Narrative:

A maintenance ladder was knocked over and fell into the host computer, shutting off the main circuit breaker switch. ZNY lost all its radar capability. (Both rdp and darc plus the fdep.) all 3 system are on the same switch! We lost the primary radar (rdp) for approximately 2 hours. The backup came on after about 30 mins, and the flight data (fdep) processor was out for about 1 hour and 45 mins. Since the controllers no longer know how to work non radar, all traffic was stopped until the darc was brought up. All the flight data had to be written manually and phoned in to the adjacent facilities. I find it inconceivable that all the system including backups, are on 1 circuit. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the main power switch was covered with a glass cover to prevent accidental shutoff. The maintenance ladder broke the glass cover and shut off the power. Reporter did not know why the power could not be turned back on for 2 hours. Ucr has been filed. Facility management is doing something to prevent this from happening again, but the reporter does not know what. Supplemental information from acn 272060: complete, total radar and computer failure at new york ARTCC. I.e., no computer printed information, no radar, no backup radar. Controllers had no information to separate airplanes except position reports from aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RADAR AND FDEP FAILURE DUE TO MAIN PWR BEING TURNED OFF ACCIDENTALLY.

Narrative: A MAINT LADDER WAS KNOCKED OVER AND FELL INTO THE HOST COMPUTER, SHUTTING OFF THE MAIN CIRCUIT BREAKER SWITCH. ZNY LOST ALL ITS RADAR CAPABILITY. (BOTH RDP AND DARC PLUS THE FDEP.) ALL 3 SYS ARE ON THE SAME SWITCH! WE LOST THE PRIMARY RADAR (RDP) FOR APPROX 2 HRS. THE BACKUP CAME ON AFTER ABOUT 30 MINS, AND THE FLT DATA (FDEP) PROCESSOR WAS OUT FOR ABOUT 1 HR AND 45 MINS. SINCE THE CTLRS NO LONGER KNOW HOW TO WORK NON RADAR, ALL TFC WAS STOPPED UNTIL THE DARC WAS BROUGHT UP. ALL THE FLT DATA HAD TO BE WRITTEN MANUALLY AND PHONED IN TO THE ADJACENT FACILITIES. I FIND IT INCONCEIVABLE THAT ALL THE SYS INCLUDING BACKUPS, ARE ON 1 CIRCUIT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE MAIN PWR SWITCH WAS COVERED WITH A GLASS COVER TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL SHUTOFF. THE MAINT LADDER BROKE THE GLASS COVER AND SHUT OFF THE PWR. RPTR DID NOT KNOW WHY THE PWR COULD NOT BE TURNED BACK ON FOR 2 HRS. UCR HAS BEEN FILED. FACILITY MGMNT IS DOING SOMETHING TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN, BUT THE RPTR DOES NOT KNOW WHAT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 272060: COMPLETE, TOTAL RADAR AND COMPUTER FAILURE AT NEW YORK ARTCC. I.E., NO COMPUTER PRINTED INFO, NO RADAR, NO BACKUP RADAR. CTLRS HAD NO INFO TO SEPARATE AIRPLANES EXCEPT POS RPTS FROM ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.