Narrative:

On dec/xx/93, our airlines instituted new checklists for all aircraft, which consist of widebody transport's, large transport's, and medium large transport's. The reasons for this drastic rewriting of checklists are: 1) to expedite taxi from the gate area by eliminating an after start checklist (which is accomplished while stopped) and placing these items on a before takeoff checklist (which is accomplished while moving). 2) to 'standardize' all fleets in order to justify future training program reductions. The result has been a disruption of proven flow patterns and elimination of critical checklist items in the medium large transport flight manual, performance and procedures, revision #52, page N18, the 'engine start after pushback' dialogue between the ground and the captain is in error. The ground is giving the 'cleared to start engines' signal prior to tow bar removal. On the medium large transport this can cause serious damage and injury, because of the possibility of pressurizing the 'a' hydraulic system, which pwrs the nosewheel steering. This could cause the nose gear to turn the tow bar. Although all air carrier medium large transport pilots are aware of this, ground personnel are not, and are clearing all aircraft to start engines on pushback. Air carrier is attempting to 'force-feed' standardization, and is using the NASA study of may 1990 to justify it. It appears that they took the study out of context and took liberty with the findings as justification to radically change all procedures. Historically, checklists are written in somebody's blood (somebody was killed using the old, or no procedure). These checklists were written in catsup, mustard, and mayonnaise around the cafeteria lunch table.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CHKLISTS USE INCOMPATIBLE WITH ACFT EQUIP OPERATING PROCS.

Narrative: ON DEC/XX/93, OUR AIRLINES INSTITUTED NEW CHKLISTS FOR ALL ACFT, WHICH CONSIST OF WDB'S, LGT'S, AND MLG'S. THE REASONS FOR THIS DRASTIC REWRITING OF CHKLISTS ARE: 1) TO EXPEDITE TAXI FROM THE GATE AREA BY ELIMINATING AN AFTER START CHKLIST (WHICH IS ACCOMPLISHED WHILE STOPPED) AND PLACING THESE ITEMS ON A BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST (WHICH IS ACCOMPLISHED WHILE MOVING). 2) TO 'STANDARDIZE' ALL FLEETS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY FUTURE TRAINING PROGRAM REDUCTIONS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN A DISRUPTION OF PROVEN FLOW PATTERNS AND ELIMINATION OF CRITICAL CHKLIST ITEMS IN THE MLG FLT MANUAL, PERFORMANCE AND PROCS, REVISION #52, PAGE N18, THE 'ENG START AFTER PUSHBACK' DIALOGUE BTWN THE GND AND THE CAPT IS IN ERROR. THE GND IS GIVING THE 'CLRED TO START ENGS' SIGNAL PRIOR TO TOW BAR REMOVAL. ON THE MLG THIS CAN CAUSE SERIOUS DAMAGE AND INJURY, BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESSURIZING THE 'A' HYD SYS, WHICH PWRS THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING. THIS COULD CAUSE THE NOSE GEAR TO TURN THE TOW BAR. ALTHOUGH ALL ACR MLG PLTS ARE AWARE OF THIS, GND PERSONNEL ARE NOT, AND ARE CLRING ALL ACFT TO START ENGS ON PUSHBACK. ACR IS ATTEMPTING TO 'FORCE-FEED' STANDARDIZATION, AND IS USING THE NASA STUDY OF MAY 1990 TO JUSTIFY IT. IT APPEARS THAT THEY TOOK THE STUDY OUT OF CONTEXT AND TOOK LIBERTY WITH THE FINDINGS AS JUSTIFICATION TO RADICALLY CHANGE ALL PROCS. HISTORICALLY, CHKLISTS ARE WRITTEN IN SOMEBODY'S BLOOD (SOMEBODY WAS KILLED USING THE OLD, OR NO PROC). THESE CHKLISTS WERE WRITTEN IN CATSUP, MUSTARD, AND MAYONNAISE AROUND THE CAFETERIA LUNCH TABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.