Narrative:

Runway 28L in use. Taxiing eastbound on taxiway D, at cmh, tower informed us that we were #1 for takeoff and asked if we wanted to 'taxi down runway 23, and back taxi into position, or if we would be able to 'depart from the intersection.' there was another air carrier medium large transport in the block and tower could not tell if we would have access utilizing the normal taxi route. We told tower we requested the full length, but, after turning the corner we noticed, and informed tower, that we had access to the runway by proceeding straight ahead, passing by the medium large transport. Tower told us and copilot acknowledged to 'taxi straight ahead and hold short.' I was concentrating on my wingtip clearance, looking out my left side, and seeing the pilot of the medium large transport giving me a thumbs-up sign confirming adequate room. In my mind, I had the impression that I had been cleared to taxi straight ahead onto the runway and hold. Prior to entering the runway, I looked at the approach path and saw landing lights of what I assumed was an airliner on a several mi final. I taxied onto the runway and turned into position, awaiting my takeoff clearance. While waiting on the numbers, we heard a voice ask, 'tower, what do you want us to do?' to which tower replied, 'go around.' I then had an uneasy feeling, and asked my copilot to confirm that we had been cleared into position. Tower replied 'negative, you were cleared to hold short.' this incident occurred at dusk, on an overcast day, the lights I saw on final were not an airliner on long final, but a smaller airplane closer to the runway. Our initial communication from tower had put in my mind the thought of back-taxiing into position, and also, by telling me that we were #1 for takeoff, I had the implied feeling that they wanted to get my flight right off. We had been on duty since early am (not counting the required time to get to work). My copilot and I had been up since early morning. This was the fifth leg of a 6 flight day, 13 hours 38 mins on duty. Our first 3 flts were in IMC conditions, with 2 approachs to CAT ii mins. Our whole day was in constant chop, and, at the time of this occurrence, fatigue was setting in. Although tower had utilized proper terminology, the abnormal 'back- taxi to the end' option, combined with revised instructions, preoccupation with wing clearance, mis- perception of traffic on the approach, WX conditions, and crew fatigue, created a very unsafe situation. In my opinion, as long as acrs are allowed to schedule crew members to the limits of endurance, and other uncontrollable factors are introduced, more unsafe sits will continue to happen. Supplemental information from acn 254401: unverified assumptions: I had thought/assumed that the captain had heard and understood the tower's instruction to hold short, and my acknowledgment of the 'hold short.' as we later discussed, the captain thought/assumed that we had been cleared 'into position and hold.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH RWY ENTRY OP.

Narrative: RWY 28L IN USE. TAXIING EBOUND ON TXWY D, AT CMH, TWR INFORMED US THAT WE WERE #1 FOR TKOF AND ASKED IF WE WANTED TO 'TAXI DOWN RWY 23, AND BACK TAXI INTO POS, OR IF WE WOULD BE ABLE TO 'DEPART FROM THE INTXN.' THERE WAS ANOTHER ACR MLG IN THE BLOCK AND TWR COULD NOT TELL IF WE WOULD HAVE ACCESS UTILIZING THE NORMAL TAXI RTE. WE TOLD TWR WE REQUESTED THE FULL LENGTH, BUT, AFTER TURNING THE CORNER WE NOTICED, AND INFORMED TWR, THAT WE HAD ACCESS TO THE RWY BY PROCEEDING STRAIGHT AHEAD, PASSING BY THE MLG. TWR TOLD US AND COPLT ACKNOWLEDGED TO 'TAXI STRAIGHT AHEAD AND HOLD SHORT.' I WAS CONCENTRATING ON MY WINGTIP CLRNC, LOOKING OUT MY L SIDE, AND SEEING THE PLT OF THE MLG GIVING ME A THUMBS-UP SIGN CONFIRMING ADEQUATE ROOM. IN MY MIND, I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT I HAD BEEN CLRED TO TAXI STRAIGHT AHEAD ONTO THE RWY AND HOLD. PRIOR TO ENTERING THE RWY, I LOOKED AT THE APCH PATH AND SAW LNDG LIGHTS OF WHAT I ASSUMED WAS AN AIRLINER ON A SEVERAL MI FINAL. I TAXIED ONTO THE RWY AND TURNED INTO POS, AWAITING MY TKOF CLRNC. WHILE WAITING ON THE NUMBERS, WE HEARD A VOICE ASK, 'TWR, WHAT DO YOU WANT US TO DO?' TO WHICH TWR REPLIED, 'GAR.' I THEN HAD AN UNEASY FEELING, AND ASKED MY COPLT TO CONFIRM THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED INTO POS. TWR REPLIED 'NEGATIVE, YOU WERE CLRED TO HOLD SHORT.' THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED AT DUSK, ON AN OVCST DAY, THE LIGHTS I SAW ON FINAL WERE NOT AN AIRLINER ON LONG FINAL, BUT A SMALLER AIRPLANE CLOSER TO THE RWY. OUR INITIAL COM FROM TWR HAD PUT IN MY MIND THE THOUGHT OF BACK-TAXIING INTO POS, AND ALSO, BY TELLING ME THAT WE WERE #1 FOR TKOF, I HAD THE IMPLIED FEELING THAT THEY WANTED TO GET MY FLT RIGHT OFF. WE HAD BEEN ON DUTY SINCE EARLY AM (NOT COUNTING THE REQUIRED TIME TO GET TO WORK). MY COPLT AND I HAD BEEN UP SINCE EARLY MORNING. THIS WAS THE FIFTH LEG OF A 6 FLT DAY, 13 HRS 38 MINS ON DUTY. OUR FIRST 3 FLTS WERE IN IMC CONDITIONS, WITH 2 APCHS TO CAT II MINS. OUR WHOLE DAY WAS IN CONSTANT CHOP, AND, AT THE TIME OF THIS OCCURRENCE, FATIGUE WAS SETTING IN. ALTHOUGH TWR HAD UTILIZED PROPER TERMINOLOGY, THE ABNORMAL 'BACK- TAXI TO THE END' OPTION, COMBINED WITH REVISED INSTRUCTIONS, PREOCCUPATION WITH WING CLRNC, MIS- PERCEPTION OF TFC ON THE APCH, WX CONDITIONS, AND CREW FATIGUE, CREATED A VERY UNSAFE SIT. IN MY OPINION, AS LONG AS ACRS ARE ALLOWED TO SCHEDULE CREW MEMBERS TO THE LIMITS OF ENDURANCE, AND OTHER UNCTLABLE FACTORS ARE INTRODUCED, MORE UNSAFE SITS WILL CONTINUE TO HAPPEN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 254401: UNVERIFIED ASSUMPTIONS: I HAD THOUGHT/ASSUMED THAT THE CAPT HAD HEARD AND UNDERSTOOD THE TWR'S INSTRUCTION TO HOLD SHORT, AND MY ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE 'HOLD SHORT.' AS WE LATER DISCUSSED, THE CAPT THOUGHT/ASSUMED THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED 'INTO POS AND HOLD.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.