Narrative:

Bfl approach was operating under non-radar procedures due to a scheduled radar outage. The procedures being used were contrary to procedures specified in the 7110.65H manual, and were considered to be unsafe by most of the center controllers in area B and many of the first line supervisors. The procedures were agreed to by area B manager, the area B specialist, and the qtp committee over the objections of the controllers in the area. I was working the handoff position and had passed several inbound estimates to approach, when I received a call from bfl with an estimate for wring intersection on an medium large transport departing bfl, climbing to 6000 ft. I was a little surprised at this since I had not received departure coordination from approach or tower as is required by paragraph 4-36 of the 7110.65H. Approach asked for a higher altitude on the medium large transport. I informed them that I was unable to approve higher due to the aircraft Y that I had just given them estimates on. The controller informed me that they would put the aircraft in a hold at wring and hung up. Since the procedures called for approach to keep the departure on the frequency until center approves higher, I did not question how they were going to hold at wring where there is no published holding pattern. The radar controller and I were both at a loss as to what to do with the aircraft when it reported on our frequency, entering holding at 6000 ft. We had already terminated radar on the inbound aircraft that was descending to 7000 ft and we assumed that it would be entering holding at arvin at 7000 ft. I was about to call approach to find out what they wanted to do to separate the 2 aircraft when we saw the arrival aircraft descending out of 7000 ft. An area supervisor, who was standing behind the sector saw the situation and called bfl to find out what kind of separation they were using between the 2 non-radar aircraft. When the medium large transport aircraft turned towards the north in his holding pattern, and was clear of the arrival route, the radar controller climbed the aircraft clear of approach control airspace. When we were relieved from the sector, we wrote statements on the situation. I was very surprised to find out later that this incident was being treated as a non- occurrence. I think that this is just a warning of possibly more serious incidents to come in the future if something is not done about this dangerous procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X POSSIBLE LTSS FROM ACFT Y. POSSIBLE SYS ERROR.

Narrative: BFL APCH WAS OPERATING UNDER NON-RADAR PROCS DUE TO A SCHEDULED RADAR OUTAGE. THE PROCS BEING USED WERE CONTRARY TO PROCS SPECIFIED IN THE 7110.65H MANUAL, AND WERE CONSIDERED TO BE UNSAFE BY MOST OF THE CTR CTLRS IN AREA B AND MANY OF THE FIRST LINE SUPVRS. THE PROCS WERE AGREED TO BY AREA B MGR, THE AREA B SPECIALIST, AND THE QTP COMMITTEE OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF THE CTLRS IN THE AREA. I WAS WORKING THE HDOF POS AND HAD PASSED SEVERAL INBOUND ESTIMATES TO APCH, WHEN I RECEIVED A CALL FROM BFL WITH AN ESTIMATE FOR WRING INTXN ON AN MLG DEPARTING BFL, CLBING TO 6000 FT. I WAS A LITTLE SURPRISED AT THIS SINCE I HAD NOT RECEIVED DEP COORD FROM APCH OR TWR AS IS REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH 4-36 OF THE 7110.65H. APCH ASKED FOR A HIGHER ALT ON THE MLG. I INFORMED THEM THAT I WAS UNABLE TO APPROVE HIGHER DUE TO THE ACFT Y THAT I HAD JUST GIVEN THEM ESTIMATES ON. THE CTLR INFORMED ME THAT THEY WOULD PUT THE ACFT IN A HOLD AT WRING AND HUNG UP. SINCE THE PROCS CALLED FOR APCH TO KEEP THE DEP ON THE FREQ UNTIL CTR APPROVES HIGHER, I DID NOT QUESTION HOW THEY WERE GOING TO HOLD AT WRING WHERE THERE IS NO PUBLISHED HOLDING PATTERN. THE RADAR CTLR AND I WERE BOTH AT A LOSS AS TO WHAT TO DO WITH THE ACFT WHEN IT RPTED ON OUR FREQ, ENTERING HOLDING AT 6000 FT. WE HAD ALREADY TERMINATED RADAR ON THE INBOUND ACFT THAT WAS DSNDING TO 7000 FT AND WE ASSUMED THAT IT WOULD BE ENTERING HOLDING AT ARVIN AT 7000 FT. I WAS ABOUT TO CALL APCH TO FIND OUT WHAT THEY WANTED TO DO TO SEPARATE THE 2 ACFT WHEN WE SAW THE ARR ACFT DSNDING OUT OF 7000 FT. AN AREA SUPVR, WHO WAS STANDING BEHIND THE SECTOR SAW THE SIT AND CALLED BFL TO FIND OUT WHAT KIND OF SEPARATION THEY WERE USING BTWN THE 2 NON-RADAR ACFT. WHEN THE MLG ACFT TURNED TOWARDS THE N IN HIS HOLDING PATTERN, AND WAS CLR OF THE ARR RTE, THE RADAR CTLR CLBED THE ACFT CLR OF APCH CTL AIRSPACE. WHEN WE WERE RELIEVED FROM THE SECTOR, WE WROTE STATEMENTS ON THE SIT. I WAS VERY SURPRISED TO FIND OUT LATER THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS BEING TREATED AS A NON- OCCURRENCE. I THINK THAT THIS IS JUST A WARNING OF POSSIBLY MORE SERIOUS INCIDENTS TO COME IN THE FUTURE IF SOMETHING IS NOT DONE ABOUT THIS DANGEROUS PROC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.