Narrative:

At approximately XX00AM on the morning of jun/thu/94, an ord mechanic called stating they were doing a bite check on #2 engine on aircraft, an A-320, fadec system because of an 'a' fault message after a normal engine start. The engine was shut down and a restart resulted in no light off with ignition a&B fault. The mechanic called back after all tests were accomplished. No faults were reported in the system through the bite. A conference call with the engine controller was made, and the decision was made to fly to bwi and back to ord. During that time, engineering would be able to evaluate the problem. When the airplane arrived at bwi, the same message was present. At that point the V2500 engine engineer suggested a restart of the engine should be accomplished, and a reinterrogation of the #2 engine fadec system for faults. This was done, and no faults were present. At that point, the engineer, the captain, the engine controller and controller (myself) all concurred that, if after engine start and taxi for takeoff, the fault did not recur, it would be all right to bring the airplane back to ord, at which time the #2 engine electronic engine control would be replaced. The problem is deciphering of information, some of which is cryptic, and has not been completely sorted out by engineering. The MEL does not address many of these fadec problems. To prevent further occurrences, engineering is working with aie (the engine manufacturer) to clarify messages and what impact they have on the engine performance, and also, the controllers are taking a much more conservative approach to engine fadec messages.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB NOT DECIPHERED. ACFT RELEASED TO SVC WITH REPEAT PROB AT DEST ARPT.

Narrative: AT APPROX XX00AM ON THE MORNING OF JUN/THU/94, AN ORD MECH CALLED STATING THEY WERE DOING A BITE CHK ON #2 ENG ON ACFT, AN A-320, FADEC SYS BECAUSE OF AN 'A' FAULT MESSAGE AFTER A NORMAL ENG START. THE ENG WAS SHUT DOWN AND A RESTART RESULTED IN NO LIGHT OFF WITH IGNITION A&B FAULT. THE MECH CALLED BACK AFTER ALL TESTS WERE ACCOMPLISHED. NO FAULTS WERE RPTED IN THE SYS THROUGH THE BITE. A CONFERENCE CALL WITH THE ENG CTLR WAS MADE, AND THE DECISION WAS MADE TO FLY TO BWI AND BACK TO ORD. DURING THAT TIME, ENGINEERING WOULD BE ABLE TO EVALUATE THE PROB. WHEN THE AIRPLANE ARRIVED AT BWI, THE SAME MESSAGE WAS PRESENT. AT THAT POINT THE V2500 ENG ENGINEER SUGGESTED A RESTART OF THE ENG SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED, AND A REINTERROGATION OF THE #2 ENG FADEC SYS FOR FAULTS. THIS WAS DONE, AND NO FAULTS WERE PRESENT. AT THAT POINT, THE ENGINEER, THE CAPT, THE ENG CTLR AND CTLR (MYSELF) ALL CONCURRED THAT, IF AFTER ENG START AND TAXI FOR TKOF, THE FAULT DID NOT RECUR, IT WOULD BE ALL RIGHT TO BRING THE AIRPLANE BACK TO ORD, AT WHICH TIME THE #2 ENG ELECTRONIC ENG CTL WOULD BE REPLACED. THE PROB IS DECIPHERING OF INFO, SOME OF WHICH IS CRYPTIC, AND HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY SORTED OUT BY ENGINEERING. THE MEL DOES NOT ADDRESS MANY OF THESE FADEC PROBS. TO PREVENT FURTHER OCCURRENCES, ENGINEERING IS WORKING WITH AIE (THE ENG MANUFACTURER) TO CLARIFY MESSAGES AND WHAT IMPACT THEY HAVE ON THE ENG PERFORMANCE, AND ALSO, THE CTLRS ARE TAKING A MUCH MORE CONSERVATIVE APCH TO ENG FADEC MESSAGES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.