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Potential ground conflict with taxiing arrival landing traffic. Unauthorized runway operation entry crossing.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 255020 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199310 |
| Day | Fri |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : fcm |
| State Reference | MN |
| Altitude | agl bound lower : 50 agl bound upper : 50 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | tower : fcm |
| Operator | general aviation : personal |
| Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear |
| Flight Phase | descent : approach landing other |
| Route In Use | approach : straight in |
| Flight Plan | None |
| Aircraft 2 | |
| Operator | general aviation : personal |
| Make Model Name | Small Aircraft |
| Flight Phase | ground other : taxi |
| Flight Plan | VFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | Other |
| Function | flight crew : single pilot |
| Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : private |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 5 flight time total : 850 flight time type : 400 |
| ASRS Report | 255020 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | Other |
| Function | flight crew : single pilot |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | conflict : ground critical incursion : runway non adherence : clearance non adherence : far |
| Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
| Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
| Miss Distance | vertical : 20 |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
I had been cleared to land on runway 18, fcm. The field has a north side taxiway which crosses 18 a few ft from the threshold. Run-up areas are on either side of the runway and occupy space between the taxiway and the north end of the runway. As I was approximately 100 ft from the end of the runway, I noticed 1 of the aircraft which I had initially thought to be in the run-up area was proceeding across the runway, west to east. I raised the right wing and pulled back on the yoke enough to activate the stall warning and then pushed the nose down making an uneventful landing, except that I was left of the centerline. The tower contacted me during the rollout and advised that the aircraft, which had crossed the runway did so without permission. There are separate ground and tower frequencys so I was unaware of any directions being given to the other aircraft. The aircraft I was flying did not have a microphone switch on the yoke. I was using a headset with the transmit switch in my lap. Although the transmit switch can be secured to the yoke with velcro, I believe it interferes with proper control of the aircraft. Had there been a yoke-mounted microphone switch, I could have contacted the tower before getting into a potentially dangerous situation. I thought until the very last moment that the taxiing aircraft was going to observe field custom and stop. I believe the lesson to be learned is to initiate a go around first rather than anticipating proper safety precautions on the part of the other pilot.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: POTENTIAL GND CONFLICT WITH TAXIING ARR LNDG TFC. UNAUTH RWY OP ENTRY XING.
Narrative: I HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 18, FCM. THE FIELD HAS A N SIDE TXWY WHICH CROSSES 18 A FEW FT FROM THE THRESHOLD. RUN-UP AREAS ARE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE RWY AND OCCUPY SPACE BTWN THE TXWY AND THE N END OF THE RWY. AS I WAS APPROX 100 FT FROM THE END OF THE RWY, I NOTICED 1 OF THE ACFT WHICH I HAD INITIALLY THOUGHT TO BE IN THE RUN-UP AREA WAS PROCEEDING ACROSS THE RWY, W TO E. I RAISED THE R WING AND PULLED BACK ON THE YOKE ENOUGH TO ACTIVATE THE STALL WARNING AND THEN PUSHED THE NOSE DOWN MAKING AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG, EXCEPT THAT I WAS L OF THE CTRLINE. THE TWR CONTACTED ME DURING THE ROLLOUT AND ADVISED THAT THE ACFT, WHICH HAD CROSSED THE RWY DID SO WITHOUT PERMISSION. THERE ARE SEPARATE GND AND TWR FREQS SO I WAS UNAWARE OF ANY DIRECTIONS BEING GIVEN TO THE OTHER ACFT. THE ACFT I WAS FLYING DID NOT HAVE A MICROPHONE SWITCH ON THE YOKE. I WAS USING A HEADSET WITH THE XMIT SWITCH IN MY LAP. ALTHOUGH THE XMIT SWITCH CAN BE SECURED TO THE YOKE WITH VELCRO, I BELIEVE IT INTERFERES WITH PROPER CTL OF THE ACFT. HAD THERE BEEN A YOKE-MOUNTED MIKE SWITCH, I COULD HAVE CONTACTED THE TWR BEFORE GETTING INTO A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SIT. I THOUGHT UNTIL THE VERY LAST MOMENT THAT THE TAXIING ACFT WAS GOING TO OBSERVE FIELD CUSTOM AND STOP. I BELIEVE THE LESSON TO BE LEARNED IS TO INITIATE A GAR FIRST RATHER THAN ANTICIPATING PROPER SAFETY PRECAUTIONS ON THE PART OF THE OTHER PLT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.