Narrative:

Approaching charlotte, we were told to expect runway 36L. There were thunderstorms just over marjo, so we requested a turn in close on final. Due to traffic we were kept at 7000 ft until 2 mi from intercepting runway 36L. We were then told we would be taken across runway 36L for a right downwind to runway 36R. The frequency was very congested with the early morning recovery into charlotte. There was at least one other aircraft with a call sign ending in number '1' like our call sign. I was flying the aircraft and the captain was setting up the radios, FMC, and communicating. He put in runway 36R frequency and I briefed approach frequency, course, minimums, missed approach altitude. He had some difficulty getting in the runway 36R approach into the FMC. While he was doing this, I was being slammed from 7000 ft to 2400 ft and intercepting runway 36R just over hayou, the marker. While I was doing this, we were switched to tower 118.1 and cleared runway 36R approach. The captain said '118.1 is not runway 36L tower!' I said we were cleared for runway 36R and he said no, we had been switched back to runway 36L. I noticed runway 36L traffic we were rapidly converging with and I immediately corrected right. The captain said he had put runway 36L in the ILS, which is what I had been intercepting. All of this happened nearly, simultaneously. He put runway 36R back into the ILS, although the FMC had runway 36R since the original change. I used the navigation to avoid the conflict. I ended up being high and right on runway 36R and ended up executing a tower directed missed approach at approximately 2400 ft. The captain was upset I did not rapidly get back on GS and complete approach, as he had put runway 36R back in time, if I had acted immediately. I feel his situational awareness due to changing radios, communicating, prevented him from seeing or appreciating the proximity to the runway 36L traffic. Approach apologized for any confusion. Although I understood runway 36R as the controller had cleared us, it was unsafe for me to continue an approach to minimums when there is doubt and navigation radios being changed over the marker. We broke out at minimums on the following runway 36R approach. Approach should minimize close in runway changes on parallel approachs in sever WX when radio communications are extremely busy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF AN MLG ACR ACFT INADVERTENTLY TUNED THE ILS TO THE WRONG PARALLEL RWY RESULTING IN A CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER ACFT ON APCH TO THE OTHER RWY AND A MISSED APCH FOR THE RPTING ACFT.

Narrative: APCHING CHARLOTTE, WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 36L. THERE WERE TSTMS JUST OVER MARJO, SO WE REQUESTED A TURN IN CLOSE ON FINAL. DUE TO TFC WE WERE KEPT AT 7000 FT UNTIL 2 MI FROM INTERCEPTING RWY 36L. WE WERE THEN TOLD WE WOULD BE TAKEN ACROSS RWY 36L FOR A R DOWNWIND TO RWY 36R. THE FREQ WAS VERY CONGESTED WITH THE EARLY MORNING RECOVERY INTO CHARLOTTE. THERE WAS AT LEAST ONE OTHER ACFT WITH A CALL SIGN ENDING IN NUMBER '1' LIKE OUR CALL SIGN. I WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND THE CAPT WAS SETTING UP THE RADIOS, FMC, AND COMMUNICATING. HE PUT IN RWY 36R FREQ AND I BRIEFED APCH FREQ, COURSE, MINIMUMS, MISSED APCH ALT. HE HAD SOME DIFFICULTY GETTING IN THE RWY 36R APCH INTO THE FMC. WHILE HE WAS DOING THIS, I WAS BEING SLAMMED FROM 7000 FT TO 2400 FT AND INTERCEPTING RWY 36R JUST OVER HAYOU, THE MARKER. WHILE I WAS DOING THIS, WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR 118.1 AND CLRED RWY 36R APCH. THE CAPT SAID '118.1 IS NOT RWY 36L TWR!' I SAID WE WERE CLRED FOR RWY 36R AND HE SAID NO, WE HAD BEEN SWITCHED BACK TO RWY 36L. I NOTICED RWY 36L TFC WE WERE RAPIDLY CONVERGING WITH AND I IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED R. THE CAPT SAID HE HAD PUT RWY 36L IN THE ILS, WHICH IS WHAT I HAD BEEN INTERCEPTING. ALL OF THIS HAPPENED NEARLY, SIMULTANEOUSLY. HE PUT RWY 36R BACK INTO THE ILS, ALTHOUGH THE FMC HAD RWY 36R SINCE THE ORIGINAL CHANGE. I USED THE NAV TO AVOID THE CONFLICT. I ENDED UP BEING HIGH AND R ON RWY 36R AND ENDED UP EXECUTING A TWR DIRECTED MISSED APCH AT APPROX 2400 FT. THE CAPT WAS UPSET I DID NOT RAPIDLY GET BACK ON GS AND COMPLETE APCH, AS HE HAD PUT RWY 36R BACK IN TIME, IF I HAD ACTED IMMEDIATELY. I FEEL HIS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS DUE TO CHANGING RADIOS, COMMUNICATING, PREVENTED HIM FROM SEEING OR APPRECIATING THE PROX TO THE RWY 36L TFC. APCH APOLOGIZED FOR ANY CONFUSION. ALTHOUGH I UNDERSTOOD RWY 36R AS THE CTLR HAD CLRED US, IT WAS UNSAFE FOR ME TO CONTINUE AN APCH TO MINIMUMS WHEN THERE IS DOUBT AND NAV RADIOS BEING CHANGED OVER THE MARKER. WE BROKE OUT AT MINIMUMS ON THE FOLLOWING RWY 36R APCH. APCH SHOULD MINIMIZE CLOSE IN RWY CHANGES ON PARALLEL APCHS IN SEVER WX WHEN RADIO COMS ARE EXTREMELY BUSY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.