Narrative:

Pushed back from dfw at XA57 on last leg home. Approaching spot 29 I made ground aware of our readiness to taxi and they instructed to turn left on the outer and taxi to runway 17R. Taxi traffic was light as we were one of the first to leave. I don't recall if the captain called for the taxi check or if I just initiated, but in any event the taxi check was in progress when I sensed that we had missed our left turn to the outer. I immediately said something questioning our progress. As the captain was applying brakes, I was looking for visual cues to confirm our position. At that point ground made the call to stop which we acknowledged indicating that we were aware of the situation. We had stopped well short of the runway hold line, but had taxied too far to make the left turn onto the outer. At this point we became aware of a 737 that was aborting due to our encroachment on the runway. There were a number of factors at work in this situation. It was our last leg and everyone was anxious to get home. Traffic was light and we were anticipating an expedited departure. The captain is very competent, dfw is a familiar airport and visibility was excellent. Thus I wasn't monitoring our progress as I might have if conditions had been different. In fact as we left the ramp the captain commented on how our taxi instructions differed from the standard (left on the inner, right at 26 left on the outer). I commented on the ongoing maintenance being done on the inner and actually looked down the inner as we crossed it at the lights in the maintenance work area. At this point the taxi check was started. The taxi check is a distraction for the captain and certain items are worse than others. The call to check airspeed bugs is the biggest distraction. Our procedures call for the captain to respond to this check by verbally stating each bug setting. To do so he must look at the FMS to confirm the V1, vr, V2 numbers, look at his airspeed indicator to verify proper settings and then try to remember what the vref 30 plus 40 and vref 30 plus 80 numbers are and verify their settings. All of this will take the captain out of the taxi loop for several seconds, and on this night we rolled through our turn and toward the runway. I don't believe that our taxi checklist procedures need to be changed. A certain amount of distraction is inevitable to get the job done. The lesson learned is a reinforcement of current procedures to not initiate the taxi check until conditions warrant. First officer's should not call for items unless the captain is in a position to respond. Capts should not attempt to respond until they are in a position to do so. Supplemental information from acn 279340: we had begun the taxi checklist and a momentary distraction caused me to taxi through outer and enter 15-20 ft into runway exit 29. A departing 737 flight initiated an abort as a result.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION PROVOKES ABORT AT NIGHT.

Narrative: PUSHED BACK FROM DFW AT XA57 ON LAST LEG HOME. APCHING SPOT 29 I MADE GND AWARE OF OUR READINESS TO TAXI AND THEY INSTRUCTED TO TURN LEFT ON THE OUTER AND TAXI TO RWY 17R. TAXI TFC WAS LIGHT AS WE WERE ONE OF THE FIRST TO LEAVE. I DON'T RECALL IF THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE TAXI CHK OR IF I JUST INITIATED, BUT IN ANY EVENT THE TAXI CHK WAS IN PROGRESS WHEN I SENSED THAT WE HAD MISSED OUR L TURN TO THE OUTER. I IMMEDIATELY SAID SOMETHING QUESTIONING OUR PROGRESS. AS THE CAPT WAS APPLYING BRAKES, I WAS LOOKING FOR VISUAL CUES TO CONFIRM OUR POS. AT THAT POINT GND MADE THE CALL TO STOP WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED INDICATING THAT WE WERE AWARE OF THE SIT. WE HAD STOPPED WELL SHORT OF THE RWY HOLD LINE, BUT HAD TAXIED TOO FAR TO MAKE THE L TURN ONTO THE OUTER. AT THIS POINT WE BECAME AWARE OF A 737 THAT WAS ABORTING DUE TO OUR ENCROACHMENT ON THE RWY. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF FACTORS AT WORK IN THIS SIT. IT WAS OUR LAST LEG AND EVERYONE WAS ANXIOUS TO GET HOME. TFC WAS LIGHT AND WE WERE ANTICIPATING AN EXPEDITED DEP. THE CAPT IS VERY COMPETENT, DFW IS A FAMILIAR ARPT AND VISIBILITY WAS EXCELLENT. THUS I WASN'T MONITORING OUR PROGRESS AS I MIGHT HAVE IF CONDITIONS HAD BEEN DIFFERENT. IN FACT AS WE LEFT THE RAMP THE CAPT COMMENTED ON HOW OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS DIFFERED FROM THE STANDARD (L ON THE INNER, R AT 26 LEFT ON THE OUTER). I COMMENTED ON THE ONGOING MAINT BEING DONE ON THE INNER AND ACTUALLY LOOKED DOWN THE INNER AS WE CROSSED IT AT THE LIGHTS IN THE MAINT WORK AREA. AT THIS POINT THE TAXI CHK WAS STARTED. THE TAXI CHK IS A DISTR FOR THE CAPT AND CERTAIN ITEMS ARE WORSE THAN OTHERS. THE CALL TO CHK AIRSPD BUGS IS THE BIGGEST DISTR. OUR PROCS CALL FOR THE CAPT TO RESPOND TO THIS CHK BY VERBALLY STATING EACH BUG SETTING. TO DO SO HE MUST LOOK AT THE FMS TO CONFIRM THE V1, VR, V2 NUMBERS, LOOK AT HIS AIRSPD INDICATOR TO VERIFY PROPER SETTINGS AND THEN TRY TO REMEMBER WHAT THE VREF 30 PLUS 40 AND VREF 30 PLUS 80 NUMBERS ARE AND VERIFY THEIR SETTINGS. ALL OF THIS WILL TAKE THE CAPT OUT OF THE TAXI LOOP FOR SEVERAL SECONDS, AND ON THIS NIGHT WE ROLLED THROUGH OUR TURN AND TOWARD THE RWY. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT OUR TAXI CHKLIST PROCS NEED TO BE CHANGED. A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DISTR IS INEVITABLE TO GET THE JOB DONE. THE LESSON LEARNED IS A REINFORCEMENT OF CURRENT PROCS TO NOT INITIATE THE TAXI CHK UNTIL CONDITIONS WARRANT. FO'S SHOULD NOT CALL FOR ITEMS UNLESS THE CAPT IS IN A POS TO RESPOND. CAPTS SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO RESPOND UNTIL THEY ARE IN A POS TO DO SO. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 279340: WE HAD BEGUN THE TAXI CHKLIST AND A MOMENTARY DISTR CAUSED ME TO TAXI THROUGH OUTER AND ENTER 15-20 FT INTO RWY EXIT 29. A DEPARTING 737 FLT INITIATED AN ABORT AS A RESULT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.