICAL FAILURE.

Narrative: STUDENT AND I WERE ON A SIMULATED IFR XCOUNTRY FLT FROM GFK-VCY-FAR-GFK. ENRTE TO VCY, WE EXPERIENCED NOTHING UNUSUAL. AT VCY THE STUDENT EXECUTED 2 TURNS IN HOLDING FOLLOWED BY THE NDB APCH RWY 31 VCY. UPON MISSED APCH WE PROCEEDED TO FARGO. SOMEWHERE ENRTE TO FARGO I NOTICED A LIGHT SURGE OF ELECTRICAL PWR. (THE LIGHTS DIMMED SLIGHTLY, I HEARD A FAINT SQUEAL IN THE HEADSET -- MY STUDENT DID NOT INDICATE THAT HE HEARD THIS.) I MONITORED THE AMMETER, IT WAS INDICATING BTWN ZERO-50. I THOUGHT IT APPEARED NORMAL. THIS ELECTRICAL SURGE WOULD OCCUR APPROX 5 MORE TIMES BEFORE WE WOULD LOSE ALL ELECTRICAL PWR. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE 10 DME ARC AT FARGO. ONCE ESTABLISHED ON THE ARC (MAYBE 5 MIN PRIOR TO LOSING ELECTRICAL) WE COULD HEAR THE STROBES NOISE OVER OUR HEADSET. ON THE ARC WE WERE 'CLRED PD TO 2500 FT CLRED VOR RWY 35 APCH.' I WAS MONITORING THE AMMETER THINKING IT WAS LOOKING A BIT LOW. WE HAD BEGUN A DSCNT AND WERE DSNDING THROUGH APPROX 3000 FT WHILE TURNING TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH COURSE WHEN WE GOT A FINAL SURGE OF PWR. THIS SURGE WAS FAIRLY STRONG. THE LIGHTS GOT BRIGHT AND WE COULD HEAR THE SURGE OVER THE HEADSET. AT THIS POINT THE LIGHTS FROM OUR RADIOS (COM/NAV) ALL FLASHED APPROX 2-3 TIMES. WE COULD HEAR FARGO CALLING US. I TRIED TO XMIT BACK. I SQUAWKED 7600 ON XPONDER, TRIED TO XMIT AGAIN BEFORE EVERYTHING WENT DEAD. WE CONTINUED INBOUND DSNDING NO LOWER THAN 2500 FT MSL. WE WENT THROUGH THE EMER PROC AND DID SOME TROUBLE-SHOOTING, IE, UNPLUGGING HEADSET, USED MIKE TO XMIT. WE WERE UNABLE TO RESTORE ELECTRICAL PWR. AS WE CONTINUED TOWARDS THE ARPT WE DISCUSSED LNDG AT FARGO BUT I HAD SOME CONCERNS AS OUR GEAR WAS STILL IN THE WELL. WE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING IF THE GEAR WAS DOWN AND LOCKED. WE COULD NOT CONTACT TWR TO HAVE THEM VERIFY THIS. THE WX WAS SEVERE CLR AND WE COULD SEE TFC BEHIND US TO THE SE APPROX 15-20 MI. AFTER DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE STUDENT I ELECTED TO DEPART THE PATTERN AT ABOUT 5 MI S OF THE ARPT -- WE DEPARTED TO THE NW. WE HAD TURNED EVERYTHING OFF AT THIS POINT. I THOUGHT THAT POSSIBLY THE BATTERY MIGHT RECHARGE ITSELF ENOUGH TO MAKE A RADIO XMIT. WE TRIED TO CONTACT FAR APCH 2-3 TIMES TO NO AVAIL. I BELIEVE I WAS BEING OVERLY ANXIOUS IN TURNING THE BATTERY MASTER BACK ON. WE COULD HEAR FARGO APCH BUT EACH TIME WE TRIED TO XMIT THE RADIO WENT BLANK. WE LET THE BATTERY MASTER SIT FOR ANOTHER MAYBE 10 MINS. AT THIS POINT I DECIDED TO TRY GFK APCH. WE WERE ABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THEM AND EXPLAINED OUR SIT. I INFORMED THEM I WOULD SHUT OFF MY BATTERY MASTER UNTIL I WAS CLOSER. AFTER SHUTTING OFF THE RADIO AND BATTERY MASTER I TURNED BACK ON TO ASK GFK APCH TO PLEASE CONTACT FAR AND INFORM THEM OF OUR PROB. I WAS INFORMED THEY HAD ALREADY TAKEN CARE OF THIS. I SHUT DOWN BATTERY MASTER. AT ABOUT 15 S OF GFK, I TURNED ON BATTERY MASTER AND MADE CONTACT WITH GFK APCH INFORMED THEM OF OUR POS AND THE NEED TO EXECUTE A FLY BY IF WE DID NOT CONFIRM (BY LIGHT INDICATION ) GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED. I TOLD THEM I WOULD CALL BACK AT 5 MI S OF ARPT. I WAS INFORMED TO CONTACT TWR AT THAT POINT AND THEY WOULD INFORM TWR OF OUR NEEDS. WE EXTENDED THE GEAR AT THAT POINT, NOTED 3 GREEN DOWN AND LOCKED, THEN SHUT OFF BATTERY MASTER. AT 5 MI S OF GFK WE CONTACTED TWR, TOLD THEM WE HAD 3 GREEN DOWN AND LOCKED AND A LOW PASS WOULD NOT BE NEEDED. THEY CLRED US TO LAND RWY 17L. WE LANDED WITH NO PROBS. WHEN WE TRIED TO CONTACT GND AFTER WE WERE CLR OF RWY, WE WERE UNABLE TO ESTABLISH VOICE COM. WE RECEIVED LIGHT GUN SIGNALS TO TAXI TO PARKING. IN CONCLUSION, I MADE THE DECISION TO RETURN TO GFK BASED ON THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN AND LOCKED, WE WOULD HAVE NO POSITIVE INDICATION OF IT BEING DOWN AND LOCKED. WE COULD NOT CONTACT TWR TO VERIFY. 2) WE HAD KNOWN TFC BEHIND US. IF WE WERE TO LAND GEAR UP, WE WOULD BE TYING UP THE RWY. IN ADDITION TO THAT, WE HAD NO LIGHTS ON THE ACFT, A POSSIBILITY OF ACFT BEHIND US LNDG ON TOP OF US. 3) THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF AN ELECTRICAL FIRE. 4) WE HAD CRASH AND RESCUE EQUIP AVAILABLE AT GFK. WE HAD MAINT FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT GFK. (GFK BEING OUR BASE). 6) WE MADE SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT FARGO TO NO AVAIL. EVENTUALLY WE WERE ABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH GFK APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.