Narrative:

We were on descent to destination airport and we were cleared to 'a' intersection, direct to destination. Center then reclred us to 'B' VOR, to cross 10 west of 'B.' VOR at 10000. Having flown into this airport and being quite familiar with the area, I knew we were rather close to B VOR. I entered 'B' VOR into the FMC and also the crossing restriction. The FMC and trend vector on the hdi indicated that we would just make the restriction. Center then changed us over to approach control. I had just finished talking to approach control, when the senior flight attendant came forward and told me that we had a medical emergency on board and we would need to have the paramedics meet the aircraft. I told her that I would contact the company and set it up. I told the first officer that I was going off frequency when approach control called and asked if we were going to make our crossing restriction. I immediately checked the crossing restriction waypoint on the hdi. The trend vector still indicated that we would be tight, but we would make the restriction. Approach gave us a vector for the airport and said nothing more. I asked the first officer if he thought that we would make the restriction and he said it would have been tight but we would have made it. I think this could have been prevented if I had told either approach or center that we were going to be close to making the restriction. Also, the fact that we had a medical emergency on board distracted me from adequately monitoring the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT MAY HAVE MISSED A XING RESTRICTION WHILE DEALING WITH A MEDICAL EMER.

Narrative: WE WERE ON DSCNT TO DEST ARPT AND WE WERE CLRED TO 'A' INTXN, DIRECT TO DEST. CTR THEN RECLRED US TO 'B' VOR, TO CROSS 10 W OF 'B.' VOR AT 10000. HAVING FLOWN INTO THIS ARPT AND BEING QUITE FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA, I KNEW WE WERE RATHER CLOSE TO B VOR. I ENTERED 'B' VOR INTO THE FMC AND ALSO THE XING RESTRICTION. THE FMC AND TREND VECTOR ON THE HDI INDICATED THAT WE WOULD JUST MAKE THE RESTRICTION. CTR THEN CHANGED US OVER TO APCH CTL. I HAD JUST FINISHED TALKING TO APCH CTL, WHEN THE SENIOR FLT ATTENDANT CAME FORWARD AND TOLD ME THAT WE HAD A MEDICAL EMER ON BOARD AND WE WOULD NEED TO HAVE THE PARAMEDICS MEET THE ACFT. I TOLD HER THAT I WOULD CONTACT THE COMPANY AND SET IT UP. I TOLD THE FO THAT I WAS GOING OFF FREQ WHEN APCH CTL CALLED AND ASKED IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE OUR XING RESTRICTION. I IMMEDIATELY CHKED THE XING RESTRICTION WAYPOINT ON THE HDI. THE TREND VECTOR STILL INDICATED THAT WE WOULD BE TIGHT, BUT WE WOULD MAKE THE RESTRICTION. APCH GAVE US A VECTOR FOR THE ARPT AND SAID NOTHING MORE. I ASKED THE FO IF HE THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD MAKE THE RESTRICTION AND HE SAID IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TIGHT BUT WE WOULD HAVE MADE IT. I THINK THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF I HAD TOLD EITHER APCH OR CTR THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE CLOSE TO MAKING THE RESTRICTION. ALSO, THE FACT THAT WE HAD A MEDICAL EMER ON BOARD DISTRACTED ME FROM ADEQUATELY MONITORING THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.