Narrative:

Flight was first flight of the day for the aircraft overnight. The aircraft was allowed somehow to roll into a steel blast fence contacting the #2 engine. This was written up in the aircraft logbook. Maintenance corrective actions included 'right&right'd #2 thrust reverser, engine and firewalls inspected, no damage noted.' we accepted the aircraft and all was well until takeoff, at approximately 140 KTS as we rotated for takeoff pitch the #2 engine flamed out. Initial climb clearance had been 5000 ft but I stated to ATC we wished to return for a visual pattern and planned to level off at 3000 ft, which we did. All standard and emergency procedures were completed albeit slowly as this was the captain's first flight since his chkout and the so just checked out after a yr on furlough. As the checklist procedures went more slowly than I had anticipated the visual pattern got extended east of the field to the lake michigan shoreline before we turned base leg to runway 27L (approximately 14 NM). After landing uneventfully, the altitude alerter was still set at 5000 ft, our initial climb clearance altitude. Although it was probably not a deviation, it was a bit disquieting to find it set at an altitude we were cleared to but never reached. Overall we felt we had done well for our first flight together as a crew. Further, after we shut down, the captain phoned company dispatch who chastised him for not calling him in-flight as he would have had us continue to msp (300 NM). I realize the 'nearest suitable' does not always mean the runway you just departed (this time it did) but the captain is the one who must ultimately take the responsibility for that decision whatever it is. This captain was brand new and open enough to suggestions. Would he have done what dispatch told him had we called while airborne? Would I have told him in direct enough terms what I thought of that plan? We'll never know, but we've read enough accident reports to realize our circumstances have already been written in the blood of those who have gone before us. This was an important reminder to us that as a crew we are at the end of the 'food chain' (so to speak) of information, equipment, training, crew planning and so on. Everything our organization does comes to a focal point at our operation of the aircraft. If there is an undetected problem in any other link in the chain, it ultimately manifests itself in our operation and will need to be corrected, dealt with or otherwise accounted for.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FO RPT ON 727 ENG FLAMEOUT ON ROTATION, RETURN LAND. CONFRONTATION WITH DISPATCH AFTER THE EVENT. ACFT EQUIP PROB MALFUNCTION. LOGBOOK. CHKLIST USE, INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN.

Narrative: FLT WAS FIRST FLT OF THE DAY FOR THE ACFT OVERNIGHT. THE ACFT WAS ALLOWED SOMEHOW TO ROLL INTO A STEEL BLAST FENCE CONTACTING THE #2 ENG. THIS WAS WRITTEN UP IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK. MAINT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED 'R&R'D #2 THRUST REVERSER, ENG AND FIREWALLS INSPECTED, NO DAMAGE NOTED.' WE ACCEPTED THE ACFT AND ALL WAS WELL UNTIL TKOF, AT APPROX 140 KTS AS WE ROTATED FOR TKOF PITCH THE #2 ENG FLAMED OUT. INITIAL CLB CLRNC HAD BEEN 5000 FT BUT I STATED TO ATC WE WISHED TO RETURN FOR A VISUAL PATTERN AND PLANNED TO LEVEL OFF AT 3000 FT, WHICH WE DID. ALL STANDARD AND EMER PROCS WERE COMPLETED ALBEIT SLOWLY AS THIS WAS THE CAPT'S FIRST FLT SINCE HIS CHKOUT AND THE SO JUST CHKED OUT AFTER A YR ON FURLOUGH. AS THE CHKLIST PROCS WENT MORE SLOWLY THAN I HAD ANTICIPATED THE VISUAL PATTERN GOT EXTENDED E OF THE FIELD TO THE LAKE MICHIGAN SHORELINE BEFORE WE TURNED BASE LEG TO RWY 27L (APPROX 14 NM). AFTER LNDG UNEVENTFULLY, THE ALT ALERTER WAS STILL SET AT 5000 FT, OUR INITIAL CLB CLRNC ALT. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROBABLY NOT A DEV, IT WAS A BIT DISQUIETING TO FIND IT SET AT AN ALT WE WERE CLRED TO BUT NEVER REACHED. OVERALL WE FELT WE HAD DONE WELL FOR OUR FIRST FLT TOGETHER AS A CREW. FURTHER, AFTER WE SHUT DOWN, THE CAPT PHONED COMPANY DISPATCH WHO CHASTISED HIM FOR NOT CALLING HIM INFLT AS HE WOULD HAVE HAD US CONTINUE TO MSP (300 NM). I REALIZE THE 'NEAREST SUITABLE' DOES NOT ALWAYS MEAN THE RWY YOU JUST DEPARTED (THIS TIME IT DID) BUT THE CAPT IS THE ONE WHO MUST ULTIMATELY TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT DECISION WHATEVER IT IS. THIS CAPT WAS BRAND NEW AND OPEN ENOUGH TO SUGGESTIONS. WOULD HE HAVE DONE WHAT DISPATCH TOLD HIM HAD WE CALLED WHILE AIRBORNE? WOULD I HAVE TOLD HIM IN DIRECT ENOUGH TERMS WHAT I THOUGHT OF THAT PLAN? WE'LL NEVER KNOW, BUT WE'VE READ ENOUGH ACCIDENT RPTS TO REALIZE OUR CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE ALREADY BEEN WRITTEN IN THE BLOOD OF THOSE WHO HAVE GONE BEFORE US. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT REMINDER TO US THAT AS A CREW WE ARE AT THE END OF THE 'FOOD CHAIN' (SO TO SPEAK) OF INFO, EQUIP, TRAINING, CREW PLANNING AND SO ON. EVERYTHING OUR ORGANIZATION DOES COMES TO A FOCAL POINT AT OUR OP OF THE ACFT. IF THERE IS AN UNDETECTED PROB IN ANY OTHER LINK IN THE CHAIN, IT ULTIMATELY MANIFESTS ITSELF IN OUR OP AND WILL NEED TO BE CORRECTED, DEALT WITH OR OTHERWISE ACCOUNTED FOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.