Narrative:

I was the PIC of aircraft B727-200. It was the first officer's leg. The departure, en route, and initial descent phases of flight were of a routine nature. Our initial contact with mem approach included the ATIS information and the entry point '2S' for our parking gate. Approach control's response was '...expect runway 36L.' we were on left downwind for runway 36L past the airport when mem approach gave us a left turn to 090 degrees and asked if we had the field in sight. I asked the first officer if he had runway 36L in sight to which he responded, 'I've got it.' I responded to approach control that we had the field in sight. Approach then cleared us for a visual to runway 36L contact the tower. The tower said change to runway 36R, cleared to land runway 36R. The first officer made the landing on runway 36R quite uneventfully. Nearing the end of the rollout, I asked the tower how we were going to get to our entry point 2S. There was confusion on my part as to which way we were to exit the runway. I took control of the aircraft and slowed us to turn off speed aware that company flight was on the approach behind us. I was confused initially when I heard turn left from the tower. I was aware of the taxiway closures on txwys C and south and the one way direction of taxiway victor. Exiting the runway to the left at C-7 and holding short of runway 18L facing east seemed like a good place to sort out my confusion. We were aware (by looking out the first officer's side window) of flight touching down and rolling out on runway 36R. At this point we were monitoring ground control, holding short of runway 18L on C-8. At this point, the frequency became quite congested. I heard 'xyy, expedite across.' I looked to the right out the first officer's side window, and saw that the Z flight had slowed to taxi speed. I released the parking brake and added power. The first officer transmitted an acknowledgement to the clearance. I looked at the Z flight again as we were well past the hold short line by now. The tower asked us to give them a call after blocking in. The event was regrettable and I have learned from this experience. I have not listened to or read transcripts of the tower tapes. The tower operator I spoke to on the phone after block in indicated the clearance was for a Y4Y to cross runway 09. Similar call signs -- radio congestion, last min runway changes, closed txwys, the hurry-up syndrome, and controller training in progress. Supplemental information from acn 280523: I believe that the cause of the event was a 'hearback' error which occurred because we expected clearance to cross just when it was issued to a different aircraft with a similar call sign. The main lesson in this to me is 'don't start across a runway (out of an altitude, etc) until after 'unkeying' the microphone to allow ATC the opportunity to correct a 'hearback' error. Supplemental information from acn 280569: xyys crossing, clearly a result of missed call sign/clearance, posed no threat to safety. Our B-727 was fully slowed as they began and could have easily been stopped well short of their position. Later I found out the confusion arose from both being on ground control, with each one waiting for clearance to cross different runways. This communication foul up is one I have witnessed many times in 26 yrs flying military and civil aircraft. As a result I am a strong proponent of the red and green stop light arrangements for all congested airports. Supplemental information from acn 280577: ground control told us to taxi to C-8 and hold short of runway 36R at the departure end. Now the first officer was working the radio and he acknowledged. At this time I started the after landing check and called the ramp tower to inform them that we were on the ground. I was just returning to ground frequency when I heard what I thought was 'expedite.' I had not yet turned down the volume on the ramp tower radio and there was a lot of chatter.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH RWY ENTRY BY B-727-200 IN A NIGHT OP.

Narrative: I WAS THE PIC OF ACFT B727-200. IT WAS THE FO'S LEG. THE DEP, ENRTE, AND INITIAL DSCNT PHASES OF FLT WERE OF A ROUTINE NATURE. OUR INITIAL CONTACT WITH MEM APCH INCLUDED THE ATIS INFO AND THE ENTRY POINT '2S' FOR OUR PARKING GATE. APCH CTL'S RESPONSE WAS '...EXPECT RWY 36L.' WE WERE ON L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 36L PAST THE ARPT WHEN MEM APCH GAVE US A L TURN TO 090 DEGS AND ASKED IF WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT. I ASKED THE FO IF HE HAD RWY 36L IN SIGHT TO WHICH HE RESPONDED, 'I'VE GOT IT.' I RESPONDED TO APCH CTL THAT WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT. APCH THEN CLRED US FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 36L CONTACT THE TWR. THE TWR SAID CHANGE TO RWY 36R, CLRED TO LAND RWY 36R. THE FO MADE THE LNDG ON RWY 36R QUITE UNEVENTFULLY. NEARING THE END OF THE ROLLOUT, I ASKED THE TWR HOW WE WERE GOING TO GET TO OUR ENTRY POINT 2S. THERE WAS CONFUSION ON MY PART AS TO WHICH WAY WE WERE TO EXIT THE RWY. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND SLOWED US TO TURN OFF SPD AWARE THAT COMPANY FLT WAS ON THE APCH BEHIND US. I WAS CONFUSED INITIALLY WHEN I HEARD TURN L FROM THE TWR. I WAS AWARE OF THE TXWY CLOSURES ON TXWYS C AND S AND THE ONE WAY DIRECTION OF TXWY VICTOR. EXITING THE RWY TO THE L AT C-7 AND HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 18L FACING E SEEMED LIKE A GOOD PLACE TO SORT OUT MY CONFUSION. WE WERE AWARE (BY LOOKING OUT THE FO'S SIDE WINDOW) OF FLT TOUCHING DOWN AND ROLLING OUT ON RWY 36R. AT THIS POINT WE WERE MONITORING GND CTL, HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 18L ON C-8. AT THIS POINT, THE FREQ BECAME QUITE CONGESTED. I HEARD 'XYY, EXPEDITE ACROSS.' I LOOKED TO THE R OUT THE FO'S SIDE WINDOW, AND SAW THAT THE Z FLT HAD SLOWED TO TAXI SPD. I RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AND ADDED PWR. THE FO XMITTED AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO THE CLRNC. I LOOKED AT THE Z FLT AGAIN AS WE WERE WELL PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE BY NOW. THE TWR ASKED US TO GIVE THEM A CALL AFTER BLOCKING IN. THE EVENT WAS REGRETTABLE AND I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS EXPERIENCE. I HAVE NOT LISTENED TO OR READ TRANSCRIPTS OF THE TWR TAPES. THE TWR OPERATOR I SPOKE TO ON THE PHONE AFTER BLOCK IN INDICATED THE CLRNC WAS FOR A Y4Y TO CROSS RWY 09. SIMILAR CALL SIGNS -- RADIO CONGESTION, LAST MIN RWY CHANGES, CLOSED TXWYS, THE HURRY-UP SYNDROME, AND CTLR TRAINING IN PROGRESS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 280523: I BELIEVE THAT THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT WAS A 'HEARBACK' ERROR WHICH OCCURRED BECAUSE WE EXPECTED CLRNC TO CROSS JUST WHEN IT WAS ISSUED TO A DIFFERENT ACFT WITH A SIMILAR CALL SIGN. THE MAIN LESSON IN THIS TO ME IS 'DON'T START ACROSS A RWY (OUT OF AN ALT, ETC) UNTIL AFTER 'UNKEYING' THE MIKE TO ALLOW ATC THE OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT A 'HEARBACK' ERROR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 280569: XYYS XING, CLRLY A RESULT OF MISSED CALL SIGN/CLRNC, POSED NO THREAT TO SAFETY. OUR B-727 WAS FULLY SLOWED AS THEY BEGAN AND COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN STOPPED WELL SHORT OF THEIR POS. LATER I FOUND OUT THE CONFUSION AROSE FROM BOTH BEING ON GND CTL, WITH EACH ONE WAITING FOR CLRNC TO CROSS DIFFERENT RWYS. THIS COM FOUL UP IS ONE I HAVE WITNESSED MANY TIMES IN 26 YRS FLYING MIL AND CIVIL ACFT. AS A RESULT I AM A STRONG PROPONENT OF THE RED AND GREEN STOP LIGHT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ALL CONGESTED ARPTS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 280577: GND CTL TOLD US TO TAXI TO C-8 AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 36R AT THE DEP END. NOW THE FO WAS WORKING THE RADIO AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED. AT THIS TIME I STARTED THE AFTER LNDG CHK AND CALLED THE RAMP TWR TO INFORM THEM THAT WE WERE ON THE GND. I WAS JUST RETURNING TO GND FREQ WHEN I HEARD WHAT I THOUGHT WAS 'EXPEDITE.' I HAD NOT YET TURNED DOWN THE VOLUME ON THE RAMP TWR RADIO AND THERE WAS A LOT OF CHATTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.