Narrative:

Flight overwater B767-200. Sfo to iad on jansen 1 arrival. Routing was direct to bucko then the arrival. ATC (ZDC) was very busy, holding most arrs high, then assigning a crossing restr first officer 11000 ft and 250 KTS at druzz intersection. We had planned for this as well as an 80-90 KT tailwind on descent. The frequency was too busy to ask for a lower altitude any earlier than the 15 mi west of kessel VOR where we received it. A descent from FL240 was initiated with full speed brakes applied after we recalculated the descent path. I tried on 3 different occasions to tell center we were unable to meet either the altitude or speed restr at druzz. I never got any confirmation from ATC that we were unable to make the druzz crossing. We crossed druzz at about 14000 ft and 340 KTS. ATC never said anything else about the crossing and then changed us to dulles approach. As a result of being high and fast at druzz, the straight in landing to runway 12 was also a difficult descent, being 10000 ft 20 mi from the field. Several vectors and s-turns on final were needed with full spoilers, flaps, and gear to reach a stabilized visual approach for landing on runway 12 by 500 ft AGL. The landing was uneventful but had a high potential for unsafe practices. The outcome of the approach and landing was never in question, but ATC and the company continue to push for rushed approachs, lndgs and dscnts. A go around would have been just as good a decision as a landing, but the company and ATC try to treat this as an incident and pilot error. Sometimes there's just no other option. Contributing factors: ATC descent and crossing restrs (with 80 KT tailwinds) weren't possible. ATC frequency congestion. Maybe not aggressive enough on the radio, but that could have caused other conflicts by doing so. Solutions: ATC knowledge of aircraft descent rates and WX/wind condition. Hold aircraft rather than have busted dscnts/vector. Data link communication or frequency/airspace split for ZDC. Declare emergency and use captain's authority/authorized to deviation from route of flight (sometimes might be necessary -- don't rule it out).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB MISSES SPD AND XING RESTR ON DSCNT.

Narrative: FLT OVERWATER B767-200. SFO TO IAD ON JANSEN 1 ARR. ROUTING WAS DIRECT TO BUCKO THEN THE ARR. ATC (ZDC) WAS VERY BUSY, HOLDING MOST ARRS HIGH, THEN ASSIGNING A XING RESTR FO 11000 FT AND 250 KTS AT DRUZZ INTXN. WE HAD PLANNED FOR THIS AS WELL AS AN 80-90 KT TAILWIND ON DSCNT. THE FREQ WAS TOO BUSY TO ASK FOR A LOWER ALT ANY EARLIER THAN THE 15 MI W OF KESSEL VOR WHERE WE RECEIVED IT. A DSCNT FROM FL240 WAS INITIATED WITH FULL SPD BRAKES APPLIED AFTER WE RECALCULATED THE DSCNT PATH. I TRIED ON 3 DIFFERENT OCCASIONS TO TELL CTR WE WERE UNABLE TO MEET EITHER THE ALT OR SPD RESTR AT DRUZZ. I NEVER GOT ANY CONFIRMATION FROM ATC THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO MAKE THE DRUZZ XING. WE CROSSED DRUZZ AT ABOUT 14000 FT AND 340 KTS. ATC NEVER SAID ANYTHING ELSE ABOUT THE XING AND THEN CHANGED US TO DULLES APCH. AS A RESULT OF BEING HIGH AND FAST AT DRUZZ, THE STRAIGHT IN LNDG TO RWY 12 WAS ALSO A DIFFICULT DSCNT, BEING 10000 FT 20 MI FROM THE FIELD. SEVERAL VECTORS AND S-TURNS ON FINAL WERE NEEDED WITH FULL SPOILERS, FLAPS, AND GEAR TO REACH A STABILIZED VISUAL APCH FOR LNDG ON RWY 12 BY 500 FT AGL. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL BUT HAD A HIGH POTENTIAL FOR UNSAFE PRACTICES. THE OUTCOME OF THE APCH AND LNDG WAS NEVER IN QUESTION, BUT ATC AND THE COMPANY CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR RUSHED APCHS, LNDGS AND DSCNTS. A GAR WOULD HAVE BEEN JUST AS GOOD A DECISION AS A LNDG, BUT THE COMPANY AND ATC TRY TO TREAT THIS AS AN INCIDENT AND PLT ERROR. SOMETIMES THERE'S JUST NO OTHER OPTION. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ATC DSCNT AND XING RESTRS (WITH 80 KT TAILWINDS) WEREN'T POSSIBLE. ATC FREQ CONGESTION. MAYBE NOT AGGRESSIVE ENOUGH ON THE RADIO, BUT THAT COULD HAVE CAUSED OTHER CONFLICTS BY DOING SO. SOLUTIONS: ATC KNOWLEDGE OF ACFT DSCNT RATES AND WX/WIND CONDITION. HOLD ACFT RATHER THAN HAVE BUSTED DSCNTS/VECTOR. DATA LINK COM OR FREQ/AIRSPACE SPLIT FOR ZDC. DECLARE EMER AND USE CAPT'S AUTH TO DEV FROM RTE OF FLT (SOMETIMES MIGHT BE NECESSARY -- DON'T RULE IT OUT).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.