Narrative:

At 4000 ft MSL in approach pattern with radar vectors, slats would not extend on our dc-10-10 when we were instructed to slow down to slat speed by approach control. Flight manual procedures were accomplished for 'slat disagree light' while getting vectored north of mem airport by approach control. A no slat with flaps approach (retract/35 degree) approach and landing was planned. I think it was the tower controller who put into the position behind the baron so close that we felt uncomfortable. At the time, with the WX and only 20000 pounds of fuel, I felt declaring the emergency and landing was the prudent thing to do. Upon parking at the ramp, the so de-briefed the maintenance personnel while I gathered up my gear and used the head. Upon exiting the head, the so had already left the aircraft and the maintenance personnel were standing in the aircraft. No one asked me anything about the incident and I left the aircraft. I made a company safety report and was in the crew lounge for about 1 hour after landing. No maintenance personnel attempted to call me to talk about the incident. The next day my flight manager called to tell me the maintenance problem had not been written up in the logbook. I told him I thought the so had handled it. The flight manager said he would make the write- up. The following day the senior manager of flight safety called me to tell me I had a possible far/FAA violation for not making sure the write-up was made. I contacted the first officer and so about the incident. The maintenance person told the so that he would make the write-up. The senior manager of flight safety suggested that we all make ASRS reports on the situation and we are doing that. The problem arose because the so did not make the write-up and trusted the maintenance person to make it. It also arose because I did not check everything my crew did for and during every phase of the trip, from block out to block in. This type procedure, where maintenance personnel make write-ups versus the crew making the write-ups happens on a fairly regular basis at our company so none of us, especially the so who normally makes write-ups felt uncomfortable with this scenario. It will never happen again to this captain. The human performance considerations were normal. A mistake was made by several people. We thought the maintenance person was making the write-up and we do not know what the maintenance person was thinking. The write-up was not made and the aircraft has been flying every day since the incident with out further incident. Supplemental information from acn 262367: after arriving in the blocks, maintenance conferred with me (the so) and I informed them of our malfunction. A radio call was made to maintenance prior to landing also advising of the slats failure to extend. I failed to make the write-up int the aircraft logbook about the slats, but had asked the maintenance person if I should or if he would make the write- up. He said he would make the write-up, but apparently did not. To prevent a recurrence the standard procedure should be followed -- flight crew members must make the write-up and have it reviewed by the captain.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB MALFUNCTION ON DC-10-10 FREIGHTER NOT ENTERED INTO LOGBOOK BEFORE FLC HAD LEFT THE FLT DECK.

Narrative: AT 4000 FT MSL IN APCH PATTERN WITH RADAR VECTORS, SLATS WOULD NOT EXTEND ON OUR DC-10-10 WHEN WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO SLOW DOWN TO SLAT SPD BY APCH CTL. FLT MANUAL PROCS WERE ACCOMPLISHED FOR 'SLAT DISAGREE LIGHT' WHILE GETTING VECTORED N OF MEM ARPT BY APCH CTL. A NO SLAT WITH FLAPS APCH (RETRACT/35 DEGREE) APCH AND LNDG WAS PLANNED. I THINK IT WAS THE TWR CTLR WHO PUT INTO THE POS BEHIND THE BARON SO CLOSE THAT WE FELT UNCOMFORTABLE. AT THE TIME, WITH THE WX AND ONLY 20000 LBS OF FUEL, I FELT DECLARING THE EMER AND LNDG WAS THE PRUDENT THING TO DO. UPON PARKING AT THE RAMP, THE SO DE-BRIEFED THE MAINT PERSONNEL WHILE I GATHERED UP MY GEAR AND USED THE HEAD. UPON EXITING THE HEAD, THE SO HAD ALREADY LEFT THE ACFT AND THE MAINT PERSONNEL WERE STANDING IN THE ACFT. NO ONE ASKED ME ANYTHING ABOUT THE INCIDENT AND I LEFT THE ACFT. I MADE A COMPANY SAFETY RPT AND WAS IN THE CREW LOUNGE FOR ABOUT 1 HR AFTER LNDG. NO MAINT PERSONNEL ATTEMPTED TO CALL ME TO TALK ABOUT THE INCIDENT. THE NEXT DAY MY FLT MGR CALLED TO TELL ME THE MAINT PROB HAD NOT BEEN WRITTEN UP IN THE LOGBOOK. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT THE SO HAD HANDLED IT. THE FLT MGR SAID HE WOULD MAKE THE WRITE- UP. THE FOLLOWING DAY THE SENIOR MGR OF FLT SAFETY CALLED ME TO TELL ME I HAD A POSSIBLE FAR/FAA VIOLATION FOR NOT MAKING SURE THE WRITE-UP WAS MADE. I CONTACTED THE FO AND SO ABOUT THE INCIDENT. THE MAINT PERSON TOLD THE SO THAT HE WOULD MAKE THE WRITE-UP. THE SENIOR MGR OF FLT SAFETY SUGGESTED THAT WE ALL MAKE ASRS RPTS ON THE SIT AND WE ARE DOING THAT. THE PROB AROSE BECAUSE THE SO DID NOT MAKE THE WRITE-UP AND TRUSTED THE MAINT PERSON TO MAKE IT. IT ALSO AROSE BECAUSE I DID NOT CHK EVERYTHING MY CREW DID FOR AND DURING EVERY PHASE OF THE TRIP, FROM BLOCK OUT TO BLOCK IN. THIS TYPE PROC, WHERE MAINT PERSONNEL MAKE WRITE-UPS VERSUS THE CREW MAKING THE WRITE-UPS HAPPENS ON A FAIRLY REGULAR BASIS AT OUR COMPANY SO NONE OF US, ESPECIALLY THE SO WHO NORMALLY MAKES WRITE-UPS FELT UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS SCENARIO. IT WILL NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN TO THIS CAPT. THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS WERE NORMAL. A MISTAKE WAS MADE BY SEVERAL PEOPLE. WE THOUGHT THE MAINT PERSON WAS MAKING THE WRITE-UP AND WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE MAINT PERSON WAS THINKING. THE WRITE-UP WAS NOT MADE AND THE ACFT HAS BEEN FLYING EVERY DAY SINCE THE INCIDENT WITH OUT FURTHER INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 262367: AFTER ARRIVING IN THE BLOCKS, MAINT CONFERRED WITH ME (THE SO) AND I INFORMED THEM OF OUR MALFUNCTION. A RADIO CALL WAS MADE TO MAINT PRIOR TO LNDG ALSO ADVISING OF THE SLATS FAILURE TO EXTEND. I FAILED TO MAKE THE WRITE-UP INT THE ACFT LOGBOOK ABOUT THE SLATS, BUT HAD ASKED THE MAINT PERSON IF I SHOULD OR IF HE WOULD MAKE THE WRITE- UP. HE SAID HE WOULD MAKE THE WRITE-UP, BUT APPARENTLY DID NOT. TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE THE STANDARD PROC SHOULD BE FOLLOWED -- FLC MEMBERS MUST MAKE THE WRITE-UP AND HAVE IT REVIEWED BY THE CAPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.