Narrative:

At about V1 smoke entered cockpit, followed by main cargo warning of fire. This type of occurrence in critical phase of flight points out the problems with 2 crew aircraft. As PNF I was 1) attempting to monitor first officer's control of the aircraft, 2) putting on oxygen mask, 3) notifying tower -- declaring emergency, 4) accomplishing appropriate checklist -- head down reading in cockpit, 5) responding to first officer requests for gear up, flaps, heading and altitude selections on mode control panel. I find, in retrospect, that the monitoring function was lost except for 'are we right side up' checks on occasion. Since the first officer was also putting his smoke equipment on I'm sure he was distracted from flying the aircraft. The niceties such as gear speed, flap speeds, airspace restrictions may or may not have been adhered to. While normally, without a physical threat to the crew (acrid smoke), these areas would have been more closely monitored. In this case our overwhelming concern was to return and land. In a previous situation such as this with a flight engineer on board, I found myself able to monitor completely, as the system were handled by the flight engineer. Engine out sits, etc, are cut and dry. Physical threat sits complicate the matter. Flight lasted a total of 9 mins. No cargo fire found. Maintenance had worked on a boroscope hole and had evidently left a pool of oil in the engine that turned to smoke and filled the aircraft through the bleed/pack system. Older aircraft completely isolated the environmental system from the engines by using turbocompressors. Maybe we shelved a good idea, it would have prevented this problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT HAS SMOKE IN COCKPIT AT TKOF. EMER DECLARED.

Narrative: AT ABOUT V1 SMOKE ENTERED COCKPIT, FOLLOWED BY MAIN CARGO WARNING OF FIRE. THIS TYPE OF OCCURRENCE IN CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT POINTS OUT THE PROBS WITH 2 CREW ACFT. AS PNF I WAS 1) ATTEMPTING TO MONITOR FO'S CTL OF THE ACFT, 2) PUTTING ON OXYGEN MASK, 3) NOTIFYING TWR -- DECLARING EMER, 4) ACCOMPLISHING APPROPRIATE CHKLIST -- HEAD DOWN READING IN COCKPIT, 5) RESPONDING TO FO REQUESTS FOR GEAR UP, FLAPS, HDG AND ALT SELECTIONS ON MODE CTL PANEL. I FIND, IN RETROSPECT, THAT THE MONITORING FUNCTION WAS LOST EXCEPT FOR 'ARE WE RIGHT SIDE UP' CHKS ON OCCASION. SINCE THE FO WAS ALSO PUTTING HIS SMOKE EQUIP ON I'M SURE HE WAS DISTRACTED FROM FLYING THE ACFT. THE NICETIES SUCH AS GEAR SPD, FLAP SPDS, AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN ADHERED TO. WHILE NORMALLY, WITHOUT A PHYSICAL THREAT TO THE CREW (ACRID SMOKE), THESE AREAS WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CLOSELY MONITORED. IN THIS CASE OUR OVERWHELMING CONCERN WAS TO RETURN AND LAND. IN A PREVIOUS SIT SUCH AS THIS WITH A FE ON BOARD, I FOUND MYSELF ABLE TO MONITOR COMPLETELY, AS THE SYS WERE HANDLED BY THE FE. ENG OUT SITS, ETC, ARE CUT AND DRY. PHYSICAL THREAT SITS COMPLICATE THE MATTER. FLT LASTED A TOTAL OF 9 MINS. NO CARGO FIRE FOUND. MAINT HAD WORKED ON A BOROSCOPE HOLE AND HAD EVIDENTLY LEFT A POOL OF OIL IN THE ENG THAT TURNED TO SMOKE AND FILLED THE ACFT THROUGH THE BLEED/PACK SYS. OLDER ACFT COMPLETELY ISOLATED THE ENVIRONMENTAL SYS FROM THE ENGS BY USING TURBOCOMPRESSORS. MAYBE WE SHELVED A GOOD IDEA, IT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.