Narrative:

During the sbound flight from mia-gcm, we noted that no VOR or ADF facilities were operational over cuba. We could use radar to map cayo largo del sur, ucl, and fly to that fix. From there, we were able to receive gcm VOR and navigation to our destination. The next day, we also found that no navaids were operational in cuba, with the exception of havana VOR which is not near the route of flight. On the day of flight, we also experienced heavy cloud cover and precipitation over cuba which prevented the use of mapping radar during the flight. All position reports were made using flight plan estimates with the first fix, ucl, being a known location based on the radial and DME of grand cayman VOR. The bottom line of this report is that we overflew cuba with no navigational reference or ground radar vectors. There was no notification that the flight planned navaids were inoperative. I believe that the republic of cuba will continue to shut down navaids due to lack of money or parts and continue to create a hazard to navigation. I notified my company dispatch of the situation upon return to miami and feel that a dual VOR-ADF operation between miami and grand cayman is marginally unsafe. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that he notified his company right away on landing and 'it went all over the place.' nothing was notamed but apparently the NAVAID was shut down for a replacement which was a much stronger signal and DME as well. This is a great improvement. Reporter still thinks the whole route is poor with a DC9 since they navigation with VOR and ADF only. There is no notice when the navaids are to be shut down or out for maintenance. He feels this is not safe in the overwater environment. Reporter was especially prompted to send the report as there was an FAA representative on board.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG DISCOVER INOP NAVAIDS WHEN FLYING S FROM MIA OVER CUBA.

Narrative: DURING THE SBOUND FLT FROM MIA-GCM, WE NOTED THAT NO VOR OR ADF FACILITIES WERE OPERATIONAL OVER CUBA. WE COULD USE RADAR TO MAP CAYO LARGO DEL SUR, UCL, AND FLY TO THAT FIX. FROM THERE, WE WERE ABLE TO RECEIVE GCM VOR AND NAV TO OUR DEST. THE NEXT DAY, WE ALSO FOUND THAT NO NAVAIDS WERE OPERATIONAL IN CUBA, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HAVANA VOR WHICH IS NOT NEAR THE RTE OF FLT. ON THE DAY OF FLT, WE ALSO EXPERIENCED HVY CLOUD COVER AND PRECIPITATION OVER CUBA WHICH PREVENTED THE USE OF MAPPING RADAR DURING THE FLT. ALL POS RPTS WERE MADE USING FLT PLAN ESTIMATES WITH THE FIRST FIX, UCL, BEING A KNOWN LOCATION BASED ON THE RADIAL AND DME OF GRAND CAYMAN VOR. THE BOTTOM LINE OF THIS RPT IS THAT WE OVERFLEW CUBA WITH NO NAVIGATIONAL REF OR GND RADAR VECTORS. THERE WAS NO NOTIFICATION THAT THE FLT PLANNED NAVAIDS WERE INOP. I BELIEVE THAT THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA WILL CONTINUE TO SHUT DOWN NAVAIDS DUE TO LACK OF MONEY OR PARTS AND CONTINUE TO CREATE A HAZARD TO NAV. I NOTIFIED MY COMPANY DISPATCH OF THE SIT UPON RETURN TO MIAMI AND FEEL THAT A DUAL VOR-ADF OP BTWN MIAMI AND GRAND CAYMAN IS MARGINALLY UNSAFE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT HE NOTIFIED HIS COMPANY RIGHT AWAY ON LNDG AND 'IT WENT ALL OVER THE PLACE.' NOTHING WAS NOTAMED BUT APPARENTLY THE NAVAID WAS SHUT DOWN FOR A REPLACEMENT WHICH WAS A MUCH STRONGER SIGNAL AND DME AS WELL. THIS IS A GREAT IMPROVEMENT. RPTR STILL THINKS THE WHOLE RTE IS POOR WITH A DC9 SINCE THEY NAV WITH VOR AND ADF ONLY. THERE IS NO NOTICE WHEN THE NAVAIDS ARE TO BE SHUT DOWN OR OUT FOR MAINT. HE FEELS THIS IS NOT SAFE IN THE OVERWATER ENVIRONMENT. RPTR WAS ESPECIALLY PROMPTED TO SEND THE RPT AS THERE WAS AN FAA REPRESENTATIVE ON BOARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.