|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : ccr|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Operator||general aviation : instructional|
|Make Model Name||Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 91|
|Flight Phase||landing other|
|Function||instruction : instructor|
|Qualification||pilot : cfi|
pilot : instrument
pilot : commercial
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 40|
flight time total : 300
flight time type : 180
|Function||flight crew : single pilot|
|Qualification||pilot : student|
|Experience||flight time total : 50|
|Anomaly||other anomaly other|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : insufficient time|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||Pilot Deviation|
I had intended the flight to be a mixture of short and soft- field landing practice and local airspace familiarization. Following a normal run-up, spi took off and we made closed traffic to practice short-field lndgs. We made 3 approachs and lndgs, one of which resulted in a go around, which was commanded by me because of low airspeed on short final. I also demonstrated one short-field landing. I should mention that spi's lndgs had never been particularly proficient. He displayed about average coordination and aptitude in landing skill. It took him over 100 lndgs to solo. However, I attribute some of his difficulties to a lack of available attention to devote to flying. He is extremely busy at his job. Unfortunately, one of spi's weak areas was a tendency to occasionally allow dangerous sits to develop during landing, such as poor directional control in the after- landing roll or slow airspds on final approach. He actually developed the skill to land the plane early on, but I only felt comfortable soloing him when he lost his erratic tendencies. Still, even after the solo, he was never as much in control of the aircraft during landing as I would have liked. I surprised spi by telling him to fly me to YYY. Soon I discovered not only did he not know what direction YYY was in, but he was not aware that he would have to penetrate class C airspace to get there. I took the controls and flew orbits while he got his bearings. We finally negotiated a class B transition. He was not well prepared for the first approach. His airspeed was too high until late in the approach. However, he eventually compensated, and I told him his aim point was the end of the numbers 15. After he reported a 3 mi final, tower cleared us to land. I requested, and we were cleared for the option. On about a 1/4 mi final for runway 15L, tower told us to go around for 'spacing.' I was pleased to see spi execute the go around first, and then respond on the radio. Unfortunately, he did not follow through well with the go around. I took the controls and entered a right crosswind for runway 15R per tower instructions. I explained hisgar mistake to him, and tower established the aircraft on a normal right downwind for runway 15R. I returned the controls to him and the tower cleared us for the option runway 15R. I informed him our aim point would be the end of the threshold markers. He knew from earlier instruction that we desired to touch down within 200 ft of our 'point.' but, I had not been stressing distance, rather technique, to this point in our short-field lndgs. The base and final approach were normal, and the wind was not a factor. On short final, we were slightly high on the glide path. I prompted him when I thought it was the right time for power reduction to idle. He reduced the power to idle and began raising the pitch attitude. I saw that the nose was coming up a little fast, but I was satisfied that we were continuing towards the runway. My impression was that it would be a firm landing. I said nothing to him. The stall warning horn began sounding, as it usually does a few seconds before touchdown on the short-field landing. We were in a stall attitude, and began sinking quickly to what I thought would be an immediate touchdown. Our drop did not stop as I thought it would and immediately we dropped what I estimate to be another 5 ft in a full stall. It happened too fast for me to take the controls or command a go around. We struck in a nearly flat pitch attitude. The windshield splintered and broke on the left side. I took the controls and I felt our forward progress being impeded. I suspected that the propeller might have been striking, so pi pulled the mixture to idle/cutoff. Using the nosewheel steering, I steered the airplane off on the first taxiway to the left, where it coasted to a stop just off the runway. I shut off the magnetos and the master switch. We exited the airplane. Neither of us were any worse than shaken. The plane was eventually towed to the maintenance area. Both spi and I fell victim to a runway illusion. We are both used to landing on runway 24 at XXX, which is a relatively narrow runway. Runway 15R at YYY is much wider, perhaps twice as wide as RWY24. The difference in width facilitated a misjudgement in ht above the runway. We both thought we were closer to the runway than we actually were. So, we stalled high. Spi told me later that he had little idea that his ht above the runway was too high. I believe the factor directly contributing to this incident was my failure to perceive that spi was going to stall the airplane too high above the runway. Had my distance judgement been accurate, I could have either commanded a go around or taken the controls and executed one myself. Even a late go around could have prevented such a hard landing. Such an incident could be prevented by better preparation for dealing with the wider-than-usual runway illusion. First, better ground training could have benefitted him in this situation, and that is a deficiency on my part. Second, prelndg briefings considering any unusual runway conditions, such as a wider- than-usual runway.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: INSTRUCTOR WITH SPI STALLS TOO HIGH ON LNDG APCH. LOSS OF ACFT CTL.
Narrative: I HAD INTENDED THE FLT TO BE A MIXTURE OF SHORT AND SOFT- FIELD LNDG PRACTICE AND LCL AIRSPACE FAMILIARIZATION. FOLLOWING A NORMAL RUN-UP, SPI TOOK OFF AND WE MADE CLOSED TFC TO PRACTICE SHORT-FIELD LNDGS. WE MADE 3 APCHS AND LNDGS, ONE OF WHICH RESULTED IN A GAR, WHICH WAS COMMANDED BY ME BECAUSE OF LOW AIRSPD ON SHORT FINAL. I ALSO DEMONSTRATED ONE SHORT-FIELD LNDG. I SHOULD MENTION THAT SPI'S LNDGS HAD NEVER BEEN PARTICULARLY PROFICIENT. HE DISPLAYED ABOUT AVERAGE COORD AND APTITUDE IN LNDG SKILL. IT TOOK HIM OVER 100 LNDGS TO SOLO. HOWEVER, I ATTRIBUTE SOME OF HIS DIFFICULTIES TO A LACK OF AVAILABLE ATTN TO DEVOTE TO FLYING. HE IS EXTREMELY BUSY AT HIS JOB. UNFORTUNATELY, ONE OF SPI'S WEAK AREAS WAS A TENDENCY TO OCCASIONALLY ALLOW DANGEROUS SITS TO DEVELOP DURING LNDG, SUCH AS POOR DIRECTIONAL CTL IN THE AFTER- LNDG ROLL OR SLOW AIRSPDS ON FINAL APCH. HE ACTUALLY DEVELOPED THE SKILL TO LAND THE PLANE EARLY ON, BUT I ONLY FELT COMFORTABLE SOLOING HIM WHEN HE LOST HIS ERRATIC TENDENCIES. STILL, EVEN AFTER THE SOLO, HE WAS NEVER AS MUCH IN CTL OF THE ACFT DURING LNDG AS I WOULD HAVE LIKED. I SURPRISED SPI BY TELLING HIM TO FLY ME TO YYY. SOON I DISCOVERED NOT ONLY DID HE NOT KNOW WHAT DIRECTION YYY WAS IN, BUT HE WAS NOT AWARE THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO PENETRATE CLASS C AIRSPACE TO GET THERE. I TOOK THE CTLS AND FLEW ORBITS WHILE HE GOT HIS BEARINGS. WE FINALLY NEGOTIATED A CLASS B TRANSITION. HE WAS NOT WELL PREPARED FOR THE FIRST APCH. HIS AIRSPD WAS TOO HIGH UNTIL LATE IN THE APCH. HOWEVER, HE EVENTUALLY COMPENSATED, AND I TOLD HIM HIS AIM POINT WAS THE END OF THE NUMBERS 15. AFTER HE RPTED A 3 MI FINAL, TWR CLRED US TO LAND. I REQUESTED, AND WE WERE CLRED FOR THE OPTION. ON ABOUT A 1/4 MI FINAL FOR RWY 15L, TWR TOLD US TO GAR FOR 'SPACING.' I WAS PLEASED TO SEE SPI EXECUTE THE GAR FIRST, AND THEN RESPOND ON THE RADIO. UNFORTUNATELY, HE DID NOT FOLLOW THROUGH WELL WITH THE GAR. I TOOK THE CTLS AND ENTERED A R XWIND FOR RWY 15R PER TWR INSTRUCTIONS. I EXPLAINED HISGAR MISTAKE TO HIM, AND TWR ESTABLISHED THE ACFT ON A NORMAL R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 15R. I RETURNED THE CTLS TO HIM AND THE TWR CLRED US FOR THE OPTION RWY 15R. I INFORMED HIM OUR AIM POINT WOULD BE THE END OF THE THRESHOLD MARKERS. HE KNEW FROM EARLIER INSTRUCTION THAT WE DESIRED TO TOUCH DOWN WITHIN 200 FT OF OUR 'POINT.' BUT, I HAD NOT BEEN STRESSING DISTANCE, RATHER TECHNIQUE, TO THIS POINT IN OUR SHORT-FIELD LNDGS. THE BASE AND FINAL APCH WERE NORMAL, AND THE WIND WAS NOT A FACTOR. ON SHORT FINAL, WE WERE SLIGHTLY HIGH ON THE GLIDE PATH. I PROMPTED HIM WHEN I THOUGHT IT WAS THE RIGHT TIME FOR PWR REDUCTION TO IDLE. HE REDUCED THE PWR TO IDLE AND BEGAN RAISING THE PITCH ATTITUDE. I SAW THAT THE NOSE WAS COMING UP A LITTLE FAST, BUT I WAS SATISFIED THAT WE WERE CONTINUING TOWARDS THE RWY. MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT IT WOULD BE A FIRM LNDG. I SAID NOTHING TO HIM. THE STALL WARNING HORN BEGAN SOUNDING, AS IT USUALLY DOES A FEW SECONDS BEFORE TOUCHDOWN ON THE SHORT-FIELD LNDG. WE WERE IN A STALL ATTITUDE, AND BEGAN SINKING QUICKLY TO WHAT I THOUGHT WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE TOUCHDOWN. OUR DROP DID NOT STOP AS I THOUGHT IT WOULD AND IMMEDIATELY WE DROPPED WHAT I ESTIMATE TO BE ANOTHER 5 FT IN A FULL STALL. IT HAPPENED TOO FAST FOR ME TO TAKE THE CTLS OR COMMAND A GAR. WE STRUCK IN A NEARLY FLAT PITCH ATTITUDE. THE WINDSHIELD SPLINTERED AND BROKE ON THE L SIDE. I TOOK THE CTLS AND I FELT OUR FORWARD PROGRESS BEING IMPEDED. I SUSPECTED THAT THE PROP MIGHT HAVE BEEN STRIKING, SO PI PULLED THE MIXTURE TO IDLE/CUTOFF. USING THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING, I STEERED THE AIRPLANE OFF ON THE FIRST TXWY TO THE L, WHERE IT COASTED TO A STOP JUST OFF THE RWY. I SHUT OFF THE MAGNETOS AND THE MASTER SWITCH. WE EXITED THE AIRPLANE. NEITHER OF US WERE ANY WORSE THAN SHAKEN. THE PLANE WAS EVENTUALLY TOWED TO THE MAINT AREA. BOTH SPI AND I FELL VICTIM TO A RWY ILLUSION. WE ARE BOTH USED TO LNDG ON RWY 24 AT XXX, WHICH IS A RELATIVELY NARROW RWY. RWY 15R AT YYY IS MUCH WIDER, PERHAPS TWICE AS WIDE AS RWY24. THE DIFFERENCE IN WIDTH FACILITATED A MISJUDGEMENT IN HT ABOVE THE RWY. WE BOTH THOUGHT WE WERE CLOSER TO THE RWY THAN WE ACTUALLY WERE. SO, WE STALLED HIGH. SPI TOLD ME LATER THAT HE HAD LITTLE IDEA THAT HIS HT ABOVE THE RWY WAS TOO HIGH. I BELIEVE THE FACTOR DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WAS MY FAILURE TO PERCEIVE THAT SPI WAS GOING TO STALL THE AIRPLANE TOO HIGH ABOVE THE RWY. HAD MY DISTANCE JUDGEMENT BEEN ACCURATE, I COULD HAVE EITHER COMMANDED A GAR OR TAKEN THE CTLS AND EXECUTED ONE MYSELF. EVEN A LATE GAR COULD HAVE PREVENTED SUCH A HARD LNDG. SUCH AN INCIDENT COULD BE PREVENTED BY BETTER PREPARATION FOR DEALING WITH THE WIDER-THAN-USUAL RWY ILLUSION. FIRST, BETTER GND TRAINING COULD HAVE BENEFITTED HIM IN THIS SIT, AND THAT IS A DEFICIENCY ON MY PART. SECOND, PRELNDG BRIEFINGS CONSIDERING ANY UNUSUAL RWY CONDITIONS, SUCH AS A WIDER- THAN-USUAL RWY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.