Narrative:

Flying from tulsa to oklahoma city on the evening of dec/xx/93, our aircraft suffered a failure of the #1 engine. This occurred on final approach to runway 17L at approximately 400 ft AGL. The first officer was flying the ILS and all checklists were complete. The winds were reported to be 160 degrees at 5 KTS but I noticed the nose of the aircraft was pointed about 190 degrees. As I was analyzing this discrepancy, we heard a rapid series of loud noises and felt the aircraft decelerate slightly. No cockpit warning lights or horns were activated. The first officer was already using a low power setting to maintain the proper approach speed so this allowed him to increase the throttles to a more 'normal' position. The captain immediately announced, 'we have a fire on the #1 engine.' he then pointed to the first officer and said, 'you fly the airplane and go ahead and land it, second officer let's do the checklist!' I turned to my panel and confirmed we had essential electrical power and then turned off the galley power. Since I had not seen or heard any cockpit fire warnings, I turned to the captain to confirm his choice of the engine fire versus engine failure checklist. It was then that I could see him silhouetted by the fire light reflecting off the ground and heard the tower controller confirm that flames were visible. The captain had executed the rest of the checklist by turning off the #1 engine and discharging the fire bottle. Then I read through the quick reference checklist to confirm we had completed all the items correctly. Just prior to landing, I depressurized the cabin to aid in the immediate opening of exits for emergency evacuate/evacuation. As we cleared the runway, the tower reported the fire was out and the captain stated that we would not evacuate/evacuation the aircraft and that I was to talk to the passenger. I opened the cockpit door and asked the flight attendant in charge to come into the cockpit. I told her of our problem and that the captain did not want to evacuate/evacuation the airplane. We agreed that I would make any announcements to the passenger. I then told the passenger to remain in their seats, explained the problem as best I could and informed them of our intentions to be towed to the gate. After transferring electrical power to the APU, we turned off the remaining 2 engines and waited for the aircraft tug. An uneventful deplaning then occurred at the gate. I believe catastrophic turbine failure occurred due to a possible overspd condition. This might explain the low power setting required for landing and the aircraft nose pointed out of the wind. Hot turbine blades fell to the ground and started a grass fire near the runway. Fortunately this did not occur 2 mins earlier when we were over the city. Cockpit resource management and simulator training quickly came into use by the entire cockpit crew. It felt very natural. The captain's clear instructions and answers made my job much easier. The entire crew and all passenger remained calm throughout. Supplemental information from acn 260510: it would be much better if the fire personnel were on the same frequency as the tower and the cockpit (they were not).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN AFTER CATASTROPHIC DESTRUCTION OF #1 ENG ON SHORT FINAL. INFLT FIRE EXTINGUISHED ON GND.

Narrative: FLYING FROM TULSA TO OKLAHOMA CITY ON THE EVENING OF DEC/XX/93, OUR ACFT SUFFERED A FAILURE OF THE #1 ENG. THIS OCCURRED ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 17L AT APPROX 400 FT AGL. THE FO WAS FLYING THE ILS AND ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETE. THE WINDS WERE RPTED TO BE 160 DEGS AT 5 KTS BUT I NOTICED THE NOSE OF THE ACFT WAS POINTED ABOUT 190 DEGS. AS I WAS ANALYZING THIS DISCREPANCY, WE HEARD A RAPID SERIES OF LOUD NOISES AND FELT THE ACFT DECELERATE SLIGHTLY. NO COCKPIT WARNING LIGHTS OR HORNS WERE ACTIVATED. THE FO WAS ALREADY USING A LOW PWR SETTING TO MAINTAIN THE PROPER APCH SPD SO THIS ALLOWED HIM TO INCREASE THE THROTTLES TO A MORE 'NORMAL' POS. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED, 'WE HAVE A FIRE ON THE #1 ENG.' HE THEN POINTED TO THE FO AND SAID, 'YOU FLY THE AIRPLANE AND GO AHEAD AND LAND IT, SECOND OFFICER LET'S DO THE CHKLIST!' I TURNED TO MY PANEL AND CONFIRMED WE HAD ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL PWR AND THEN TURNED OFF THE GALLEY PWR. SINCE I HAD NOT SEEN OR HEARD ANY COCKPIT FIRE WARNINGS, I TURNED TO THE CAPT TO CONFIRM HIS CHOICE OF THE ENG FIRE VERSUS ENG FAILURE CHKLIST. IT WAS THEN THAT I COULD SEE HIM SILHOUETTED BY THE FIRE LIGHT REFLECTING OFF THE GND AND HEARD THE TWR CTLR CONFIRM THAT FLAMES WERE VISIBLE. THE CAPT HAD EXECUTED THE REST OF THE CHKLIST BY TURNING OFF THE #1 ENG AND DISCHARGING THE FIRE BOTTLE. THEN I READ THROUGH THE QUICK REF CHKLIST TO CONFIRM WE HAD COMPLETED ALL THE ITEMS CORRECTLY. JUST PRIOR TO LNDG, I DEPRESSURIZED THE CABIN TO AID IN THE IMMEDIATE OPENING OF EXITS FOR EMER EVAC. AS WE CLRED THE RWY, THE TWR RPTED THE FIRE WAS OUT AND THE CAPT STATED THAT WE WOULD NOT EVAC THE ACFT AND THAT I WAS TO TALK TO THE PAX. I OPENED THE COCKPIT DOOR AND ASKED THE FLT ATTENDANT IN CHARGE TO COME INTO THE COCKPIT. I TOLD HER OF OUR PROB AND THAT THE CAPT DID NOT WANT TO EVAC THE AIRPLANE. WE AGREED THAT I WOULD MAKE ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS TO THE PAX. I THEN TOLD THE PAX TO REMAIN IN THEIR SEATS, EXPLAINED THE PROB AS BEST I COULD AND INFORMED THEM OF OUR INTENTIONS TO BE TOWED TO THE GATE. AFTER TRANSFERRING ELECTRICAL PWR TO THE APU, WE TURNED OFF THE REMAINING 2 ENGS AND WAITED FOR THE ACFT TUG. AN UNEVENTFUL DEPLANING THEN OCCURRED AT THE GATE. I BELIEVE CATASTROPHIC TURBINE FAILURE OCCURRED DUE TO A POSSIBLE OVERSPD CONDITION. THIS MIGHT EXPLAIN THE LOW PWR SETTING REQUIRED FOR LNDG AND THE ACFT NOSE POINTED OUT OF THE WIND. HOT TURBINE BLADES FELL TO THE GND AND STARTED A GRASS FIRE NEAR THE RWY. FORTUNATELY THIS DID NOT OCCUR 2 MINS EARLIER WHEN WE WERE OVER THE CITY. COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT AND SIMULATOR TRAINING QUICKLY CAME INTO USE BY THE ENTIRE COCKPIT CREW. IT FELT VERY NATURAL. THE CAPT'S CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS AND ANSWERS MADE MY JOB MUCH EASIER. THE ENTIRE CREW AND ALL PAX REMAINED CALM THROUGHOUT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 260510: IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER IF THE FIRE PERSONNEL WERE ON THE SAME FREQ AS THE TWR AND THE COCKPIT (THEY WERE NOT).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.