Narrative:

I was captain and PF on air carrier X msp-phx. We were in position on runway 29L for takeoff while a jetstream was taking off on runway 29R. Our takeoff clearance 'maintain runway heading, keep the jetstream in sight' and was crossing our path. It seemed evident to met that my takeoff would result in getting an RA on the TCASII. Not wanting this to happen I instructed the copilot to switch the TA only. Sometime during flap retraction at 1000 ft AGL and while I was keeping the jetstream in sight, the tower controller issued a turn to 280 degrees which I did not hear. After completing the flap retraction the copilot said we were instructed to turn to 280 degree heading. Departure control told us to turn to 220 degree heading and to maintain 6000 ft MSL. Our normal procedures call for adding climb power at 3000 ft AGL (3800 ft MSL at msp). Since we were only cleared to 6000 ft I elected to leave the power at a reduced setting to preclude busting an altitude. On a heading of 220 degrees and climbing through 2400 ft MSL we were told by departure to expedite through 5000 ft we had 4000 ft traffic at 10 O'clock. They had turned us into conflicting traffic. I couldn't really do anything to expedite the climb without large power and pitch changes. 2 different items of safety were at risk in this incident. First of all, the tower controller should not have given us a clearance while in the takeoff stage. I was not able to fly the aircraft, watch the traffic, change confign and hear the clearance. There is absolutely no reason for a tower controller to issue clrncs while we are in the takeoff stage, they are distracting they are unsafe and they should be stopped. Second it seems obvious to me that turning the jetstream in front of us on takeoff and then turning us into the 4000 ft traffic was an attempt to give us an RA on the TCASII. It is a well known fact that there is a lot of dissatisfaction among the controller ranks concerning TCASII. It is very often quite obvious that some of them want to put us into a position where we have to respond to an RA. Both of these items could be avoided if all airports had a SID that was well thought out and coordinated with arrs and missed approach procedures. A well designed SID or missed approach procedure would eliminate the need of a crew acknowledging a clearance while they were trying to fly the aircraft safely.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X HAD CONFLICT WITH ACFT OFF MULTIPLE RWY OP PARALLEL RWY. VISUAL SEPARATION APPLIED.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT AND PF ON ACR X MSP-PHX. WE WERE IN POS ON RWY 29L FOR TKOF WHILE A JETSTREAM WAS TAKING OFF ON RWY 29R. OUR TKOF CLRNC 'MAINTAIN RWY HDG, KEEP THE JETSTREAM IN SIGHT' AND WAS XING OUR PATH. IT SEEMED EVIDENT TO MET THAT MY TKOF WOULD RESULT IN GETTING AN RA ON THE TCASII. NOT WANTING THIS TO HAPPEN I INSTRUCTED THE COPLT TO SWITCH THE TA ONLY. SOMETIME DURING FLAP RETRACTION AT 1000 FT AGL AND WHILE I WAS KEEPING THE JETSTREAM IN SIGHT, THE TWR CTLR ISSUED A TURN TO 280 DEGS WHICH I DID NOT HEAR. AFTER COMPLETING THE FLAP RETRACTION THE COPLT SAID WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN TO 280 DEG HDG. DEP CTL TOLD US TO TURN TO 220 DEG HDG AND TO MAINTAIN 6000 FT MSL. OUR NORMAL PROCS CALL FOR ADDING CLB PWR AT 3000 FT AGL (3800 FT MSL AT MSP). SINCE WE WERE ONLY CLRED TO 6000 FT I ELECTED TO LEAVE THE PWR AT A REDUCED SETTING TO PRECLUDE BUSTING AN ALT. ON A HDG OF 220 DEGS AND CLBING THROUGH 2400 FT MSL WE WERE TOLD BY DEP TO EXPEDITE THROUGH 5000 FT WE HAD 4000 FT TFC AT 10 O'CLOCK. THEY HAD TURNED US INTO CONFLICTING TFC. I COULDN'T REALLY DO ANYTHING TO EXPEDITE THE CLB WITHOUT LARGE PWR AND PITCH CHANGES. 2 DIFFERENT ITEMS OF SAFETY WERE AT RISK IN THIS INCIDENT. FIRST OF ALL, THE TWR CTLR SHOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN US A CLRNC WHILE IN THE TKOF STAGE. I WAS NOT ABLE TO FLY THE ACFT, WATCH THE TFC, CHANGE CONFIGN AND HEAR THE CLRNC. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO REASON FOR A TWR CTLR TO ISSUE CLRNCS WHILE WE ARE IN THE TKOF STAGE, THEY ARE DISTRACTING THEY ARE UNSAFE AND THEY SHOULD BE STOPPED. SECOND IT SEEMS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT TURNING THE JETSTREAM IN FRONT OF US ON TKOF AND THEN TURNING US INTO THE 4000 FT TFC WAS AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE US AN RA ON THE TCASII. IT IS A WELL KNOWN FACT THAT THERE IS A LOT OF DISSATISFACTION AMONG THE CTLR RANKS CONCERNING TCASII. IT IS VERY OFTEN QUITE OBVIOUS THAT SOME OF THEM WANT TO PUT US INTO A POS WHERE WE HAVE TO RESPOND TO AN RA. BOTH OF THESE ITEMS COULD BE AVOIDED IF ALL ARPTS HAD A SID THAT WAS WELL THOUGHT OUT AND COORDINATED WITH ARRS AND MISSED APCH PROCS. A WELL DESIGNED SID OR MISSED APCH PROC WOULD ELIMINATE THE NEED OF A CREW ACKNOWLEDGING A CLRNC WHILE THEY WERE TRYING TO FLY THE ACFT SAFELY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.