Narrative:

We were cleared to taxi to active runway 12 having approximately 7000 ft available runway. Upon reaching active runway 12, the hou tower cleared us into position on runway 17. Runway 17 only had 6000 ft available. After re-computing the 'numbers' we found that we could still accept runway 17. After bringing the aircraft into position, using all available of runway 17, the captain brought the throttles up, while holding the brakes, for a full static thrust takeoff. We used maximum thrust (for a 60 degree F day as reported by ATIS). After double-checking all before takeoff items, I told the captain that we were ready for takeoff. The captain then released the brakes and we began our takeoff roll. I called airspeed alive and the captain x-chked. I called 80 KTS and the captain brought his left hand off the tiller wheel and onto the control yoke and replied x-chked. I called V1 and he then put his right hand on the control yoke. I then called 'rotate' and the captain brought the yoke back to rotate position (approximately 9 degrees nose up on the command bars). The captain then replied 'it's not coming off the ground, abort, abort!' at that point the captain brought the throttles back and went into full reverse thrust. We also then used maximum braking and spoilers to decelerate the aircraft. The aircraft came to rest approximately 20 yards straight off of hou's runway 17. There were no injuries to anyone aboard. The only damage to the aircraft were 2 flat tires. Although the aircraft was heavy, the computations said that we could in fact use a 6000 ft runway. From my side of the cockpit all indications were that, the aircraft was accelerating at a normal rate and would, in fact, have flown. I feel the cause of the abort was due to the captain's lack of confidence in the aircraft's performance and, therefore, he aborted the takeoff. The abort occurred after the aircraft had passed the V1 speed. In my mind this is why we overshot the end of the runway. I did not take the controls assuming that he had discovered something seriously wrong with the aircraft that I had not. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporting first officer states that there was no damage to the aircraft except for 2 flat tires. The aircraft was slowed quickly by the mud that was at the end of the runway. The aircraft was picked out of the mud, washed off, and underway in a few hours. There was absolutely no problem with the aircraft that would require a takeoff abort. The captain had had no experience with this type aircraft in a heavy weight, short runway situation. The captain received a long lecture from his boss and some remedial training in aircraft performance. The aircraft is used in far part 91 and 135 operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE CAPT OF A CPR MDT ABORTED HIS TKOF BELIEVING THAT HE LACKED PERFORMANCE.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO ACTIVE RWY 12 HAVING APPROX 7000 FT AVAILABLE RWY. UPON REACHING ACTIVE RWY 12, THE HOU TWR CLRED US INTO POS ON RWY 17. RWY 17 ONLY HAD 6000 FT AVAILABLE. AFTER RE-COMPUTING THE 'NUMBERS' WE FOUND THAT WE COULD STILL ACCEPT RWY 17. AFTER BRINGING THE ACFT INTO POS, USING ALL AVAILABLE OF RWY 17, THE CAPT BROUGHT THE THROTTLES UP, WHILE HOLDING THE BRAKES, FOR A FULL STATIC THRUST TKOF. WE USED MAX THRUST (FOR A 60 DEG F DAY AS RPTED BY ATIS). AFTER DOUBLE-CHKING ALL BEFORE TKOF ITEMS, I TOLD THE CAPT THAT WE WERE READY FOR TKOF. THE CAPT THEN RELEASED THE BRAKES AND WE BEGAN OUR TKOF ROLL. I CALLED AIRSPD ALIVE AND THE CAPT X-CHKED. I CALLED 80 KTS AND THE CAPT BROUGHT HIS L HAND OFF THE TILLER WHEEL AND ONTO THE CTL YOKE AND REPLIED X-CHKED. I CALLED V1 AND HE THEN PUT HIS R HAND ON THE CTL YOKE. I THEN CALLED 'ROTATE' AND THE CAPT BROUGHT THE YOKE BACK TO ROTATE POS (APPROX 9 DEGS NOSE UP ON THE COMMAND BARS). THE CAPT THEN REPLIED 'IT'S NOT COMING OFF THE GND, ABORT, ABORT!' AT THAT POINT THE CAPT BROUGHT THE THROTTLES BACK AND WENT INTO FULL REVERSE THRUST. WE ALSO THEN USED MAX BRAKING AND SPOILERS TO DECELERATE THE ACFT. THE ACFT CAME TO REST APPROX 20 YARDS STRAIGHT OFF OF HOU'S RWY 17. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO ANYONE ABOARD. THE ONLY DAMAGE TO THE ACFT WERE 2 FLAT TIRES. ALTHOUGH THE ACFT WAS HVY, THE COMPUTATIONS SAID THAT WE COULD IN FACT USE A 6000 FT RWY. FROM MY SIDE OF THE COCKPIT ALL INDICATIONS WERE THAT, THE ACFT WAS ACCELERATING AT A NORMAL RATE AND WOULD, IN FACT, HAVE FLOWN. I FEEL THE CAUSE OF THE ABORT WAS DUE TO THE CAPT'S LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ACFT'S PERFORMANCE AND, THEREFORE, HE ABORTED THE TKOF. THE ABORT OCCURRED AFTER THE ACFT HAD PASSED THE V1 SPD. IN MY MIND THIS IS WHY WE OVERSHOT THE END OF THE RWY. I DID NOT TAKE THE CTLS ASSUMING THAT HE HAD DISCOVERED SOMETHING SERIOUSLY WRONG WITH THE ACFT THAT I HAD NOT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTING FO STATES THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT EXCEPT FOR 2 FLAT TIRES. THE ACFT WAS SLOWED QUICKLY BY THE MUD THAT WAS AT THE END OF THE RWY. THE ACFT WAS PICKED OUT OF THE MUD, WASHED OFF, AND UNDERWAY IN A FEW HRS. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO PROB WITH THE ACFT THAT WOULD REQUIRE A TKOF ABORT. THE CAPT HAD HAD NO EXPERIENCE WITH THIS TYPE ACFT IN A HVY WT, SHORT RWY SIT. THE CAPT RECEIVED A LONG LECTURE FROM HIS BOSS AND SOME REMEDIAL TRAINING IN ACFT PERFORMANCE. THE ACFT IS USED IN FAR PART 91 AND 135 OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.