Narrative:

I had received a call from crew scheduling at XA30 CDT oct/sun/93 that a captain was needed to fly from msp to nkt to nbw. The flight required a report time of XE10 on oct/mon/93. I only managed to receive about 1 hour rest before leaving for the airport after being awake all day sunday. We departed from msp with an augmented crew of 2 capts, 1 first officer, and 2 so's. I flew as first officer from msp to nkt. I flew as the captain from nkt to nbw. At the time the incident occurred, I had about 1 hours sleep in a 36 hour period. Limited time was available for proper planning by both dispatch planning and the flight crew. I was not aware of the hazards associated with an approach to runway 10 at nbw. We were planning an approach to runway 28. As we approached on a left base leg for runway 28, we received a report that the winds were from the ese and favored runway 10. I then made a left turn and flew for runway 10. Because the nbw reservation airspace is only 3/4 of a mi from the approach end of runway 10, it allows for a very short final after completion of the turn to final. I was making a right turn to final. The winds were from right to left. As I was in the flare for landing, the heading of the aircraft caused me to drift toward the upwind side of the runway. The touchdown was normal but the right main gear was just to the right of the runway edge. The aircraft touchdown was just short of the 2000 ft marker. The right main landing gear was just off the edge of the runway. The right main landing gear struck one runway edge light. I maneuvered the aircraft so that the right main landing gear returned to the runway at approximately the 3000 ft marker. There was no damage to the aircraft. There was a small cut on the #7 tire. Attached is a copy of the approach procedures into nbw. We had not received this information prior to our landing at nbw. I believe what contributed to this incident were: a hurry to accept a flight without proper planning, information, and rest. Fatigue which caused me to not immediately recognize that the aircraft was not aligned properly to remain over the runway at touchdown. Supplemental information from acn 254421: wind 130/10 (overshooting). Right base 3/4 mi intercept of final approach required by local procedure. The glide path was properly maintained. The aircraft was continuously in position to make a normal, safe landing. I felt comfortable with the approach until the very end. I did not want to fight him for the controls. Supplemental information from acn 254959: the wind was overshooting. I pointed that out with a call that we were overshooting. Some difficulty in interpreting navy ball system. No VASI. I called out '1000 ft sink.' probably 500 ft AGL. Insufficient rest. Unfamiliar with base. Minimal approach plates. Needed more information on nbw from the company. Unstabilized approach. Restr to within 3/4 mi due to cuban airspace. Fatigue? Supplemental information from acn 254617: our briefing for this mission was inadequate. We should have landed with a tailwind and used more flaps. As an observer during this incident, I could have helped in the decision making to change runways and did not do so.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR WDB BROKE 2 RWY LIGHTS ON LNDG.

Narrative: I HAD RECEIVED A CALL FROM CREW SCHEDULING AT XA30 CDT OCT/SUN/93 THAT A CAPT WAS NEEDED TO FLY FROM MSP TO NKT TO NBW. THE FLT REQUIRED A RPT TIME OF XE10 ON OCT/MON/93. I ONLY MANAGED TO RECEIVE ABOUT 1 HR REST BEFORE LEAVING FOR THE ARPT AFTER BEING AWAKE ALL DAY SUNDAY. WE DEPARTED FROM MSP WITH AN AUGMENTED CREW OF 2 CAPTS, 1 FO, AND 2 SO'S. I FLEW AS FO FROM MSP TO NKT. I FLEW AS THE CAPT FROM NKT TO NBW. AT THE TIME THE INCIDENT OCCURRED, I HAD ABOUT 1 HRS SLEEP IN A 36 HR PERIOD. LIMITED TIME WAS AVAILABLE FOR PROPER PLANNING BY BOTH DISPATCH PLANNING AND THE FLC. I WAS NOT AWARE OF THE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH AN APCH TO RWY 10 AT NBW. WE WERE PLANNING AN APCH TO RWY 28. AS WE APCHED ON A L BASE LEG FOR RWY 28, WE RECEIVED A RPT THAT THE WINDS WERE FROM THE ESE AND FAVORED RWY 10. I THEN MADE A L TURN AND FLEW FOR RWY 10. BECAUSE THE NBW RESERVATION AIRSPACE IS ONLY 3/4 OF A MI FROM THE APCH END OF RWY 10, IT ALLOWS FOR A VERY SHORT FINAL AFTER COMPLETION OF THE TURN TO FINAL. I WAS MAKING A R TURN TO FINAL. THE WINDS WERE FROM R TO L. AS I WAS IN THE FLARE FOR LNDG, THE HDG OF THE ACFT CAUSED ME TO DRIFT TOWARD THE UPWIND SIDE OF THE RWY. THE TOUCHDOWN WAS NORMAL BUT THE R MAIN GEAR WAS JUST TO THE R OF THE RWY EDGE. THE ACFT TOUCHDOWN WAS JUST SHORT OF THE 2000 FT MARKER. THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR WAS JUST OFF THE EDGE OF THE RWY. THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR STRUCK ONE RWY EDGE LIGHT. I MANEUVERED THE ACFT SO THAT THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR RETURNED TO THE RWY AT APPROX THE 3000 FT MARKER. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. THERE WAS A SMALL CUT ON THE #7 TIRE. ATTACHED IS A COPY OF THE APCH PROCS INTO NBW. WE HAD NOT RECEIVED THIS INFO PRIOR TO OUR LNDG AT NBW. I BELIEVE WHAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT WERE: A HURRY TO ACCEPT A FLT WITHOUT PROPER PLANNING, INFO, AND REST. FATIGUE WHICH CAUSED ME TO NOT IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZE THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT ALIGNED PROPERLY TO REMAIN OVER THE RWY AT TOUCHDOWN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 254421: WIND 130/10 (OVERSHOOTING). R BASE 3/4 MI INTERCEPT OF FINAL APCH REQUIRED BY LCL PROC. THE GLIDE PATH WAS PROPERLY MAINTAINED. THE ACFT WAS CONTINUOUSLY IN POS TO MAKE A NORMAL, SAFE LNDG. I FELT COMFORTABLE WITH THE APCH UNTIL THE VERY END. I DID NOT WANT TO FIGHT HIM FOR THE CTLS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 254959: THE WIND WAS OVERSHOOTING. I POINTED THAT OUT WITH A CALL THAT WE WERE OVERSHOOTING. SOME DIFFICULTY IN INTERPRETING NAVY BALL SYS. NO VASI. I CALLED OUT '1000 FT SINK.' PROBABLY 500 FT AGL. INSUFFICIENT REST. UNFAMILIAR WITH BASE. MINIMAL APCH PLATES. NEEDED MORE INFO ON NBW FROM THE COMPANY. UNSTABILIZED APCH. RESTR TO WITHIN 3/4 MI DUE TO CUBAN AIRSPACE. FATIGUE? SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 254617: OUR BRIEFING FOR THIS MISSION WAS INADEQUATE. WE SHOULD HAVE LANDED WITH A TAILWIND AND USED MORE FLAPS. AS AN OBSERVER DURING THIS INCIDENT, I COULD HAVE HELPED IN THE DECISION MAKING TO CHANGE RWYS AND DID NOT DO SO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.