Narrative:

Air carrier X heard the tower clear the now airborne dhc-8 to turn right to cross the departure course of runway 18. Then tower changed his mind and said something to the effect of 'oh, that's not going to work, turn back to your original heading' to the dhc-8 crew. Tower cleared X for takeoff. I was watching the dhc- 8 and remember hearing tower ask the dhc-8 crew if they could maintain visual contact on us. After an affirmative reply from the dhc-8 crew. Tower cleared them to maintain visual separation from X and cleared the dhc-8 to make the right turn. While X was still rolling down runway 18, tower advised us during this critical phase of flight that traffic would be crossing our departure course, maintaining visual on us. I saw the dhc-8 begin his second right turn just as we lifted off from runway 18. Things were happening rapidly. In my judgement the dhc-8's initial rate of turn and climb might have presented a hazardous situation. As we climbed through about 500 ft AGL I was not comfortable with the relative position of the dhc-8 so I began to reduce our rate of climb. Within a few seconds, passing 700 ft AGL, our TCASII issued 2 'reduce climb' RA's, immediately followed by an RA 'descend.' I was flying X. As I began to reduce our rate of climb during second segment, my first officer picked up his microphone. When we received the TCASII RA, he immediately notified the tower that we were responding to an RA, at which point the tower controller said in a very annoyed voice, 'disregard, the dash 8 has a visual on you.' I make no accusations, but I believe that too much was happening in too short a time. Believing that the dhc-8 had originally been turned back left to avoid our climb, I accepted the clearance to takeoff. Very soon thereafter I found myself thinking, 'ok, the dash 8 driver is going to maintain visual on us, but this looks like it will be awfully close to me.' I believe the ATC tower at dca could have easily avoided a potentially hazardous situation by 1) not allowing a situation to develop that would require routine TA's to aircraft in critical stages of flight, e.g., takeoff roll. 2) not requesting the crew of an aircraft to maintain visual separation from another aircraft in a critical phase of flight (e.g. Second segment climb) when it is impossible to predict that aircraft's climb path. 3) remembering that a pilot's options are severely limited when his aircraft is low, slow, and configured for takeoff or landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X TCASII RA AFTER TKOF WITH DH-8. EVASIVE ACTION TAKEN. VISUAL SEPARATION IN USE.

Narrative: ACR X HEARD THE TWR CLR THE NOW AIRBORNE DHC-8 TO TURN R TO CROSS THE DEP COURSE OF RWY 18. THEN TWR CHANGED HIS MIND AND SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'OH, THAT'S NOT GOING TO WORK, TURN BACK TO YOUR ORIGINAL HDG' TO THE DHC-8 CREW. TWR CLRED X FOR TKOF. I WAS WATCHING THE DHC- 8 AND REMEMBER HEARING TWR ASK THE DHC-8 CREW IF THEY COULD MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT ON US. AFTER AN AFFIRMATIVE REPLY FROM THE DHC-8 CREW. TWR CLRED THEM TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM X AND CLRED THE DHC-8 TO MAKE THE R TURN. WHILE X WAS STILL ROLLING DOWN RWY 18, TWR ADVISED US DURING THIS CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT THAT TFC WOULD BE XING OUR DEP COURSE, MAINTAINING VISUAL ON US. I SAW THE DHC-8 BEGIN HIS SECOND R TURN JUST AS WE LIFTED OFF FROM RWY 18. THINGS WERE HAPPENING RAPIDLY. IN MY JUDGEMENT THE DHC-8'S INITIAL RATE OF TURN AND CLB MIGHT HAVE PRESENTED A HAZARDOUS SIT. AS WE CLBED THROUGH ABOUT 500 FT AGL I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE RELATIVE POS OF THE DHC-8 SO I BEGAN TO REDUCE OUR RATE OF CLB. WITHIN A FEW SECONDS, PASSING 700 FT AGL, OUR TCASII ISSUED 2 'REDUCE CLB' RA'S, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY AN RA 'DSND.' I WAS FLYING X. AS I BEGAN TO REDUCE OUR RATE OF CLB DURING SECOND SEGMENT, MY FO PICKED UP HIS MICROPHONE. WHEN WE RECEIVED THE TCASII RA, HE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THE TWR THAT WE WERE RESPONDING TO AN RA, AT WHICH POINT THE TWR CTLR SAID IN A VERY ANNOYED VOICE, 'DISREGARD, THE DASH 8 HAS A VISUAL ON YOU.' I MAKE NO ACCUSATIONS, BUT I BELIEVE THAT TOO MUCH WAS HAPPENING IN TOO SHORT A TIME. BELIEVING THAT THE DHC-8 HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN TURNED BACK L TO AVOID OUR CLB, I ACCEPTED THE CLRNC TO TKOF. VERY SOON THEREAFTER I FOUND MYSELF THINKING, 'OK, THE DASH 8 DRIVER IS GOING TO MAINTAIN VISUAL ON US, BUT THIS LOOKS LIKE IT WILL BE AWFULLY CLOSE TO ME.' I BELIEVE THE ATC TWR AT DCA COULD HAVE EASILY AVOIDED A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS SIT BY 1) NOT ALLOWING A SIT TO DEVELOP THAT WOULD REQUIRE ROUTINE TA'S TO ACFT IN CRITICAL STAGES OF FLT, E.G., TKOF ROLL. 2) NOT REQUESTING THE CREW OF AN ACFT TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM ANOTHER ACFT IN A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT (E.G. SECOND SEGMENT CLB) WHEN IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT THAT ACFT'S CLB PATH. 3) REMEMBERING THAT A PLT'S OPTIONS ARE SEVERELY LIMITED WHEN HIS ACFT IS LOW, SLOW, AND CONFIGURED FOR TKOF OR LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.