Narrative:

On dec/fri/93, a united states airline instituted new checklists for all aircraft, which consist of B-747-400, B-747, dc-10, B-767, B-757, B-737-300, B-737-200, and A-320 (b- 727 has just been implemented). The NASA study of may/90 has been continually referenced as being the catalyst/justification for this change. What has resulted is 'force-fit standardization' which has created flawed checklists in all fleets. The authors of those checklists have quoted 'standardization' and 'safety' as rationale for this dramatic change, but a recent article in the airline's B-747-100/200 magazine has an article that states that 'most feedback has been positive' (the 747 has a 3-MAN crew). Later in the article, it states 'air carrier's overall taxi times during jan/94 have decreased by 42 seconds. Air carrier's goal is merely to decrease overall fleet average taxi times by 2 mins. We are almost halfway there! Certainly the deletion of before taxi checklist in both the B-747-400 and B-737 fleets has played a significant role.' it is quite evident that this new checklist, particularly on 2-MAN crew airplanes, is to get airplanes moving, ready or not. Performing checklist items while moving is not as safe as doing them while parked. Although many experienced pilots will accomplish the checklist while parked, newer pilots feel that they must do it while moving because, 'the company wants it.' I see an enormous safety problem evolving, with the company-imposed 'hurry-up mandate' contributing to taxiway/runway incursions and possible collision with ground vehicles and other aircraft. This ill advised project has seriously degraded safety. Supplemental information from acn 262901: a united states airline has incorporated new checklists in all aircraft fleets. A task force has attempted to 'homogenize' checklists to minimize differences between aircraft and to subsequently reduce training by stating that 'all aircraft are alike.' in the last 2 months, numerous reports have been submitted to air carrier concerning problems with the checklists. Many crews are improvising with the checklist because they consider it to be unsafe (requires doing too much while moving and omits critical items/checks). To date, the 'hierarchy' that devised these checklists has ignored input and has attempted to stifle criticism. They state that their project was well researched and tested and that crews are obligated to 'obey.' however, no line pilot input was solicited nor accepted during the formation/implementation of this project. Even pilots involved with safety/training committees were ignored. I feel that the attitude of those who devise these projects in order to build their own empire are seriously degrading safety in the airline industry.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PLT WANTS THE ASRS TO KNOW HIS FEELINGS ABOUT THE 'STANDARDIZED' CHKLISTS THAT HIS ACR HAS INSTITUTED.

Narrative: ON DEC/FRI/93, A UNITED STATES AIRLINE INSTITUTED NEW CHKLISTS FOR ALL ACFT, WHICH CONSIST OF B-747-400, B-747, DC-10, B-767, B-757, B-737-300, B-737-200, AND A-320 (B- 727 HAS JUST BEEN IMPLEMENTED). THE NASA STUDY OF MAY/90 HAS BEEN CONTINUALLY REFED AS BEING THE CATALYST/JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS CHANGE. WHAT HAS RESULTED IS 'FORCE-FIT STANDARDIZATION' WHICH HAS CREATED FLAWED CHKLISTS IN ALL FLEETS. THE AUTHORS OF THOSE CHKLISTS HAVE QUOTED 'STANDARDIZATION' AND 'SAFETY' AS RATIONALE FOR THIS DRAMATIC CHANGE, BUT A RECENT ARTICLE IN THE AIRLINE'S B-747-100/200 MAGAZINE HAS AN ARTICLE THAT STATES THAT 'MOST FEEDBACK HAS BEEN POSITIVE' (THE 747 HAS A 3-MAN CREW). LATER IN THE ARTICLE, IT STATES 'ACR'S OVERALL TAXI TIMES DURING JAN/94 HAVE DECREASED BY 42 SECONDS. ACR'S GOAL IS MERELY TO DECREASE OVERALL FLEET AVERAGE TAXI TIMES BY 2 MINS. WE ARE ALMOST HALFWAY THERE! CERTAINLY THE DELETION OF BEFORE TAXI CHKLIST IN BOTH THE B-747-400 AND B-737 FLEETS HAS PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE.' IT IS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THIS NEW CHKLIST, PARTICULARLY ON 2-MAN CREW AIRPLANES, IS TO GET AIRPLANES MOVING, READY OR NOT. PERFORMING CHKLIST ITEMS WHILE MOVING IS NOT AS SAFE AS DOING THEM WHILE PARKED. ALTHOUGH MANY EXPERIENCED PLTS WILL ACCOMPLISH THE CHKLIST WHILE PARKED, NEWER PLTS FEEL THAT THEY MUST DO IT WHILE MOVING BECAUSE, 'THE COMPANY WANTS IT.' I SEE AN ENORMOUS SAFETY PROB EVOLVING, WITH THE COMPANY-IMPOSED 'HURRY-UP MANDATE' CONTRIBUTING TO TXWY/RWY INCURSIONS AND POSSIBLE COLLISION WITH GND VEHICLES AND OTHER ACFT. THIS ILL ADVISED PROJECT HAS SERIOUSLY DEGRADED SAFETY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 262901: A UNITED STATES AIRLINE HAS INCORPORATED NEW CHKLISTS IN ALL ACFT FLEETS. A TASK FORCE HAS ATTEMPTED TO 'HOMOGENIZE' CHKLISTS TO MINIMIZE DIFFERENCES BTWN ACFT AND TO SUBSEQUENTLY REDUCE TRAINING BY STATING THAT 'ALL ACFT ARE ALIKE.' IN THE LAST 2 MONTHS, NUMEROUS RPTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO ACR CONCERNING PROBS WITH THE CHKLISTS. MANY CREWS ARE IMPROVISING WITH THE CHKLIST BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER IT TO BE UNSAFE (REQUIRES DOING TOO MUCH WHILE MOVING AND OMITS CRITICAL ITEMS/CHKS). TO DATE, THE 'HIERARCHY' THAT DEVISED THESE CHKLISTS HAS IGNORED INPUT AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO STIFLE CRITICISM. THEY STATE THAT THEIR PROJECT WAS WELL RESEARCHED AND TESTED AND THAT CREWS ARE OBLIGATED TO 'OBEY.' HOWEVER, NO LINE PLT INPUT WAS SOLICITED NOR ACCEPTED DURING THE FORMATION/IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROJECT. EVEN PLTS INVOLVED WITH SAFETY/TRAINING COMMITTEES WERE IGNORED. I FEEL THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THOSE WHO DEVISE THESE PROJECTS IN ORDER TO BUILD THEIR OWN EMPIRE ARE SERIOUSLY DEGRADING SAFETY IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.