Narrative:

We were cleared for takeoff on runway 3 and unbeknownst to us, an air carrier 727 was cleared by ground to cross runway 3 at taxiway a. As we were rolling we heard the 727 say on tower frequency that he was cleared to cross. The tower then called us a different call name and said our takeoff clearance was canceled. By this time we were well past the 727 and coming up on runway 36. The tower told us to turn left immediately where there was no taxiway, then he told us to stop. The tower was not clear on what they wanted nor were they familiar with the airport. Supplemental information from acn 273770: I was the first officer on a scheduled 121 flight from dca to isp. Clearance was given by ground control to taxi to runway 3 for departure. (Runways 3, 33, and 36 were all in use.) at the end of the taxi, we switched to tower frequency and awaited takeoff clearance. We then received and acknowledged takeoff clearance from runway 3. Since I was the PF, I brought power up towards 'takeoff power' and started the takeoff roll. After rolling approximately 50-100 ft, a flight transmitted over tower frequency that he was cleared to cross runway 3. The tower controller canceled our takeoff clearance just as I noticed a 727 crossing the hold line on taxiway C. I aborted the takeoff and taxied clear of the runway and runway 36 where another passenger jet was on short final. We never heard the 727 receive his taxi clearance because we were monitoring the tower frequency. It's common practice for ground control to clear an aircraft across an active runway and then instruct that aircraft to monitor tower frequency on the other side. If the jet hadn't switched over when he did, we wouldn't have known that he was attempting to cross. In looking back it probably would have been just as safe to continue the takeoff. Dca is a high density airport and there is very little room for error, either on the ground or in the air. An additional few seconds could mean the difference in future incidents.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GND INCIDENT, POTENTIAL CONFLICT. ABORTED TKOF TAKES MDT ACFT INTO A RWY INCURSION.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 3 AND UNBEKNOWNST TO US, AN ACR 727 WAS CLRED BY GND TO CROSS RWY 3 AT TXWY A. AS WE WERE ROLLING WE HEARD THE 727 SAY ON TWR FREQ THAT HE WAS CLRED TO CROSS. THE TWR THEN CALLED US A DIFFERENT CALL NAME AND SAID OUR TKOF CLRNC WAS CANCELED. BY THIS TIME WE WERE WELL PAST THE 727 AND COMING UP ON RWY 36. THE TWR TOLD US TO TURN L IMMEDIATELY WHERE THERE WAS NO TXWY, THEN HE TOLD US TO STOP. THE TWR WAS NOT CLR ON WHAT THEY WANTED NOR WERE THEY FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 273770: I WAS THE FO ON A SCHEDULED 121 FLT FROM DCA TO ISP. CLRNC WAS GIVEN BY GND CTL TO TAXI TO RWY 3 FOR DEP. (RWYS 3, 33, AND 36 WERE ALL IN USE.) AT THE END OF THE TAXI, WE SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ AND AWAITED TKOF CLRNC. WE THEN RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGED TKOF CLRNC FROM RWY 3. SINCE I WAS THE PF, I BROUGHT PWR UP TOWARDS 'TKOF PWR' AND STARTED THE TKOF ROLL. AFTER ROLLING APPROX 50-100 FT, A FLT XMITTED OVER TWR FREQ THAT HE WAS CLRED TO CROSS RWY 3. THE TWR CTLR CANCELED OUR TKOF CLRNC JUST AS I NOTICED A 727 XING THE HOLD LINE ON TXWY C. I ABORTED THE TKOF AND TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY AND RWY 36 WHERE ANOTHER PAX JET WAS ON SHORT FINAL. WE NEVER HEARD THE 727 RECEIVE HIS TAXI CLRNC BECAUSE WE WERE MONITORING THE TWR FREQ. IT'S COMMON PRACTICE FOR GND CTL TO CLR AN ACFT ACROSS AN ACTIVE RWY AND THEN INSTRUCT THAT ACFT TO MONITOR TWR FREQ ON THE OTHER SIDE. IF THE JET HADN'T SWITCHED OVER WHEN HE DID, WE WOULDN'T HAVE KNOWN THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO CROSS. IN LOOKING BACK IT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN JUST AS SAFE TO CONTINUE THE TKOF. DCA IS A HIGH DENSITY ARPT AND THERE IS VERY LITTLE ROOM FOR ERROR, EITHER ON THE GND OR IN THE AIR. AN ADDITIONAL FEW SECONDS COULD MEAN THE DIFFERENCE IN FUTURE INCIDENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.